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Case of the Mexican Banking Industry
Chu V. Nguyen

Charles Smith*

Justo Manrique

Abstract
Asymmetries in the Mexican lending-deposit rate spread were documented. Empirical results
revealed that the lending-deposit rate spread adjusts to the threshold faster when the deposit rates
fall relative to the lending rates than when the deposit rates move in the opposite direction This
non-predatory rate setting behavior in the highly concentrated market may be attributable to the
rise in foreign bank entry, which has fostered market contestability over the sample period. The
empirical results also revealed the bidirectional Granger causality between the lending rate and
the deposit rate, indicating that the lending rate and the deposit rate affect each other’s
movement.
Key Words: Asymmetry; lending rate; deposit rate; lending-deposit rate spread; Mexican
predatory pricing behavior.
JEL classification codes: C22; E44; G21.
Introduction
The financial sector in general and
commercial banks in particular play a
significant
role
in
promoting
the
industrialization and economic development
of a country and are well documented in
financial economics literature. This sector is
expected to provide efficient intermediation to
mobilize savings and channel them into
productive investments and thus promote
industrialization
and
development.
Additionally, the banking sector is an integral
part of the monetary policy transmission
mechanism. These intermediaries would
derive their interest income from the spread
between the lending rate charged to borrowers
and the deposit rate paid to savers. Economic
theory has articulated that if the lending rates
or spread is high, it would reflect inefficiency
and/or lack of competition, and keep the
financial sector from fulfilling its expected
role in the economic development process.
Furthermore, commercial banks’ behavior in
setting their deposit and lending rates
significantly influences the effectiveness of
the monetary authority in its monetary
policymaking.1

As suggested by Thompson (2006), banks
may set their lending rates as some markup or
premium over their deposit rates. If the
premium is perceived to be too high or too
low, the market forces will discipline banks to
adjust back to some equilibrium spread. More
importantly, part of any market determined
lending rate, and hence lending-deposit rate
spread, is risk premium. Therefore, despite
conventional
microeconomic
theoretical
articulation otherwise, operating in a highly
concentrated market, charging high nominal
lending rates or lending-deposit rate spread,
and asymmetrically pricing financial products
are necessary, but not sufficient, evidence of
exhibiting oligopolistic/monopolistic market
power by financial institutions in the context
of predatory pricing. A highly concentrated
market, high lending rate or lending-deposit
rate spread, coupled with the predatory
asymmetric rate-setting ability are stronger
evidence of market power.
The evidence of asymmetric rate-setting
behavior in the banking industry supports the
literature hypothesizing the asymmetric effects
of monetary policy on output. There are three
main theoretical explanations for commercial
bank interest rate asymmetries: bank
2
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concentration
hypothesis,
consumer
characteristic hypothesis, and consumer
reaction hypothesis.2
The bank concentration hypothesis posits that
banks in more concentrated markets are
slower to adjust deposit rates upward and
faster to adjust them downward while
exhibiting the opposite behavior regarding
lending rates (Neumark and Sharpe, 1992;
Hannan and Berger, 1991). The consumer
characteristic hypothesis asserts that the
greater the proportion of unsophisticated
consumers relative to sophisticated consumers
in the market, together with the potential
search and switching costs, the greater the
banks’ ability to adjust interest rates to their
advantage (Calem and Mester, 1995;
Hutchison, 1995; Rosen, 2002).
However, the asymmetric adjustment in
lending rates may actually benefit the
consumers. As articulated by Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981), the presence of asymmetric
information may create an adverse selection
problem in lending markets such that higher
interest rates will tend to attract riskier
borrowers. Therefore, banks would be
reluctant to raise lending rates, even if market
rates rise. The expected cost to the banks of
not raising the lending rates when their
marginal cost of fund increases, will be offset
by the benefits from not encouraging the
higher-risk consumers to borrow.
Additionally, the asymmetric rate-setting in
the context of rates of return on financial
market instruments in developed economies
has been empirically documented in financial
economics literature. Arak et al. (1983),
Goldberg (1984), Forbes and Mayne (1989),
Levine and Loeb (1989), Mester and Saunders
(1995), Dueker (2000), and Tkacz (2001) have
reported asymmetries in the U.S. prime
lending rate in the past. Thompson (2006)
found asymmetries in the U.S. prime lendingdeposit rate spread. Cook and Hahn (1989),
Moazzami (1999), and Sarno and Thornton
(2003) found asymmetries in U.S. Treasury
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securities in their studies. Frost and Bowden
(1999) and Scholnick (1999) reported
asymmetries in mortgage rates in New
Zealand, and Canada. Heffernan (1997) and
Hofmann and Mizen (2004) indicated
asymmetric behavior of retail rates in the
United Kingdom. Hannan and Berger (1991),
Neumark and Sharpe (1992), and Diebold and
Sharpe (1990) examine various deposit rates
for the same behavior.
The Mexican Financial Sector
The Mexican economy has experienced some
adverse financial phenomena in the recent
history: the debt overhang in the 1980s, the
Tequila attack in the early 1990s, and most
recently the contagion of the U.S. subprime
mortgage crisis. The banking system was
nationalized and privatized to complete the
circle to the current state of the system of an
emerging economy.3 The central bank of
Mexico (Banco de México) regulates the
money supply and foreign exchange markets,
sets reserve requirements for Mexican banks,
and enforces credit controls. It serves as the
fiscal agent of the federal government, the
issuing bank for the peso, and as a discount
house for private deposit banks. It supervises
the private banking sector through the
National Banking Commission.
As pointed out in the IMF Country Report (no
01/192, October 2001, p. 9), Mexico, up to the
early 1990s, had most of the financial
institutions found in the financial systems of
industrial countries, but the degree of
development
across
sectors
varied
significantly. The banking sector dominated
the financial system. Large conglomerates
headed by banks normally provided private
financial services. State-owned banks were
involved in development-related lending, and
housing finance. Nonbanking institutions
included finance and factoring companies,
specialized investment funds, pension funds,
and insurance companies (IMF Country
Report no 01/192, October 2001, p. 10).

3
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In regard to the banking system, Blavy and
Souto (2009, p. 7) characterized the Mexican
banking system as having a low level of
financial intermediation, with bank credit to
the private sector substantially lower than in
comparator countries. Moreover, the authors
observed that an important share of banks’
assets was devoted to holdings of public sector
debt instruments. However, the banking sector
consumer- and mortgage-lending increased
significantly, starting in early 2000. For
example, from 2002 to 2007, consumerlending increasing on average increased by
over 40 percent each year from 2002 to 2007
(Blavy and Souto 2009, p. 7). More recently,
consumer-lending has slowed greatly, while
credit to firms picked up in the last two years.
Following the currency crisis of late 1994,
known as the Tequila attack, the government
was forced to raise interest rates sharply in
order to protect the peso’s value by retaining
existing short-term foreign investment and
attracting new capital inflows. High interest
rates during 1995 sharply increased the
payments owed by Mexican individual and
business borrowers, many of whom could not
shoulder the increased burden. As a result, the
share of nonperforming to performing loans
held by Mexican banks rose significantly,
creating a major crisis for the financial sector.
As pointed out by Zanforlin and Espinosa
(2008, p. 5) the sharp interest rate spike in the
aftermath of the Tequila crisis triggered a
wave of bank mortgage defaults. The majority
of mortgage lending in the early 1990s had
adjustable interest rates. After the crisis,
commercial banks relinquished almost entirely
the origination of real estate mortgages to
nonbank financial institutions and public
sector entities. In 1994 nonbank financial
intermediaries that specialized in real estate
mortgages (Sofoles) were created, with their
core market consisting of low-income
households.
Additionally, as pointed out in IMF Country
Report (no 01/192, October 2001, p. 12),
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another consequence of the Tequila attack is a
contractionary trend in the banking industry.
After the crisis, banking system assets shrank
from 55 percent of GDP at the end of 1994 to
37 percent of GDP at the end of 2000. Even
more spectacular was the contraction of bank
credit to the private sector—it represented 76
percent of bank assets (43 percent of GDP) at
the end of 1994, and shrank to the equivalent
of 22 percent of bank asset (10 percent of
GDP) at the end of 2000.
In the face of the Tequila crisis and its
attendant economic and financial difficulties,
the Mexican economy underwent a significant
transformation to comply with the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
implemented in January 1994 and one year
later -- to the day – with the World Trade
Organization (WTO) agreement. Complying
with the NAFTA and WTO is an important
undertaking for developing nations. NAFTA
and WTO memberships, without a doubt,
change the characteristics and the complexity
of the Mexican economy. Tariffs in all sectors
are decreased substantially over time. Being a
member of NAFTA and WTO also entails a
wide array of commitments from Mexico to
reduce trade-distorting subsidies, establish
foreign companies’ trading rights, and comply
with the full range of NAFTA and WTO rules
and regulations. The distribution sector has to
be opened up from the date of accession to
foreign companies engaging in joint ventures
with domestic partners that are allowed to
operate in all but a few specific sectors or
activities.
In regard to engagement of foreign banks in
Mexico, Blavy and Souto (2009, p. 7) reported
that the banking sector is highly concentrated,
and dominated by foreign-owned banks. To
substantiate their position, these authors cited
that BBVA Bancomer, Banco Mercantil del
Norte, Banco Nacional de México, Banco
Santander, HSBC and Scotiabank Inverlat are
the six largest banks in Mexico. Five of them
are foreign owned. More striking, (IMF
4
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Country Report no 01/192, October 2001, p.
13), has been the rise in foreign participation
in the Mexican banking system, as the share in
total assets of foreign-controlled banks rose
from 24 percent in 1998 to nearly 50 percent
at the end of 2000, and will reach over 70
percent when the purchase of Banamex by
Citigroup is completed.
Thus, across this spectrum of events, it can be
arguably posited that, over the NAFTA and
WTO membership era, Mexican banks have
been operating in fairly concentrated markets.
The most important question is: does highly
concentrated market inevitably lead to
predatory
pricing
behavior
as
oligopolistic/monopolistic economic theory
suggested? More specifically, do asymmetries
exist in the Mexican lending-deposit rate
spread, and if so, do such asymmetries reveal
that the Mexican banks engage in
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oligopolistic/monopolistic or competitive ratesetting behavior? Second, if asymmetries are
present, how do lending and deposit rates
respond to such asymmetries? The remainder
of this study is organized as follows: the next
section describes the data used in this study
and its descriptive statistics; the following
section briefly describes the methodology used
in the investigation; the section that follows
reports the empirical results; and the final
section provides concluding remarks.
Data
To study the market power of Mexican banks
in the NAFTA and WTO membership era by
investigating the asymmetries in the Mexican
lending-deposit rate spread, this analysis
utilizes monthly data from International
Financial Statistics, published by the IMF,
over the period of 1995:02 to 2010:01.

Mexican Lending Rates and Deposit Rates
February 1995 to January 2010
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Figure 1
Figure 1 displays the behavior of the resulting spreads were very high by
respective lending and deposit rates over the international standards, raising questions as to
sample period (correlation = 0.975). The mean whether the risk premium or the
lending rate during this period is 17.13 oligopolistic/monopolistic power led to this
percent, and ranges from 5.15 to 91.97. The phenomenon in the NAFTA and WTO era in
mean deposit rate over the same period is 9.77 Mexico.
percent, and ranges from 1.30 to 57.51 These Methodology
descriptive statistics indicate that the lending As aforementioned, the Mexican economy and
rates are high relative to deposit rates and the its financial sector have gone through many
5
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changes and experienced many economic TAR model empirically reveals whether the
shocks; therefore, it is possible that the spread tends to revert to the long-run position
lending rates and the deposit rates might faster when the spread is above or below the
experience structural breaks over the sample threshold. Therefore, the estimated TAR
period. To avoid possible misspecification of model indicates whether troughs or peaks
equation (1) due to failure to account for persist more when shocks push the spread out
structural shifts and hence the entire model, of its long term path. For instance, if the
following Perron (1997) procedure, this study autoregressive decay is fast when the spread is
specified and estimated an endogenous unit above the trend and slow when the spread is
root test function with the intercept, slope, and below the trend, troughs will be more
the trend dummies to test the hypothesis that persistent than peaks.
Likewise, if the
the Mexican lending rates and the deposit rates autoregressive decay is slow when the spread
have experienced structural shifts over the is above trend and fast when the spread is
sample period. The estimation results of these below trend, peaks will be more persistent
tests suggest that both the Mexican lending than troughs In this model’s specification, the
rates and the deposit rates might experience null hypothesis that the lending-deposit rate
structural breaks in March 2001, possibly due spread contains a unit root can be expressed as
to the impact of the recession in the US—its
ρ1 = ρ 2 = 0 , while the hypothesis that the
Northern neighbor and major trading partner. spread is stationary with symmetric
However, the test statistics rejected this adjustments can be stated as ρ = ρ .
1
2
suggested possibility at any conventional level
Enders and Siklos (2001) extended the popular
of significance (see the Appendix).
two-step symmetric Engle-Granger (1987)
Given the result of the structural break tests
methodology to test for long-run relationships
and to investigate the aforementioned concern,
between two time series allowing for
the threshold autoregressive (TAR) model
asymmetry. As demonstrated by Enders-Siklos
developed by Enders and Siklos (2001) is
(2001), the first step in the procedure is to
estimated to formally examine the behavior of
follow the Engel-Granger (1987) methodology
the Mexican lending-deposit rate spread. The
to estimate the following long-run relationship
threshold autoregressive model allows the
between the Mexican lending rate and deposit
degree of autoregressive decay to depend on
rate
using
ordinary
least
squares.
the state of the lending-deposit rate spread,
(i.e., “deepness” of cycles). The estimated
LRt = β 0 + β1 DRt + β 2 Dummyt + β 3Trend t + ε t
(1)
where LRt and DRt are denoted as the lending saved residuals, ε t from the estimation of
rate and the deposit rate, respectively. Trend t
equation (1), denoted by εˆt , are then used to
is a time trend and Dummyt is a dummy (with estimate the following TAR model:
values of zero prior to March 2001 and values
of one for March 2001 and thereafter). The
p
∆εˆt = I t ρ1εˆt −1 + (1 − I t ) ρ 2 εˆt −1 + ∑i =1 α i ∆εˆt − p + uˆ t
(2)
where uˆ t ~ i.i.d .(0, σ 2 ) , and the lagged values
of ∆εˆt are meant to yield uncorrelated
residuals. As defined by Enders and Granger

(1998), the Heaviside indicator function for
the model is given as:

6
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if εˆt −1 ≥ τ
1
It = 
(3)
if εˆt −1 < τ
0
The threshold value, τ , is endogenously
determined using the Chan (1993) procedure,
which obtains τ by minimizing the sum of
squared residuals after sorting the estimated
residuals in ascending order, and eliminating
15 percent of the largest and smallest values.
The elimination of the largest and smallest
values is to assure that the εˆt series crosses
through the threshold in the sample period.
Empirical Results
The estimation results of the model are
summarized in Table 1. An analysis of the
overall empirical results indicates that the
estimation results are devoid of serial
correlation and have good predicting power, as
evidenced by the Ljung-Box statistics and the
overall F-statistics, respectively. With the
calculated statistic Φ µ = 66.5866, the null
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(i.e., the spread is stationary). As to the speed
of adjustment, based on the partial test statistic
F = 51.3378, the null hypothesis of symmetry,
ρ1 = ρ2 , is rejected at any conventional
significance level. Thus, the empirical results
indicate that adjustments around the threshold
value of the Mexican lending-deposit rate
spread are asymmetric. In fact, the point
estimates suggest that the spread tends to
decay at the rate of ρ1 = 0.6292 for εˆt −1 above
the threshold, τ = 1.7837 , and at the rate of
ρ 2 = 0.1132 for εˆt −1 below the threshold.
Both ρ1 and ρ 2 are statistically significant at
1 percent level. Furthermore, the estimates of
ρ1 and ρ2 satisfy the stationary (convergence)
conditions.4 With regard to the stationarity of
the basis, Ewing et al. (2006, p. 14) pointed
out that this simple finding is consistent with
the two underlying series that comprise the
basis being co-integrated in the conventional,
linear combination sense.

hypothesis of a unit root ( ρ1 = ρ 2 = 0 ) is
rejected at the 1 percent significance level
Table 1: Unit Root and Tests of Asymmetry, Mexican Monthly Data, 1995:02 to 2010:01
τ
aic
H 0 : ρ1 = ρ 2 = 0
H 0 : ρ1 = ρ 2
ρ1
ρ2
-0.6292*

-0.1132*

1.7837

QLB (2)=4.0920[0.1292]

Φ µ = 66.5866*

F = 51.3378*

ln L = -267.9745

F(4,173)=41.1168*

Notes: The null hypothesis of a unit root, H 0 : ρ1 =

ρ2 = 0 ,

0.0404

uses the critical values from Enders and Siklos

(2001, p. 170, Table 1, for four lagged changes and n = 100).”*” and”**” indicate 1 and 5 percent levels of
significance. The null hypothesis of symmetry, H 0 : ρ1 = ρ 2 , uses the standard F distribution. τ is the threshold
value determined via the Chan (1993) method. QLB (2) denotes the Ljung-Box Q-statistic with 2 lags.

With regard to the adjustment process, given
ρ1 > ρ 2 , the Mexican lending-deposit rate
spread adjusts to the threshold value faster
when monetary policy action or economic
shock causes the deposit rates to fall relative
to the lending rates, widening the spread, than
when the deposit rates move in the opposite
direction, narrowing the spread. These
findings contradict those reported by

Thompson (2006) in the U.S. with respect to
the prime rate and the secondary market onemonth CD rate, and seem to support the
position articulated by the consumer-reaction
hypothesis articulated by Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981), that the presence of asymmetric
information may create an adverse selection
problem in lending markets such that higher
interest rates will tend to attract riskier
borrowers. These empirical findings seem to
7
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suggest strongly that the observed high NAFTA and WTO membership era, is likely
lending rate and deposit-lending rate spread be explained by the rise in foreign bank entry,
attributable to the risk profile of the Mexican which has fostered market contestability (IMF
economy.
Country Report no 01/192, October 2001, p.
More interestingly, these empirical findings 33).
parallel the standard econometric simulation Results of the Asymmetric Errorresults conducted by the IMF’s Financial Correction Model
Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) mission The presence of asymmetric adjustments in
that supports the hypothesis that “observed the Mexican lending-deposit rate spread, as
interest rates and loan quantities have been indicated by the above estimation results,
statistically equivalent to those a competitive necessitates the estimation of a TAR VEC
system would have produced.” This suggests model to further investigate the short-run and
that the larger players have not exhibited long-run dynamics with respect to the lending
predatory pricing behavior. The lack of rate ( LRt ) and the deposit rate ( DRt ).
evidence on predatory pricing behavior in
spite of the increased concentration, over the
∆LRt = α 0 + ρ1 I t εˆt −1 + ρ 2 (1 − I t )εˆt −1 + A11 ( L)∆LRt −i + A12 ( L)∆DRt −i + u1t
(4)
~
~
~
∆DRt = α 0 + ρ 1 I t εˆ t −1 + ρ 2 (1 − I t )εˆ t −1 + A21 ( L)∆LRt −i + A22 ( L)∆DRt −i + u 2t
(5)
where u1,2 t ~ i.i.d .(0,σ 2 ) and I t is set in indicating the 1 and 5 percent significant
levels, respectively. QLB (2) is the Ljung-Box
accordance with equation (3).
As pointed out by Thompson (2006, pp. 327- statistics and its significance is in squared
328), the above specified TAR VEC model brackets, testing for the first six of the residual
differs from the conventional error-correction autocorrelations to be jointly equal to zero. ln
models by allowing asymmetric adjustments L is the log likelihood. The overall F-statistic
toward the long-run equilibrium. Also, the with “*” indicates the significance level of 1
asymmetric error correctional model replaces percent.
the single symmetric error correction term An analysis of the overall empirical results
with two error correction terms. Thus, in indicates that the estimated equations (4) and
addition to estimating the long-run equilibrium (5) are devoid of serial correlation and have
relationship and asymmetric adjustment, the good predicting power as evidenced by the
model also allows for tests of short-run Ljung-Box statistics and the overall Fdynamic between changes in lending rate and statistics, respectively. As to the short-run
deposit rate. This in turn reveals the nature of dynamic adjustment, the calculated partial Fstatistics in equations (4) and (5) indicate
their Granger causality.
Granger-causality
between
The estimation results of the asymmetric error bidirectional
Mexican
lending
and
deposit
rates.
These
correction model are reported in Table 2. In
the summary of the estimation results, Aij(L) results imply that the Mexican lending rate
represents the first-order polynomials in the and deposit rate adjustments affected each
lag operator L. The Fij represents the other’s movements, which parallel those
calculated partial F-statistics with the p-value reported by Thompson with respect to the
in squared brackets testing the null hypothesis prime lending rate and the one-month CD rate
that all coefficients of Aij are equal to zero. in the U.S. banking industry, i.e., there is
The t-statistics are reported with “*” and “**” evidence of Granger bidirectional causality.

8
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Table 2: Asymmetric Error Correction Model, Mexican Monthly Data, 1995:02 to 2010:01
∆LRt t = 0.0568 − 0.3324 I t εˆt −1 + 0.0286(1 − I t )εˆt −1 + A21 ( L)∆LRt t −i + A22 ( L)∆DRt t −i + u1t
0.3759
-3.8237*
0.3246
F11=13.9307[0.000] F21 =17.5226[0.000]
QLB (2) = 0.9000[0.6377]

ln L = -319.5516

F (6,160) =9.3290*

∆DRt t = −0.1233 − 0.1214 I t εˆt −1 + 0.0634(1 − I t )εˆt −1 + A21 ( L)∆LRt t −i + A22 ( L)∆DRt t −i + u 2t
-1.3153 -2.2679 **
1.2917
F21= 27.4639[0.000] F22=32.5082[0.002]
QLB (2) = 5.4230[0.0665]
In addition to revealing the short -run dynamic
Granger-causality, the asymmetric error
correction model also allows the long-run
adjustments of the lending rate, ρ1 > ρ 2 in
equation (4), indicating that the lending rate
adjusts to the long-run equilibrium faster when
the shock widens than when it narrows the
lending-deposit rate spread. This empirical
finding is consistent with the estimation
results of the TAR model. However, while ρ1
is statistically significant at 1 percent, ρ 2 is
not significant at any conventional level.
Economically, this result suggests that the
Mexican lending rate does not respond to
contractionary monetary policy in the long
run. With regard to the long-run adjustment of
the deposit rate, the estimation results for
equation (5) show that ρ~1 > ρ~2 , and only ρ~1
is statistically significant at 5 percent level.
These findings suggest that the deposit rate
only responds to the expansionary monetary
policy, widening the lending-deposit rate
spread, but does not respond to contractionary
monetary policy that narrows the spread in the
long run.
Concluding Remarks
This
study
utilized
the
threshold
autoregressive (TAR) model developed by
Enders and Siklos (2001) to examine the
Mexican banks’ lending-deposit rates setting
behavior. Contrary to conventional wisdom,
the empirical results suggest that Mexican

ln L = -248.6013

F (7,159) =19.5433*

banks do not engage in predatory pricing
strategy that is expected in the concentrated
markets. In fact the Mexican lending ratedeposit rate spread adjusts faster toward the
threshold value when the spread is widening
(i.e., decreasing the deposit rate) than when
the spread is narrowing (i.e., increasing the
deposit rate). These findings contradict those
reported by Thompson (2006) regarding the
responses of the U.S. prime lending rate and
the one-month CD rate to their spread, but
seem to support the consumer reaction
hypothesis articulated by Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981).
With regard to the short-run and long-run
dynamics of the Mexican lending and deposit
rates, the empirical estimations of the
asymmetric error-correction model reveal that
the lending rate and the deposit rate affect
each other’s movement. These bidirectional
Granger causality findings parallel those
reported by Thompson (2006) with respect to
the prime lending rate and the one-month CD
rate. The estimation results further suggest that
the lending rate adjusts to the long-run
equilibrium faster when a shock widens than
when it narrows the lending-deposit rate
spread. However, the estimation results seem
to indicate that the deposit rate only responds
when the spread is widening, not when it is
narrowing in the long-run.
These empirical findings are important
because they indicate that Mexican
contractionary and expansionary monetary
9
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policy actions affect the market rates
differently. The banking system, operating in a
fairly highly concentrated market where five
out of the six largest banks are foreign owned,
is quite wary of high-risk borrowers, and
avoids the high-return and high-risk pricing
strategy. Thus, the high lending rates and the
high market rate spreads are attributable to the
high-risk profile of the economy. The lack of
evidence on predatory pricing behavior in
spite of the increased market concentration is
likely explained by the rise in foreign bank
entry,
which
has
fostered
market
contestability,
Endnotes
1
Sellon (2002) provides a nice overview of the
impact of the changing U.S. financial system
on the interest rate channel for monetary
policy transmission.
2
Scholnick (1999) provides the survey on
these three types of explanations for
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commercial banks’ interest rate asymmetries
in the literature.
3
Mexican
commercial
banks
were
nationalized in 1982 by presidential decree
under the presidential administration of Jose
Lopez Portillo (1976 -1982). Under the
presidential administration of Miguel de la
Madrid Hurtado (1982-88), private sector
institutions were allowed to perform the socalled nonbank functions of the banks, and the
radical liberalization and privatization process
of the Mexican commercial banking system
began in 1987. This radical liberalization and
privatization process was completed in 199192, under the presidential administration of
Carlos Salina de Gortari (1988-94).
4
As shown by Petrucelli and Woolford
(1984), the necessary and sufficient condition
for the basis to be stationary is: ρ1 <0, ρ 2 <0
and (1+ ρ1 )(1+ ρ 2 ) < 1.

Appendix
To endogenous search for the structural break possibility in the time series data Rt , Perron
(1997) procedure with the intercept, slope, and the trend dummy is specified as:
k
Rt = µ + θDU + αt + γDT + δD (Tb ) + β SPt −1 + ∑i =1ψ i ∆Rt −i + υ t
where DU = 1(t > Tb ) is a post-break constant dummy variable; t is a linear time trend;
DT = 1(t > Tb ) is a post-break slope dummy variable; D(Tb ) = 1(t = Tb + 1) is the break dummy
variable; and υt are white-noise error term. The break date, Tb , is selected based on the
minimum t-statistic for testing β = 1 (see Perron, 1997, pp. 358-359). Estimation results using
the Mexican lending rate and deposit rate, LRt and DRt , with lt and dt denoting white noise
error terms, are summarized in Table 3:
Table 3: Perron’s Endogenous Unit Root Test, Mexican Monthly Data, 1995:2 -2010:1
LRt = 6.0649 − 4.9161DU − 0.0503t + 0.0481DT + 0.7119D(Tb ) + 0.8211LRt −1 + lt
(3.7312*)

(-3.3290*)

(2.6699*) (2.5937*)

(0.4283)

(20.5026*)

k = 12 Break Date: March 2001
t (α = 1) = −4.4673
DRt = 3.3525 − 2.7573DU − 0.0339t + 0.0323DT + 0.4110D(Tb ) + 0.8621DRt −1 + d t
No. of augmented lags:

(3.2222*) (-3.1133*) (-2.7370*) (2.7282*)
(0.6020)
(26.1545*)
No. of augmented lags: k = 12 Break Date: March 2001
t (α = 1) = −4.1843
Notes: Critical values for t-statistics in parentheses: Critical values based n = 100 sample for the break date
(Perron, 1997). “*” indicates significance at 1 percent level.
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Life Insurers’ Switch to Private Debt Holdings: The Duration Model
Fan Liu, PhD
Abstract
Life insurers as major lenders in the private debt market must have relevant characteristics to
match the special needs of private debt such as having the ability to evaluate the credit quality of
borrowers and performing ongoing risk monitoring. The purpose of this paper is to examine the
determinants of life insurers’ switch from no private debt holdings to private debt holdings. The
results suggest that life insurers with fair or good financial strength rating scores, facing stringent
regulation, having more percentage of foreign holdings and less cash holdings are more likely to
switch from no private debt holdings to private debt holdings.
Introduction
In the United States, private placements
(including debts and equities) are offerings of
debts or equity securities that are not
registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). They are generally fixedrate, intermediate-to-long-term securities, with
individual issues being for moderately larger
amounts and often including restrictive
covenants and can be thought of as lying
between bank loans and public bonds in their
maturity, size and tightness of covenants. In
1990, the SEC further adopted Rule144A to
develop a new market for privately placed
debt which splits the private debt market into
two segments: the traditional market and a
new Rule144A market.
Lenders in the private debt market engage in
extensive credit evaluations of the potential
borrowers and perform ongoing loan
monitoring since borrowers in this market tend
to be less well-know companies. They
normally hold the debt to maturity because
private debt is less liquid than public debt. The
long-term character of private debt together
with its relatively lower prepayment risk
facilitates duration matching with life insurer
fixed-rate liabilities. Life insurance companies
are major lenders in the private debt market
(both in the traditional market and Rule144A
market). At year-end 2003, the value of U.S.
issued private debt was $491.4 billion (see
Table I) and life insurers held $437 billion of

total privately placed debt up to year 2003
which also included private debt issued by
other countries (National Association of
Insurance Commissioner). During the latest 5
years (Year2003-Year2007), the trend for life
insurers to invest more in private debt market
is even more apparent (see Figure 1) and the
relative percentage to the public debt holdings
remains stable (see Figure 2). Moreover, both
holdings class distribution and maturity
distribution illustrate that life insurers keep
their preferences to invest within high quality
class (class1 and class2) and average maturity
around 5-10 years (see Figure 3 and Figure 4).
All these imply that there exist some reasons
for life insurers to be attracted into this
market.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the
determinants of life insurers’ switch to private
debt holdings. Drawing on the finance
literature, we derive hypotheses regarding the
relation between life insurers’ switch decision
and firm-specific characteristics. We find that
life insurers with good financial quality,
licensed in New York State, having more than
10% foreign holdings and less cash holdings
are more likely to switch to private debt
holdings.
The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows. In the next section we review prior
studies on private debt market. Section III
provides the details of the data. Section IV
elaborates the framework for empirical tests
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and the main hypotheses, and specifies the
variables used to test the hypotheses. Section
V describes the econometric methods and our
model. Section VI presents our principal
findings. The paper concludes with a summary
and directions for future research.
Literature Review
Prior empirical studies on private debt
financing focus only on the borrower side of
the market. Blackwell and Kidwell (1988)
examine the cost differences between public
sales and private placements of debt for a
sample of public utility issues and suggest that
firms minimize the cost of issuing securities
by selecting the market providing the lowest
transaction costs. Houston and James (1996)
examines the determinants of the mix of
private and public debt using detailed
information on the debt structure of publicly
traded corporations. Krishnaswami, Spindt,
and Subramaniam (1999) empirically examine
the impact of flotation costs, agency conflicts,
regulation, and information asymmetries on a
firm’s mix between public and private debt.
Denis and Mihov (2003) examine the choice
among bank debt, non-bank private debt and
public debt. However, all these studies neglect
the important role of lenders in the private
debt market.
Three studies exceptionally focus on lender
side of the market. Carey et al. (1998) present
empirical evidence on the existence of
specialization in private market corporate
lending, adding a new dimension to the public
versus private debt distinctions in the
literature. Pottier (2007) extends the
understanding of the private debt market by
being the first to examine life insurer as the
major lenders in the private debt market.
However,
without
longitudinal
data
framework, it is hard to permits the sign of the
relationship between the explanatory variables
and the decision to hold private debt to differ
from that linking these variables to the volume
of holdings. Liu (2013) analyzes life insurers’
participation in the private debt market by
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using Cragg’s (1971) model. But the
characteristics of life insurers which influence
their decisions to switch from no-private debt
holdings to private debt holdings are still
unclear.
Data
The data used for our analysis are drawn from
the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC) Life-Health Annual
Statement database and Best’s Key Rating
Guide (A.M. Best) Life-Health Edition
database beginning in the year 2003 through
the year 2007. These data sets capture life
insurer private debt holdings, financial
strength rating and other firm-specific
characteristics.
For the purpose of our analysis, private debt
holdings are defined as non-Rule 144A private
debt consistent with the earlier discussion
regarding the traditional private debt
(Cummins, 1977). Firms must have nonnegative private debt holdings, positive total
net admitted assets and total net premiums,
and at least an ‘F’ letter rating from Best’s
Key Rating. The sample consists of
unaffiliated and affiliated insurers based on
the individual level. For each year, the data
may have different number of firms because of
the exit or entry of new life insurers but for the
same insurer, it cannot cycle on and off
repeatedly. The final unbalanced panel
includes 1014 observations for the 5 year
window.
A total of 297 life insurers which do not hold
any private debt initially are included in the
analysis that follows. Of all these life insurers,
95 (or 11.20%) experienced switch to private
debt holdings at least once (see Figure 5 and
Table II). We focus on each life insurer’s first
time switch to private debt holdings in the
remaining analysis.
Hypotheses
This study examines the characteristics of life
insurers that accelerate or delay the duration of
their decisions to switch to private debt
holdings.
A
binary
variable,
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TRAD_PRIVATE, equals to one for life
insurers that hold private debt, and zero
otherwise.
Several insurer-specific characteristics are
included in the analysis of the determinants of
switch to private debt holdings. The firm
characteristics are considered related to
financial
quality,
organization
form,
ownership,
business
growth,
market
geographic
concentration,
regulatory
environment, liquidity, and foreign control.
1. Financial Quality
A variable, RATING_SCORE, measured from
0 (with rating score ‘F’- In Liquidation) to 9
(with rating score ‘A++’- Superior) from A.M.
Best is used as a proxy for financial quality.
The Best’s Financial Strength Rating is an
independent opinion of an insurer’s financial
strength and ability to meet its ongoing
insurance policy and contract obligations. It is
based on a comprehensive quantitative and
qualitative evaluation of a company’s balance
sheet strength, operating performance and
business profile. High quality lenders convey
more accurate information about the
borrower’s risk and those firms seeking a
credible signal of positive private information
will use high quality lenders. Furthermore, a
lender’s credit quality might also proxy for its
incentive to monitor borrowers in order to
protect their credit rating. As a result, life
insurers with higher financial ratings are
expected to accelerate their decisions to switch
to private debt holdings.
2. Organization Form
A binary variable, MUTUAL, equals to one
for mutual insurers and zero for non-mutual
(stock) firms is used to measure organization
form. Because more effective managerial
control mechanisms exist in a stock firm,
stock insurer should hold investments
requiring more managerial discretion. On the
other hand, the prior research (Garven and
Pottier, 1995) suggests that the merger of the
owner and policyholder functions in the
mutual form mitigates the incentives for firm
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owners to increase asset risk at policyholders’
expense and the benefit of the mutual form is
expected to be even greater in relation to stock
firm where external monitoring is more
limited. Thus the expected impact of
organizational form on private debt holdings
depends on whether agency costs associated
with the owner-manager conflict or agency
costs associated with the owner-policyholder
conflict dominate. Latest research on private
debt holdings (Pottier, 2007) argues that life
insurers with mutual form have positive
effects on private debt holdings. We expect
that life insurers with mutual organization
form are more likely to switch to private debt
holdings.
3. Ownership
A binary variable, TRADED, which equals to
one if the insurer is owned by a publiclytraded insurer and zero otherwise, is used as
an ownership measure. Public traded life
insurers are expected to lessen the risk-shifting
potential related to private debt and face lower
costs of asymmetric information between the
firm and the outside market. Thus, we expect
to see being a publicly-traded insurer
accelerates the switch to private debt holdings.
4. Business Growth
We define the business growth of life insurer
as
















.

The more rapidly the percentage of premium
increases, the higher the life insurer growth
rate is. While the life insurer will have more
liquid to engage into the private debt market,
growth also means big expansion on
expenditure. If the net value of business
growth for life insurers is to hold more liquid,
we expect to see this has positive effect on
private debt holdings. However, if the net
value of business growth is to spend more on
expenditure, a delay to have private debt
holdings will be expected.
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5. Market Geographic Concentration
Market
geographic
concentration,
GEO_MKT_SHARE, is a function of firm’s
total share of the life business in different U.S.
States/Possession. Mathematically, it is
defined for each life insurer as
55

∑(
i =1

life _ bu sin ess _ in _ statei

)2

55

∑ life _ bu sin ess _ in _ state

i

i =1

The value of market geographic concentration
is between zero and one, and larger value
implies more geographically concentrated for
the life insurer. Geographic concentration for
the life insurer in the previous literature is
assumed not to have big influence on the
investment
decision
comparing
with
geographic concentration for the nonlife
insurer (Proper and Casualty). But since we
define it here as the market geographic
concentration for life business instead of
annuity, it may bring different level of risks
for different specific areas. We expect to see
this variable to have some impacts on the life
insurers’ switch decisions.
6. Regulatory Environment
A binary variable, NY_LIC that equals to one
if the insurer is licensed in New York State, is
used as a proxy measure for regulatory
environment. Based on a review of state
investment regulation, it doesn’t appear that
insurance regulators impose any limitations
specifically on private debt holdings.
However, New York State insurance
regulation is considered especially stringent
and applies an extraterritorial basis (Pottier
and Sommer, 1998). Thus, an insurer licensed
in New York State must adhere to New York
State regulations wherever the insurer
operates. Consequently, positive effect is
expected to see.
7. Liquidity
The percentage of cash holdings, CASH, is
used as a proxy for the liquidity level of the
life insurer. It is defined as
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cash _ and _ short _ term _ investment
invested _ assets
Higher rate of cash holdings may offset the
reduction in liquidity associated with
relatively more private debt holdings. Thus,
we expect to find positive effect on the switch
decisions.
8. Foreign Control
A binary variable, FOREIGN, equals to one if
any foreign (non-United States) person or
entity directly or indirectly control 10% or
more of the life insurer is used as a measure
for foreign control. The foreign control may
have positive effect on the private debt
holdings because of the preference to risktaking while it may also cause obstacles which
delay the holding. Selected summary statistics
for the samples of insurers with private debt
holdings and those without private debt
holdings are shown in Table III. The
differences in means between life insurers
with private debt holdings and life insurers
without any private debt holdings are as
expected. The exceptions are organization
form (MUTUAL) and ownership (TRADED).
However, this can be explained by the original
unbalanced panel data. We define the initial
status as life insurers without any private debt
holdings and by fact, life insurers with mutual
as organization form and traded publicly are
investors who buy majority of private debt in
the market.
Methodology
A variety of econometric methods are
available for examining time-duration data.
Among the most common are various forms of
proportional hazards model that estimate the
effects of various factors on the probability
that a spell will end at some point in time,
given that it has not previously ended.
Denoting  as the individual life insurer’s
choice-switch spell length and  as the current
time, this probabilities is as follows:
      ∆|  
where ∆ represents a small increment of time.
The limit of       ∆|  /∆ as
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∆ goes to zero is known as the hazard rate. It is
typically assumed that  has a continuous
probability distribution function, given
by!, where the associated cumulative
distribution function is
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λ (t ) = λ0 (t ) exp( Xβ ),

where . represents the usual vector of
coefficients. Estimation of this type of model
involves making a decision about the
functional form of the baseline hazard.
(
A direct extension of the previous proportional
" # $ !%&% #   .
hazard specification is the accelerated failure
)
The hazard rate λ (t ) is the rate at which spells time (AFT) metric, which is used in this paper.
are completed immediately after  , given that Defining / as / # exp3. , and with some
they have lasted at least until , and is related manipulation and rearranging, the log of the
failure time  can then be conveniently
to the survival function
expressed as a linear function of a set of
P(t ≤T ≤t +∆| T ≥t)
F(t +∆) −F(t) f (t)
λ(t) = lim
= lim
= ,
relevant covariates
∆→0
∆→0
∆
∆S(t)
S(t)
ln # 3.  ln /.
The natural log of / represents something of
where + # 1 - " #    is the an error term in the above equation. The
survival (or survivor) function.
distribution of it determines the particular
Empirically, hazard models express the hazard model in much the same way as the choice of
rate as a multiplicative function of some functional form for the baseline hazard in the
baseline hazard, λ0 (t ) , and an exponential proportional hazards metric. Specifically, we
function of a set of covariates as
have
parametric
model
as
follows,
ln(t ) = β 0 + β 1 * RATING _ SCORE + β 2 * MUTUAL + β 3 * TRADED
+ β 4 * GEO _ MKT _ SHARE + β 5 * CASH + β 6 * GROWTH
+ β 7 * NY _ LIC + β 8 * FOREIGN + ln(τ )
The selection of an appropriate distribution for
the baseline hazard (or / in the AFT metric) is
typically based on an examination of the
empirical hazard exhibited by the data in
question. The relatively smooth empirical
hazard exhibited by our data (see Figure 6 and
Figure 7), which is characterized by high
initial hazard rates followed by gradually
declining rates, indicates that the log-normal
or log-logistic is most appropriate.
Empirical Results
The results of the accelerated failure time
model that analyze the determinants of switch
to private debt holdings are presented in Table
IV and Table V with using log-normal
distribution and log-logistic distribution.
Table IV captures the results by reporting
coefficients and Table V by time ratios.
The coefficient of the insurer financial quality
variable (RATING_SCORE) is negative (as
expected) and very significantly related to

private debt holdings with 1% level, after
controlling other characteristics. Transformed
into time ratio, it indicates that the effect of
one-unit increases in life insurer’s credit rating
score speeds up the probability of switching to
private debt holdings by 30% for log-normal
distribution and 36% for log-logistic
distribution.
Contrary to the expectation, the coefficient of
liquidity (CASH) is positive with 1%
significance level (5% for log-logistics). As
discussed earlier, we expect to see negative
value here if higher rate of cash holdings may
offset the reduction in liquidity associated
with relatively more private debt holdings.
Further, this contradicts with the static result
shown by Pottier (2007). In his paper, he finds
that life insurers with large percentage of cash
holdings choose to hold private debt even
though he also gets the same difference in
means from summary statistics as we do.
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However, results from our duration model
show those life insurers who don’t hold
private debt but with large cash holdings delay
their switch to private debt holdings, which
consists with the difference in means from our
previous summary statistics. This can be
explained by the investment preference of life
insurers initially with no any private debt
holdings instead of all life insurers in Pottier’s
paper.
The coefficients of regulatory environment
(NY_LIC) and foreign control (FOREIGN)
are both negative and significant with 10%
level in log-normal distribution model, which
means getting license in New York State or
having more than 10% foreign control speeds
up the probability of life insurers’ switch to
private debt holdings by 27% and 33%
respectively.
The coefficients of ownership (TRADED),
organization form (MUTUAL), Market
Geographic
Concentration
(GEO_MKT_SHARE)
and
growth
(GROWTH) are insignificant but most of
them have the positive or negative effects as
we expect with only exception for
organization form which we have explained
earlier. From results we can see that publicly
traded life insurers with less geographic
concentration for life business are more likely
to switch to private debt holdings while the
effect of growth rate is unpredictable.
The potential problems of multicollinearity
and heterogeneity are considered. From the
Spearman’s correlation coefficient table (see
Table VI), multicollinearity can hardly be
considered as problem in our model.
Moreover, we implement both gamma
distribution and inverse-Gaussian distribution
for controlling unobserved heterogeneity.
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However, considering our initial log-normal or
log-logistic regression, it is not easy to get
convergence when implementing unobserved
heterogeneity. Besides, since AFT model with
log-normal distribution and AFT model with
log-logistic distribution are not nested models,
we prefer to use AFT model with log-normal
distribution if comparing the value of the
Akaike information criterion (AIC).
Conclusions
This paper extends our understanding of the
private debt market by examining the major
lenders in the private debt market. We analyze
the characteristics of life insurers that
determine their switch decisions to private
debt holdings in the private debt market.
Our empirical results indicate that life insurers
with fair or good financial strength rating
scores, facing stringent regulation, having
more percentage of foreign holding control
and less cash holdings are more likely to
switch from no private debt holdings to private
debt holdings.
Because this study provides some of the first
findings that use longitudinal data, a number
of questions remain unanswered. First, the
investment decision performed remarkably
importance for life insurers both from
individual firm level and consolidated group
level. Their decisions to switch to private debt
holdings may be influenced differently.
Second, our multivariate analysis has only
considered life insurers’ first switch for
investment decisions but not repeated switch.
Finally, future research may consider to
separate life insurers who don’t have access to
private debt investment from life insurers who
only invest in public debt but having access to
private access to private debt investments.
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Table I Private Placements in the U.S., Year2003-Year2007 ($ billions)
Value of U.S. private placements
Number of U.S. private placements
Debt
Equity
Total
Debt
Equity
Total
491.4
28.9
520.3
2,635
534
3,169
570.4
32.1
602.5
2,729
560
3,289
554.7
57.7
612.4
2,887
516
3,403
523.7
73.5
597.2
2,705
596
3,301
555.2
72.0
627.2
1,933
512
2,445
Source: Insurance Information Institute, Financial Service Fact Book

Year
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

Table II Overall First Switch Rates (Year2003-Year2007)
Years

Switch

Cumulative Switch Rate

2003-2004

46

5.42%

2004-2005

29

8.84%

2005-2006

8

9.79%

2006-2007

12

11.20%

Table III Selected Summary Statistics with and without Private Debt Holdings
TRAD_PRIVATE =1
Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

cash
foreign
geo_mkt_share
growth
mutual
ny_lic
rating_score
traded

201
201
201
201
201
201
201
201

0.075754
0.19403
0.373178
0.152552
0.019901
0.323383
7.99005
0.079602

0.122327
0.396439
0.380442
0.278656
0.140007
0.468936
1.212395
0.271352

0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0

0.717526
1
1
1
1
1
9
1

TRAD_PRIVATE =0
Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

cash

813

0.136717

0.179779

0

0.999928

foreign

813

0.098401

0.298039

0

1

geo_mkt_share

813

0.437633

0.38718

0

1

growth

813

0.163368

0.275928

0

1

mutual

813

0.02829

0.165903

0

1

ny_lic

813

0.177122

0.382007

0

1

rating_score

813

7.311193

1.077232

2

9

traded

813

0.110701

0.313955

0

1
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Table IV Coefficients for AFT Model with Log-normal Distribution and Log-logistics Distribution
(1)
(2)
VARIABLES
Log-normal (AFT) Log-logistic (AFT)
Coef.
Coef.
ny_lic
-0.318*
-0.260
(0.181)
(0.183)
foreign
-0.413*
-0.334
(0.221)
(0.219)
traded
-0.0847
-0.0940
(0.250)
(0.263)
mutual
0.570
0.486
(0.620)
(0.651)
rating_score
-0.359***
-0.461***
(0.0770)
(0.0963)
geo_mkt_share
0.158
0.161
(0.202)
(0.204)
cash
1.644***
1.613**
(0.577)
(0.637)
growth
-0.000550
0.0310
(0.275)
(0.289)
Constant
4.251***
5.001***
(0.619)
(0.768)
Observations
848
848
Log-likelihood
-219.1134
-221.18333
AIC
458.2268
462.3667
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table V Time Ratio for AFT Model with Log-normal Distribution and Log-logistics Distribution
Log-normal (AFT)
Log-logistic (AFT)
Variable
Time-ratio
Time-ratio
ny_lic
foreign
traded
mutual
rating_score
geo_mkt_share
cash
growth

cash
foreign
geo_mkt_share
growth
mutual
ny_lic
rating_score
traded

0.7275256
0.6614687
0.9187768
1.767693
0.6987021
1.17101
5.178044
0.9994501

0.7709335
0.715809
0.9103092
1.625496
0.6309281
1.174673
5.017924
1.031478

Table VI Spearman’s Correlation Coefficient Across 297 Firms
cash
foreign geo_mkt_share
growth mutual ny_lic
1
0.0861 1
0.0977 -0.1456 1
0.1279 -0.1029 0.0368
1
0.0854 -0.0603 -0.0753
-0.024
1
0.0646 0.0415
0.0127
0.0395
0.0369
1
0.1095 0.1776
-0.107
0.0739
-0.0907 0.2931
-0.012
-0.0745 -0.1205
0.0883
-0.0565 0.0171

rating_score

traded

1
-0.0944

1
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Figure 1 U.S. Life Insurer Private Debt Holdings (Year2003-Year2007)
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Figure 2 U.S. Life Insurer Total Debt Holdings (Public and Private Debt Holdings)

$ Billions

Life insurer total debt holdings
2500
2250
2000
1750
1500
1250
1000
750
500
250
0
2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

Year
Value of U.S. Life insurer public debt holdings

Value of U.S. Life insurer private debt holdings

Source: National Association of Insurance Commissioner (Year2003-Year2007)

21

International Research Journal of Applied Finance
Vol. V Issue – 1 January, 2014

ISSN 2229 – 6891

Life insurer private debt placed class distribution
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Figure 4 U.S. Life Insurer Private Debt Placed Maturity Distribution
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Figure 6 Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates and Smoothed Hazard Estimates
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Figure 7 Nelson-Aalen Cumulative Hazard Estimates
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A Framework for Explaining Accounting Students’ Formal Communication
GAP
Charles Harter

Robert Marley

Abstract
This paper introduces a framework that explains how innovations in communication technology
have affected students’ communication skills. Our framework suggests that new communication
mediums have reduced students’ exposure to contexts requiring formal communication and
increased students’ exposure to contexts utilizing informal communication. As a result, today’s
accounting students have less formal communication experience, thus less developed formal
communication skills than their predecessors. To mitigate this communication gap, we discuss
adapting the accounting classroom to familiarize, hone, and instill formal communication skills.
Keywords: communication
flipping the classroom

skills,

communications

Introduction
Accounting students inappropriately informal
communication style has been decried by both
college educators and industry professionals
(Mulling, 2013). Though faculty may no
longer consider informal communication
unusual, it was relatively unknown only one
generation ago and it remains inappropriate for
many professional workplace settings (Vance
and Stephens, 2010; Bauer, 1996).
The
following
anecdote
illustrates
the
inappropriately informal communication style
exhibited by some contemporary accounting
students:
A partner in a CPA firm recently
received a resume and cover letter from
an accounting student who possessed a
good GPA, was active in beta alpha psi,
and seemingly had prepared herself for a
professional career in public accounting.
However, upon reading the student’s
cover letter, the partner rejected the
application because the student had
inappropriately used the letter “u” in
place of the word “you” and “thnx” as a
replacement for “thank you.” When
faculty followed up with the student, she
said she was unaware that the

gap,

informal

communication,

communication style she used in
applying for the job was inappropriately
informal.
Many similar informal communication
anecdotes are shared on College Misery
(2013), a popular blog where faculty members
share their collegiate experiences.
Both
anecdotes
and
accounting
research
(Christensen and Rees, 2002) suggest today’s
accounting students may not sufficiently
develop the formal communication skills
required to be successful in the accounting
profession during their college education.
There are serious consequences associated
with accounting students’ failure to develop
formal communication skills during their
college years. In the example above, the
student’s
inappropriately
informal
communication style prevented her from
obtaining the job she wanted.
More
frequently, an accounting student obtains a job
without possessing the requisite formal
communication etiquette, leading to frustration
and embarrassment for those who interact with
the student in a professional setting. Thus,
failing to obtain and hone formal
communication
skills
leads
to
a
“communication gap” between students’
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informal communication style and the more
formal communication style expected of
professionals. The communication gap is of
particular concern to the accounting profession
as there is some empirical evidence that
suggests accountants are already perceived to
lack communication skills (Friedman and
Lyne, 2001). Therefore, it is not surprising that
employers, managers, and professors have all
expressed concern regarding the quality of
current accounting students’ soft skills (Cohn,
2013; Christensen and Rees, 2002).
This paper contributes to the literature by
introducing a framework that proposes
innovations in communication technology have
reduced students’ exposure to contexts
requiring formal communication. Accordingly,
we suggest it is not surprising that today’s
students may lack the formal communication
skills held by their predecessors because
today’s
students
have
less
formal
1
communication practice. While we recognize
that the primary focus of the classroom should
be student learning, we suggest it is important
that students understand how to formally
communicate. As a result, we contribute to
accounting pedagogy by identifying means by
which educators can help mitigate the
communications gap. We suggest adapting the
accounting classroom to familiarize, hone, and
instill formal communication skills.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows:
in the next section we identify how
technological innovations have changed

communication norms. Then, we explain how
changing communication norms have impeded
the development of formal communication
skills. Finally, we identify ways the classroom
can be adapted to instill formal communication
skills. We conclude by summarizing our key
contributions and by identifying limitations
and opportunities for future research.
Technological
Innovations
and
Communication Norms
The current generation of accounting students
grew up in an era categorized by tremendous
advancements in communication technology.
In the span of one generation, entirely new
mediums of communication, such as e-mail,
text messaging, and social media, have not
only been introduced but have become
ubiquitous.2
Generally, using these new
communication mediums (“new mediums”)
requires some form of electronic device, but
more significantly the new mediums enable
individuals to remain in communication with
each other asynchronously and without regard
to physical proximity (IJsselsteijn, van Baren,
and van Lanen, 2003).3 However, since new
mediums do not require physical proximity or
temporal synchronization, many of the verbal
and non-verbal cues associated with traditional
mediums are no longer present, leading
communicators
to
apply
different
communication norms (i.e., “etiquette”).
Research finds that when verbal and nonverbal cues are removed, social presence cues
are lost (Short, Williams, and Christie, 1976;
Rice, 1993) and communication becomes more
1
The literature suggests
We define formal communication as the depersonalized.
communication etiquette that is appropriate for a student depersonalization encourages self-centeredness
to use when they are communicating with an individual and anti-social behavior (Sproull and Kiesler,
in a non-peer relationship. Examples of non-peer
relationships are numerous, such as a student-professor
relationship, a student-employer relationship, and
student-parent relationship. We recognize that our
definition of “formal communication” connotes the
existence of hierarchical relationships, which is
admittedly somewhat unpopular with regards to recent
societal trends which take a more egalitarian tone,
suggesting that everybody is a peer and nobody should
be thought to hold positions of “superiority.”

2

We define communication mediums as those
permitting individuals to share information with each
other.
3

The principal constraint of these new technological
innovations is connection to an internet or
telecommunications signal.
However, given the
communication infrastructure of the United States circa
2013, such a connection is widely available.
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1986; Siegel, Dubrovsky, Kiesler, and
McGuire, 1986), leading individuals to
communicate with each other more as objects
than as people (Williams, 1977). As the
communication medium becomes more
indirect, that is less rich in social cues, the
manner in which the message is communicated
becomes increasingly informal because
communicators cannot use social cues, like
body language and facial expressions, as
feedback to detect when an individual’s
behavior is perceived as inappropriate or rude
by the other party. Further, as communication
becomes more indirect, the immediacy of
social cues becomes diminished, causing
individuals to feel increasingly comfortable
saying what comes to mind. This explains
why the content of messages communicated
via new mediums has become less formal.
Additionally, the etiquette associated with new
mediums is not as well established as
traditional forms of communication. Thus, it is
not altogether surprising that faculty and
practitioners are concerned about receiving
messages which were previously considered
unheard of since the norms of communication
behavior are less defined for new
communication mediums. While accounting
professionals may expect etiquette surrounding
new communication mediums to be no
different than traditional communication
mediums, assuming the norms of traditional
communication mediums to automatically
apply to new communication mediums seems a
bit presumptuous. For example, when
considering the following student messages
were sent via email, the level of informality
contained is not altogether unexpected in light
of the indirectness of the communication
medium itself:
“Hello Professor Bauer, I will not be in
class today, because it is just too
beautiful a day out to be inside. I hope
you’re not too dissapointed [sic]. Here is
…. Thanks again!!” (Bauer, 1997)
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“I have just returned from a trip
I took with my father. It was
very exciting that I got to go …
to Denmark, Germany and …
Finland.… I need to make up
the quizzes I have missed, and
am willing to do so, whenever it
is convenient for you. If it is
possible, could you please let
me know basicly [sic] what the
quizzes covered? You can
contact me at the above E-Mail
address. Thank you for your
time.” (Bauer, 1997)
In the past, individuals communicating the
above messages would have been required to
do so in a face-to-face setting containing more
established norms of behavior and richer social
cues. Therefore, such messages may have
been relatively rare because the social cues
inherent in face-to-face communication would
have alerted the communicator he was being
inappropriately informal, prompting him to
maintain a sense of decorum for fear of
provoking an immediate and negative response
from the person receiving the message.
However, as a communication mode moves to
environments less rich in social cues, such as a
student sending their professor an email from
the safety and comfort of their home,
individuals
will
become
increasingly
comfortable stating whatever springs to mind
because there is no risk of a direct, immediate
response.
Because new communication
mediums are less direct, thus less rich in social
cues, such mediums have likely affected
communication norms.
Since young individuals integrate technology
into their lives faster than the general
population
(Gonsalves,
2006),
the
communication norms associated with new
mediums have disproportionally affected
younger generations.
Unlike previous
generations who entered the workforce before
new mediums were ubiquitous, today’s
accounting students have never known a time
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when these mediums did not exist. As a result,
younger generations have no frame of
reference to draw upon in determining the
appropriateness
of
using
a
specific
communication medium to convey a message.
For example, younger employees see little
wrong with informing their boss via text
message that they will be absent from work
due to illness (Mirror, 2011), whereas older
employees may feel it appropriate to
communicate the message via the telephone.
As new mediums are popular forms of
communication among students, it should
come as no surprise that these new mediums
have affected students’ communication style.
Finally, since new mediums permit individuals
to communicate at almost any time from
almost anywhere, individuals likely perceive
new mediums to be the most convenient way
to communicate a message in many situations.
As a result, new mediums have eliminated the
need for individuals to engage in face-to-face
or telephone communication in many
circumstances. Accordingly, new mediums
have likely reduced the use of traditional
communication mediums in favor of newer,
less direct mediums.
Thus, while new
mediums have made it more convenient for
individuals to communicate with each other,
the loss of social cues has likely increased the
informality of the messages exchanged.
As a result, because today’s students have less
practice communicating formally vis-à-vis
prior generations, it should come as no surprise
that
they
possess
weaker
formal
communication skills.
Students’ lack of
experience with formal communication may
help to explain why they seemingly lack
formal communication skills.
To be successful in the accounting profession,
it is important that students acquire formal
communication skills. As faculty members are
responsible for preparing students to enter the
profession, we suggest faculty should play an
active role in helping accounting students
develop their formal communication skills. In
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the next section, we identify ways the
classroom can be used to develop students’
formal communication skills.
Developing Students Communication Skills
As faculty charged with preparing the next
generation of accounting leaders, we believe
faculty have an obligation to educate students
in the norms associated with professional
communication so students are not caught off
guard when they enter the business world.
Though we understand there may be
considerable resistance from faculty, who may
feel their primary obligation is to provide
students with knowledge of accounting
principles, this definition of a professor’s role
is too narrow. We subscribe to the argument
that a good professor is one who prepares his
or her students to be successful in their field of
study. Thus, educating students in the norms
associated with professional communication
etiquette does not fall outside of the
professor’s charge.
In this section, we provide suggestions on how
new mediums can be redirected to facilitate
student learning in a classroom environment.
We select this approach because it gives
students the opportunity to see elements of
formal and informal communication and to
learn when each is appropriate.
Our
suggestions are in line with the evolution of
technology into the modern classroom and to
teaching innovations like flipping the
classroom.
Our goal is to begin the
development of a roadmap that will provide a
new perspective in accounting education by
providing examples of teaching approaches
that are conducive to using technology that
students may find appealing. Though we
recognize that flipping the classroom and
virtual discussions are not new ideas, as both
have been suggested by other academics as
ways to improve student learning, we believe
these two approaches are especially suited to
the current generation of students because they
encourage communication while utilizing
technology students are familiar with.
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Flipping the Classroom
Today’s technology savvy-students do not
necessarily thrive in a lecture style class. For
decades,
educational
researchers
have
questioned the effectiveness of the lecture
approach, concluding that the traditional
lecture is not an effective method for
facilitating student leaning. At best, lectures
disseminate knowledge that might or might not
be retained (Van Eynde and Spencer, 1988).
Some studies suggest that students in lecturebased classrooms fail to retain as much
material as students in active learning
classrooms (Van Eynde and Spencer, 1988).
Active or collaborative learning methods like
flipping the classroom focus on learning rather
than teaching. When students become active
participants in the classroom they utilize higher
order thinking skills such as analysis,
synthesis, and evaluation. The result is that
students learn how to apply concepts, resulting
in greater learning.
Flipping the classroom can be implemented
using the technology that today’s students are
comfortable with. Prior to receiving an inclass assignment, on-line lectures or other
media can be used to provide students with
basic concepts. While flipped classrooms may
be live or on-line, if the class is live, class time
can be devoted to interactive discussions where
students solve complex problems using the
concepts provided to them prior to class. Thus,
the class functions more as an interactive lab
then a sterile lecture hall. If a live classroom is
not used, students can interact using various
electronic media. In a flipped classroom,
student learning predominantly takes place as
the students interact with each other to solve
case or problem assignments. The professor’s
role shifts to observing progress and offering
assistance on an as-needed basis by circulating
among students in the classroom or by
monitoring on-line communication.
Students respond to a flipped classroom
because
it
incorporates
inter-personal
communication, encourages use of technology
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for research, and focuses on interactive
problem solving. By permitting students to
work together using whatever communication
medium they prefer, students learn to manage
their time efficiently because they have
periodic reporting assignments. The assigned
tasks should be complex enough to require
critical thinking and may culminate in a final
product that is presented to the class. This
presentation can model the type of
presentations students will need to be
comfortable giving in their future accounting
careers. Grading is most effective when based
upon the quality of the solution, the degree of
team involvement, and the quality of the
presentation. We suggest fostering an informal
communication style until the class
presentation, where students can be required to
present
their
results
using
formal
communication norms. Flipping the classroom
allows students to learn using the informal
communication style they are accustomed to,
but instills the importance of formal
communication by requiring students to
change their communication style when
presenting their results. We suggest this
approach both exposes students to formal
communication styles and demonstrates that
informal communication is not always
appropriate for every task context.
Virtual Discussion
Learning management tools like Desire-tolearn or Blackboard are already widely used in
higher education.
Students like these
electronic tools because they provide timely
information. Outlines, handouts, and grades
can be updated quickly by the professor and
accessed in real-time by students. Tools
available in most learning management
applications such as chat, email, and
gradebook are readily accepted by students.
Further, this technology is effective as an
information disseminator in a live classroom or
can be used to facilitate a totally online class.
A useful, but sometimes overlooked tool
provided with most learning management
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systems is the discussion function. This tool
can be used to engage students in discussions
that can be more effective online than in a
face-to-face classroom setting. For example,
in an online discussion, even the shyest student
will often participate in the discussion.
Students who are uncomfortable participating
in a live classroom may be willing to post their
ideas online because they are accustomed to
using informal communication technology like
social media to make their opinions known.
Unlike the traditional classroom discussion
where one student speaks at a time, online
discussions permit students to post their ideas
simultaneously so that all are actively engaged.
Further, to encourage students to formulate
their own ideas, the learning management
system can be set so that students must make a
post before they are allowed to see posts made
by other students.
This type of virtual
discussion can generate a more in-depth
discussion than is possible in a live classroom.
We suggest assessing learning by using a
record of the discussion, which is archived by
the system. To promote the development of
formal communication skills, we suggest the
professor establish some communication
etiquette “ground rules” at the beginning of the
class. During the semester, we suggest the
professor at least occasionally praise students
applying appropriate communication etiquette,
while identifying how students communicating
in an inappropriately informal manner can
improve their communication style. By tying
some portion of the discussion grade to
communication style, the professor can take
advantage of peer pressure and achievement
pressure to motivate students to learn and
apply formal communication etiquette. Thus,
virtual discussion can be an interactive,
collaborative learning environment from which
to impart formal communication skills to
students.
Conclusion
In this paper we proposed a framework to
identify how innovations in communication
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technology
(i.e.,
new
communication
mediums) have caused communication norms
to become more informal. Our framework also
identifies how these new mediums have
reduced students’ exposure to formal
communication contexts, impeding their
development of formal communication skills.
While our framework identifies how
technology has shifted the norms of
interpersonal
communication
towards
informality, we emphasize the need for
embracing and re-directing these new
mediums. Banning the use of new mediums in
the classroom is misguided and only results in
the classroom becoming increasingly removed
from the outside world. We advance flipping
the classroom and virtual discussion as two
means by which professors can use the new
mediums to facilitate learning and impart
formal communication skills, thereby adapting
to the times instead of becoming overcome by
them.
While we developed our framework by
drawing upon the findings of prior research,
we acknowledge our framework is built upon
logical argument but not tested or supported by
empirical evidence. Thus, future research may
find it advantageous to empirically test our
framework to contribute to the academic
conversation regarding the efficacy of the two
learning means suggested in this article.
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The Information Asymmetry of A and B Shares in China: Which One
Dominates the Market?
Anthony H. Tu
Abstract
This study examines the possible information asymmetry between A-share (domestic
investors) and B-share (foreign investors) markets in China. We use and modify the
information share model, proposed by Hasbrouck (1995), to analyze the contribution of each
market to the price discovery. The modified information share model allows us to distinguish
two sources of information asymmetries between markets: volume-related (private)
information shocks and volume-unrelated (public) information shocks. The empirical
evidence indicates that, as the two markets are completely segmented, the price discovery
contribution of B-shares is slightly higher (lower) than that of A-shares in private (public)
information shocks. This implies that domestic individual investors in A-shares market have
better public information, whereas foreign institutional investors in B-shares market have
better private information. After the B-share market is opened to domestic investors, the
information advantage of B-shares no longer exists. A-shares have the information advantage
over B-shares in both private and public information shocks.
Keywords: Segmented markets; Chinese stock markets; Information shares; Information
asymmetry; error correction model
JEL Classifications: G14; G15
Introduction
In China, the same firm can issue A shares
and B shares. Domestic investors can only
buy A shares and foreign investors can only
buy B sharesa. The shares are identical in
terms of voting power and dividend claims.
Due to the existing regulations, the amount
of outstanding B shares is always smaller,
so foreign investors are forced to be
minority shareholders. The outcome is that
the equity of the same firm is traded at the
same time, at the same exchange, but by two
different investor groups and at quite
different prices. Typically, A shares trade at
a premium over B shares (Fung et al.
(2000), Chen et al. (2001), Karolyi and Li
(2003), Mei et al. (2005)).
This study proposes to examine whether
foreign investors (B-shares) are at an
information advantage (or disadvantage)

relative to domestic investors (A-shares)b.
Understanding this may lead to improved
predictions that can benefit both policymakers and market-participants. Calvo and
Mendoza (2000) argue that the information
disadvantage of foreign investors will cause
contagions across international markets.
Several factors can cause information
asymmetry between domestic and foreign
investors in China. Foreign investors in
China are mainly big financial institutions.
Compared with the domestic investors,
foreign institutional investors can, in
general, be assumed to be more
experienced, have better means of obtaining
information, and have access to more
advanced technology to analyze data. Thus,
the presence of foreign investors can be a
b

a

On February 19, 2001, the authority implemented a
new policy by opening the B-share market to
domestic individual investors with foreign currency
holdings. As a result, the A- and B-share markets are
now no longer completely segmented.

In this paper, we define “A-share (B-share)
dominates the market” if A-share (B-share) has the
information advantage over the B-share (A-share),
because the better informed investors always
dominate the price discovery process in an
asymmetric-information market.
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“buy signal” for the relatively uninformed
domestic investors. In this situation, the
price of B shares would lead those of A
shares indicating domestic investors get
information from foreign investors. The
above argument refers to the “institutional
dominance hypothesis.” Grinblatt and
Keloharju (2000) support this hypothesis
using Finnish data as do Froot and
Ramadorai (2001) using a cross section of
data from 25 countries. Pan et al. (2001)
also find that foreign investors are better
informed than domestic investors in six East
Asian emerging markets.
Yet, domestic investors might have the
information advantage. They can better
acquire relevant news from local sources
and the information does not have to travel
over physical, linguistic, or cultural
distances. This refers to the “local
familiarity hypothesis.” Choe et al. (2001)
provides convincing evidence using Korean
data, Hau (2001) using German data, and
Dvorak (2005) using Indonesian data. In this
scenario the price of A shares would lead
the prices of B shares because foreign
investors learn from domestic investors.
This paper proposes to study the
informational advantage (or disadvantage)
of domestic investors relative to foreign
investors in China’s stock market by
inferring information shares, proposed by
Hasbrouck (1991b, 1995), for the two
classes of marketsc. The empirical
methodology has been widely adopted in
c

The present paper is most closely related to the
previous work on price discovery in multiple-trading
environments. Garbade and Silber (1979) conclude
that regional exchanges contribute to price discovery.
Harris et al. (1995) use an error correction model to
examine the discovery in IBM price on the New
York, Midwest, and Pacific Stock Exchanges. Harris
McInish, and Wood (2002) apply the common longmemory procedure of Gonzalo and Granger (1995) to
estimate the relative contribution of the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) for price discovery. Ding et
al. (1999) uses the same methodology for comparing
the contribution to price discovery of a Malaysian
firm and Sime Darby Berhad uses the methodology
on the Kuala Lumpur and Singapore Stock
Exchanges.
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investigating the informational roles of
information-linked
markets
(Martens
(1998), Huang (2002), Grammig et al.
(2005), Pascual, et al. (2006)). China’s stock
market is an ideal market for investigation
since the A-share market and B-share
market were completely segmented before
February 19, 2001, which means the
information advantages of A- and B-share
markets can be examined under different
trading mechanisms. In addition, the
Chinese equity markets offer an excellent
laboratory for the purpose of this study.
Chinese equity markets have one of the
largest individual investor populations in the
worldd. Individual investor accounts make
up 99.5 percent of the total number of
investor accounts in the markets, whereas
institutional accounts form merely 0.5
percent of investor accounts.
This study is, of course, not the first to
examine information asymmetry between
the markets for domestic and foreign
investors in China. Chakravarty et al. (1998)
and Chui and Kwok (1998) investigated
information transmission between A-shares
and B-shares markets. While Chakravarty,
et al. (1998) finds that A-share returns lead
B-share returns more than vice versa, Chui
and Kwok (1998) find the opposite result.
According to Chakravarty, et al. (1998),
foreign investors are less informed than
domestic investors because of the language
barrier and different accounting standards.
However, Chui and Kwok (1998) argue that
foreign investors are institutional investors
who are more experienced and have better
means of obtaining information and more
access to advanced technology to analyze
data than individual domestic investors. By
contrast, individual domestic investors rely
solely on rumor and perception and are
more likely to trade based on “noise” rather
than on information. Using the forecast error
variance decomposition, Yang (2003) also
find that foreign investors in the Shanghai
d

By the end of 2002, the number of individual
investor accounts opened at the Chinese stock
exchanges reached 68.5 million.
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B-shares market are better informed than
Chinese domestic investors in both A-shares
markets (Shanghai and Shenzhen).
Recently, a similar study by Chan et al.
(2007) indicates that the A-shares market
led the B-share market in price discovery
during the period of complete market
segmentation. After the B-shares market
opened to domestic investors, the A-share
market continues to dominate the price
discovery process. Evidence further
indicates that the intraday 5-minute signed
volume and quote revision in the B-shares
market contain information for predicting
subsequent quote revision in the A-shares
market. However, the analysis is based on
76 firms with sample period from Jan 10,
2000 to Nov 8, 2001.
The finding of Chan et al. (2008) also
supports the information advantage of Ashare market. They use the same data to
examine
whether
the
information
disadvantage of foreign investors (who trade
B-shares), relative to domestic investors
(who trade A-shares), can explains the socalled “foreign share discount puzzle”
(Fernald and Rogers (2002), Eun et al.
(2001)). They construct measures of
information asymmetry based on market
microstructure models, and show that the
cross-sectional variation in foreign share
discounts can be explained by these
measures, even after controlling for other
factors. They further investigate the effect of
the B-share market being opened to
domestic investors in March 2001. The
results indicate that, by allowing domestic
investors to trade in the B-shares market,
there is less of the information disadvantage
in this market, and thus the B-share
discounts become smaller.
Notwithstanding the different results in
these earlier studies, a common shortcoming
is that these studies base their analyses on
price series data only. This paper uses and
modifies the information shares model by
including the influence of trading activities
(trading
volumes).
The
modified
information share model allows us to
distinguish two sources of information
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asymmetries between markets: volumerelated (private) information shocks and
volume-unrelated (public) information
shocks. The theoretical motivation is
provided by some recent theoretical models
and empirical findings. Blume et al. (1994)
and Bernardo and Judd (1999) argue that
volume conveys information to the market
that cannot be deduced from price alone.
They also develop models in which traders
use previous periods’ trading volume to
make inferences about the quality of
informed traders’ signals which is important
for estimating the payoff for the security. In
Suominen’s (2001) model, traders estimate
the availability of private information using
past periods’ trading volumes and use this
information to adjust their strategies.
Further, this study applies the model
empirically to a longer period (more than 8
years) and to individual-firm stocks listed
both on A and B shares, rather than the
aggregated index only. As indicated by
Llorente et al. (2002), the individual-firm
stocks allow to efficient examination of the
information role of volume. The empirical
results in this paper indicate that when the
two markets are completely segmented, the
price discovery contribution of B-shares is
slightly higher (lower) than that of A-shares
in private (public) information shocks. This
implies that domestic individual investors in
A-shares market have better public
information, whereas foreign institutional
investors in B-shares market have better
private information.
Finally, how the relationship changes after
domestic investors are allowed to trade on
the B-share market is also investigated. This
happens after February 19, 2001 when the
Chinese government introduced a new
policy that allowed domestic investors with
foreign currency holdings to trade B-shares.
Consequently, the A- and B-share markets
are now no longer completely segmented.
Chiu et al. (2005) investigate the impact of
the China stock market allowing domestic
residents to invest in B-shares. Their results
show that this policy improves the B-share
price discount and strengthens market
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integration between A- and B-shares.
Moreover, the volatility transmission
between A- and B-shares accelerates. The
results in this paper verify the finding of
Chiu et al. (2005) in a more robust sense.
The remainder of this paper is organized as
followed. The next section presents and
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discusses the empirical model. Section 3
proposes a modified model of information
shares measures, and Section 4 describes the
data set and reports the empirical results.
The final section summarizes the paper.

Information revelation by prices and trading volumes and the empirical model
The most common efficient parameterization of a vector of co-integrated variables is a vector
error correction (VEC) model from Granger’s Representation Theorem in Engle and Granger
(1987). The standard error-correction representation of the market prices for a cross-listed
stock is
∆p At = α A (p At -1 - β p Bt -1 ) + φ AA (L)∆p At -1 + φ BA (L)∆p Bt -1 + η tA ,

(1)

∆p Bt = α B (p At -1 - β p Bt -1 ) + φ AB (L)∆p At -1 + φ BB (L)∆p Bt -1 + η tB

where ∆pti = pti − pti−1 = ln Pt i − ln Pt i−1 ,

i = { A, B} . Pt i is market i ’s daily closing price at

time t . The terms φ ki (L) , for k and i = { A, B} , are stationary autoregressive polynomials in
the lag operator L . The component ( ptA−1 − β ptB−1 ) is the normalized error correction term.
Presumably, β is equal to one. The α i term is the response of the market i to a divergence
from other markets’ prices. If both α A and α B were statistically significant, the model
would be facing a two-way price discovery process.
In matrix form, the equation (1) can be rewritten as
∆pt = αβ ′ pt −1 + Φ ( L)∆pt −1 + ε t
A
t

(1a)

B
t

where pt = ( p , p )′ .
The information role of (trading) volume in stock markets has long been a subject of
empirical researcha. In a theoretical model of Blume et al. (1994), volume provides
information in a way distinct from that provided by price. As is true in most rational
expectations models, that price impounds information about the average level of trader’s
private information, their model emphasizes that volume captures the important information
contained in the quality or precision of traders’ information signals. In Suominen’s (2001)
model, trading volume plays an important role in traders’ learning. Traders estimate the
availability of private information using past periods’ trading volume and use this
information to adjust their strategies. This accord with the empirical observation that the
information contained in trading volume is important for traders’ learning and affects their
behavior. Finally, Suominen shows that price changes are not sufficient to characterize the
evolution of conditional variance; information on trading volume is also needed.
Following the above discussion, we thus modify the traditional VEC model by including the
interacting effects of price and volume. Similar to Pascual et al. (2006), we extend (1) by
allowing the VEC model to be
a

Karpoff (1987) documented that stock return volatility and contemporaneous trading volume are positively
correlated, and Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990) found that trading volume in stock markets contains relevant
information for predicting future volatility.
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∆p At = α A (p At -1 - β p Bt -1 ) + φ AA (L)∆p At -1 + φ BA (L)∆p Bt -1 + θ AA (L)∆x At + θ BA (L)∆x Bt + ε tA ,
∆p Bt = α B (p At -1 - β p Bt -1 ) + φ AB (L)∆p At -1 + φ BB (L)∆p Bt -1 + θ AB (L)∆x Bt + θ BB (L)∆x Bt + ε tB

where ∆xti ,

i = { A, B} is market i ’s trading activity (trading volume) in t .

The generating process of ∆xti ,
A
t

∆x = Π

A
x, A

(2)

(L)∆x

A
t −1

+Π

A
x,B

(L)∆x

i = { A, B} is given by
B
t −1

+ Π Ap , A (L)∆ptA−1 + Π Ap , B (L)∆ptB−1 + etA ,

∆x Bt = Π Bx , A (L)∆xtA−1 + Π Bx , B (L)∆xtB−1 + Π Bp , A (L)∆ptA−1 + Π Bp , B (L)∆ptB−1 + etB

(3)

with Π ih,k ( L) , for h = {x, p} and k = { A, B} . All lag polynomials are stationary. By
substituting recursively (3) into (2), it is straightforward to obtain (1) as

η tA = θ AA ( L)etA + θ BA ( L)etB + ε tA

(4)

η tB = θ BB ( L)etB + θ AB ( L)etA + ε tB

Similar to the framework by Frijns (2006) and Pascual et al. (2006), the shocks η tA , η tB in (1)
include both volume-related and volume-unrelated shocks. Thus, the vector of ε t = (ε tA , ε tB )
represents volume-unrelated shocks. We expect E (ε tA , ε tB ) ≠ 0 due to the existence of
common factors. The formulation of volume-related or volume-unrelated shocks is consistent
with the treatment in Hasbrouck (1991b) and Dufour and Engle (2000)b.
The above equation (4) captures usual features that p it may, due to market frictions, not
instantaneously reproduce all the information trades released in t . As described in the
theoretical investigation in Frijns (2006) and Pascual et al. (2006), one might be tempted to
equate all “private information shocks” with volume-related shocks (etA , etB ) and all “public
information shocks” with volume-unrelated shocks (ε tA , ε tB ) .
In equation (3), the trading volumes do not depend on the contemporaneous change in market
prices. This is because trading volumes and prices are not determined simultaneously; the
b

Hasbrouck (1991b) and Dufour and Engle (2000) suggest the following vector autoregression (VAR),
∞

∞

∆qt = ∑ ai ∆qt − i + ∑ bi xt − i + v1,t
i =1

i =1

∞

∞

i =1

i =1

xt = ∑ ci ∆qt − i + ∑ d i xt − i + v2,t ,

to study the effects of trade-related information on prices. In the above equation, ∆qt is conventionally defined
as the quote change subsequent to the t th trade. Furthermore, the informational component of price variation
can be related to two different sources of information, public and private. These informational shocks are
commonly represented with two white noise processes v1, t and v 2 ,t . Specifically, v1, t is the update to the
public information set and v 2 ,t is the update from the private information which is gleaned from unexpected
trades. Dufour and Engle (2000) consider the simplest version of this model where xt is a univariate limited
dependent variable, the trade sign. Hasbrouck (1991b) proposes generalizations with xt as a vector of traderelated variables (e.g., trade sign, the interaction between trade sign and volume, the interaction between trade
sign and spread).
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price revisions always follow the trading activities. The model allows causality running from
lagged price revisions to trading volumes but not contemporaneouslyc.
Following the above discussion, we use a similar framework of the extended VEC model by
Arranz and Escribano (2000) with 4 equations, and with r ≤ 3 co-integrating vectors,
F∆z t = αβ ′z t -1 + G(L)∆z t -1 + ξ t

(5)

where ∆z t = ( ∆p At , ∆p Bt , ∆x At , ∆x Bt )′ is a 4 x 1 vector.
ξ t ′ = (ε tA ε tB etA etB ) ,
α is a 4 x r matrix of coefficients representing the speed of adjustment to equilibrium,
β is a 4 x r matrix of long-run coefficients,
A
A
1 0 - θ A,0

- θ B,0


B
B
0 1 - θ A,0 - θ B,0 

F=
,
0
0
1
0


0 0 0
1 
 φAA (L)
φBA (L)
(θ AA ( L) − θ AA,0 ) L-1
(θ BA ( L) − θ BA,0 ) L-1 
 B

φBB (L)
(θ AB ( L) − θ AB,0 ) L-1
(θ BB ( L) − θ BB,0 ) L-1 
 φA (L)
G(L) =  A

A
Π Ax,B (L)
Π Ax,A (L)
Π p,A (L) Π p,B (L)

 B

B
B
B
Π x,A (L)
Π x,B (L)
Π p,A (L) Π p,B (L)


c

The causality structure is common among theoretical models, such as Huang and Stoll (1997).

The empirical model (5) contains the main
features of the structural relationship as
described previously. It includes the
contemporaneous causality running from
trading volumes to prices; lagged causality
from prices to trading volumes; uncorrelated
(by definition) volume-related and volumeunrelated shocks; multiple co-integration
relationships involving trading volumes and
prices, and all the relevant information
being inferred from the past trading volumes
and prices.a
The Model of Information Shares
Hasbrouck (1991a, 1995) proposes a
measure of a market’s contribution to price
discovery based on the permanent impact of
new information on observed prices. This
study extends it to calculate “information
a

A salient feature of the VEC model (equation (5)) is
the extra lags in the error correction term. This type
of specification is called an extended vector error
correction (EVEC) model.

shares” as relative contributions of variance
of a security in the variance of innovations
of both trading volumes and prices. The
modified information share (MIS) model
can effectively distinguish the information
asymmetry
resulting
from
private
information or public information. Every
VEC model has an associated common
trend model representation implied by the
co-integration relationshipsb. The vector
moving average (VMA) representation of
(5) is
∆z t = Ψ ( L)ξ t
(6)
b

Hasbrouck (2002) confronts the information share
approach in Hasbrouck (1995) with the permanenttransitory approach in Harris et al. (2002). He shows
that in the case of a two-market model with private
and public information, similar to the one presented
in this paper, the information share approach is more
reliable. The bound generated by the information
share approach contains (up to the estimation error)
the true value. This cannot be said for the permanenttransitory approach.
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where Ψ ( L ) is a lag polynomial. Consider
the first two equations in (6),
∆pt = ψ ( L)ξ t
′
∆pt = (∆ptA ∆ptB )
and
where
ψ (L)
represents the first two rows in Ψ (L ) . By
recursive
substitution
and
using
*
ψ ( L) = ψ (1) + (1 − L)ψ ( L) with
ψ * ( L) = (ψ ( L) −ψ (1))(1 − L) −1 ,
t

pt = ψ (1)∑ ξτ + ψ * ( L)ξ t

(7)

τ =1

The first term on the right side of (7) is the
common long-run (permanent) component.
The second term is a zero-mean weakly
stationary (transitory) component. Cointegration entails δ ′Ψ (1) = 0 , where δ is a
co-integration vector. Under the theoretical
assumption that the difference between the
prices is stationary, δ ′ = (1 − 100) we have
that
with
ψ k (1)
ψ 1 (1) = ψ 2 (1) (1×4) ,
representing the k th row in Ψ (1) .
Intuitively,
the
common
long-run
component implies that the long-run impact
of a new shock on either A or B share
should have the same permanent impact on
all prices. It follows that ψξ t measures the
impact of a shock on the information
efficient price.
Let Var (ξ t ) = Ω ( 4×4) . Then the long-run
variance would be given by ψΩψ ′ . The aim
is to identify the part of this long-run
variance that is explained by each market’s
information. Under the assumption of no
correlation between (etA , etB ) and (ε tA , ε tB ) ,
δ ’s
the
corresponding
modified
information share (MIS) would be
MIS

δ

=

ψ δ2 σ δ2
ψΩψ ′

δ = {ε tA , ε tB , etA , etB }

(8)
where ψ δ2σ δ2 and ψ δ is the δ ’s
corresponding component of the row vector
ψ . Further, it requires that

∑δ MIS δ

=1
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′
If the innovations in ξ t = (ε tA ε tB etA etB )
are correlated, the covariance terms in Ω
could be attributed to any shock. This paper
follows
Hasbrouck’s
suggestion
of
constructing upper and lower bounds for the
information shares. We orthogonalize the
residual variance-covariance matrix using
the Cholesky factorization and rotate the
ordering of the variables to maximize and
minimize the explanatory power of each
particular shock. The Hasbrouck modeling
framework is problematic wherever the
contemporaneous correlation of shocks
across markets is substantive. In that case,
Huang (2002) and Booth et al. (2002) show
wide gaps between the upper and lower
bounds on the information shares. Although
Hasbrouck (1995) indicates the higher the
correlation between market innovations, the
greater (smaller) the upper (lower) bound,
Baillie et al. (2002) shows that the mean
value of the lower and upper bounds is a
reasonable estimate of a market’s
contribution to price discovery.
Empirical results
Data
There are two stock exchanges in China, the
Shanghai stock exchange and the Shenzhen
stock exchange, both inaugurated in the
early 1990s. The Shenzhen exchange is a
relatively smaller and less liquid market.
The market for 13 shares opened in 1992,
more than a year after A shares were first
listed on the Shanghai exchange. Table 1
presents basic statistics for the two
exchanges and Figure 1 plots the daily
trading volumes and share indices of A and
B shares in the two exchanges.
The sample in this study includes times
series of daily closing prices for sixty-four
firms issuing both A and B shares from
10/6/1997 to 10/31/2005 on either the
Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchange.
Among the firms, thirty-four are from the
Shanghai exchange and thirty are from the
Shenzhen exchange. We divide the full
sample into two sub-periods: before
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(10/6/1997 – 2/18/2001) and after
(2/20/2001 – 10/31/2005) when China
opened B shares to domestic investors.
Since the information-driven component in
the information share model is assumed to
follow a random walk, which is a unit root
process. Thus, we examine whether prices
from cross-listing (both A-shares and Bshares) contain unit roots and exclude the
samples that do not follow a random walk.
In the final sample, there are a total of eight
firms in Shanghai and twelve firms in
Shenzhen left before China opened B shares
to domestic investors and twenty-six firms
in Shanghai and twenty-two firms left in
Shenzhen after the opening of B shares (see
Appendix for the list of company names).
Cointegration between A- and Bshares
In segmented markets, prices are primarily
determined by supply and demand
conditions within each trading venue. By
contrast, proper price discovery requires that
prices from various traders not only be
informative but that they also reflect
common information on the underlying
asset. This means prices for the same asset
must be cointegrated.
To test the cointegration relationship of
prices between A- and B-shares, we adopt
the Johansen (1988) maximum likelihood
methodology. Johansen (1988) observes that
the rank of the matrix αβ ′ in (1a)
determines whether or not the prices from
various markets are cointegrated, and rank
also determines the number of cointegrating
vectors. Specifically, he provides two test
statistics:
n

λtrace (r ) = −T ∑ ln(1 − λˆt )

(10)

t = r +1

and
λmax (r , r + 1) = −T ln(1 − λˆr +1 ) (11)
where the n characteristic roots are ordered
such that λ1 > λ2 > ... > λn and T is the
number of observations. The statistic λtrace
tests the null hypothesis that the number of
cointegrating vectors is less than or equal to
r against the alternative that it is greater
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than r . The statistic λmax tests the null
hypothesis that the number of cointegrating
vectors equals r against the alternative that
it is equal to r + 1 .
The test results for all stocks in the final
sample in each of the two exchanges are
consistent with at least one cointegrating
vector. Tables 2(a) and 2(b) report the
cointegration results for the sample period
before and after the opening of B-shares.
The results for the two exchanges are
similar.
The Information Shares of
Hasbrouck (1995)
The estimation methodology exploits the
duality between the VAR representation (5)
and the VMA formulation (7) to estimate
the information share, using the covariance
matrix of innovations diagonalized by the
Cholesky factorization procedure. Varying
the participant order produces the maximum
and minimum bounds on the information
shares of the participants. Since an estimate
of the information share’s standard error is
difficult to obtain, the analysis follows
Hasbrouck (1995) in using the crosssectional variation in the information share
to determine the statistical significance of
the estimates.
Tables 3(a) and 3(b) report the information
shares in Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges
respectively. The two exchanges have
similar results. Before the opening of Bshares to domestic investors, B-shares
dominate the market (with an average of
61.88 percent (55.72 percent) in B-shares as
compared to 38.12 percent (44.28 percent in
A-shares
in
Shanghai
(Shenzhen)).
However, A-shares dominate the market
after the opening of B-shares to domestic
investors (with an average of 58.01 percent
(54.52 percent) in A-shares compared to
41.99 percent (45.48 percent) in Shanghai
(Shenzhen)).
The result before the opening of B-shares is
consistent with the “institutional dominance
hypothesis,” in which large foreign
institutional investors generally are more
experienced, have better means of obtaining
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information, and have access to more
advanced technology to analyze the data. In
the earlier period when A- and B-shares
were completely segmented, the B-share
market was traded by foreign institutional
investors only. The A-share market,
composed of domestic individual investors,
learned information from the B-share
market. However, after the opening of Bshares to domestic investors, traders in the
B-share market are composed of both
foreign institutional investors and domestic
investors. The information advantage of Bshares thus no longer exists.
Despite using different empirical models,
our finding is consistent with those of Chui
and Kwok (1998) and Sjöö and Zhang
(2000). They all indicate there exists crucial
information barriers to domestic investors in
China, mainly because of the low
creditability of the domestic media. The cost
of obtaining correct information about the
stock market is generally high for domestic
investors. Thus, a cost-effective way for
getting information is to observe the price
movements in the foreign B shares.
The information asymmetry is obvious in
Shanghai relative to that in Shenzhen. The
explanation could be that the Shenzhen
exchange is relatively smaller in terms of
total market capitalization and the number
of listed firms (as shown in Table 1)c. The
finding is also at odds with the argument
that the Shenzhen market informationally
leads the Shanghai market, as reported in
Fung et al. (2000) and Poon and Fung
(2000). The observed prices and trading
activities in the Shanghai exchange seem to
play a more important role as a “buy signal”
for
relatively
uninformed
domestic
d
investors .
c

Another possible explanation is that more “foreign”
investors (mainly Hong Kong investors, who are
allowed to open A-share accounts in Shenzhen and
Shanghai) traded A-share in Shenzhen than that in
Shanghai before February 2001.
d
Another possible explanation is information quality
and institutional investor choices. Chan (1993)
argues large firm has better quality information than
small firms. Thus, institutional investors usually
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The Modified Information Shares
Table 4(a) (Table 4(b)) represents the lower,
upper and mean modified information
shares bounds between A and B shares on
the Shanghai (Shenzhen) exchange. Table
4(c) summarizes the average mean values of
modified information shares between A and
B shares. As shown in Table 4(c), the
private (volume-related) information shocks
(in e A and e B ) always dominate the public
(volume-unrelated) information shocks (in
ε A and ε B ) on both exchanges. Before the
opening of B-shares to domestic investors,
B-shares’ contribution is slightly higher than
A-shares’ in private information shocks. As
for public information shocks, B-shares’
price discovery contribution is slightly
lower than A-shares’. The two exchanges
have similar findings.
When the market is completely segmented,
the results in this section support the
institutional dominance hypothesis. Even
though the B-share market has relatively
low trading volumes (as shown in Figure 2),
foreign institution investors, who have been
regarded as informed traderse, have better
private information than local investors
because of their experience and expertise.
By contrast, local individual investors’
information
advantage
on
public
information is due to their understanding of
the local language and culture. Another
potential source of information advantage
for local investors is a better knowledge of
important government data releases or
policy actions (Covrig and Melvin (2002)).
After the opening of B-shares to domestic
investors, A-shares have an information
advantage over B-shares in both private and
public information shocks (except for the
focus on large firms. Individual investors adjust the
prices of small stocks after observing previous price
changes of large stocks. Bailey and Jagtiani (1994)
found that foreign investors prefer to invest in large
domestic firms where the financial disclosure and
information availability are better.
e
Many prior studies, such as Szewczyk et al. (1992),
Alangar et al. (1999), Chakravarty (2001) and Anand
et al. (2005), found evidence of institutions being
better informed (relative to individuals).
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public information in the Shenzhen
exchange). The result, which supports the
local familiarity hypothesis, is consistent
with the finding by Chiu et al. (2005). They
indicated that the removal of the B-share
restriction accelerates the market integration
between A- and B-shares.
Conclusion
Are foreign investors at an information
advantage (or disadvantage) relative to
domestic investors? This has been one of the
frequently researched topics in the
international capital market literature. This
paper examines the possible information
asymmetry between A-share (domestic
investors) and B-share (foreign investors)
markets in China. China’s stock market is
an ideal market for investigation since the
A-share and B-share markets were
completely segmented before February 19,
2001, which means that we can examine
information advantages of A- and B-share
markets under different trading mechanisms.
Foreign investors in the B-share market are
almost all institutional investors who are
more experienced and have better means of
obtaining
information.
By
contrast,
domestic investors in the A-share market are
almost all individual investors who rely

solely on rumor and perception and are
more likely to trade based on “noise” rather
than on information.
We use and modify the Hasbrouck’s
information share model to analyze the
contribution of each market to price
discovery. The modified information share
model allows us to distinguish two sources
of information asymmetries between
markets:
volume-related
(private)
information shocks and volume-unrelated
(public) information shocks.
The empirical results indicate that when the
two markets are completely segmented, the
price discovery contribution of B-shares is
slightly higher (lower) than that of A-shares
in private (public) information shocks. This
implies that domestic individual investors
have better public information, while
foreign institutional investors have better
private information. After the B-share
market was opened to domestic investors,
the information advantage of B-shares no
longer exists. Due to the improvement of
market integration between A- and Bshares, the A-share market has the
information advantage over the B-share
market in both private and public
information
shocks.

Table 1 Descriptive statisticsa
Shanghai
stock exchange
Number of A shares listed
824
Number of B shares listed
534
A-share market capitalization (billion RMB)b
490.592
B-share market capitalization (billion RMB)
10.445

a
b
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Shenzhen
stock exchange
54
55
199.562
12.639

This table contains basic statistics of China’s stock markets during the sample period in the study.
Updated to October, 2005.
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Table 2(a) Cointegration Tests Before the Opening of B-shares
The table presents the results of Johansen cointegration tests for daily closing prices between A- and B-shares
on twenty cross-listed stocks (eight in Shanghai and twelve in Shenzhen) before the opening of B-shares to
domestic investors. Two test statistics are λtrace and λmax and the critical values are from Osterwald-Lenum
(1992). The statistic

λtrace

tests the null hypothesis that the number of cointegrating vectors is less than or equal

r = 1 against the alternative that it is greater than r . The statistic λmax tests the null hypothesis that the
number of cointegrating vectors equals r against the alternative that it is equal to r + 1 .
Shanghai (8 firms)
Code no. λ
trace
of stock
600614
25.677
600639
25.779
600663
24.403
600680
21.083
600776
22.263
600801
19.480
600822
19.132
600841
22.661

λmax
23.295
24.375
19.152
19.202
19.808
18.401
16.930
20.933

critical
values
2.382
1.405
5.251
1.881
2.456
1.079
2.202
1.728

Shenzhen (12 firms)
Code no.
λtrace
of stock
000002
18.399
000011
21.533
000016
25.428
000018
24.867
000026
15.361
000056
18.073
000058
12.047
000418
40.264
000530
30.009
000539
17.101
000541
34.597
000553
11.971

λmax
16.544
19.155
22.259
20.218
15.361
15.839
11.814
32.373
23.325
15.980
29.882
11.971

critical
values
1.854
2.378
3.169
4.649
0.000
2.234
0.233
7.892
6.685
1.122
4.716
0.000
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Table 2(b) Cointegration Tests After the Opening of B-shares
The table presents the results of Johansen cointegration tests for daily closing prices between A- and B-shares
on forty-eught cross-listed stocks (twenty-six in Shanghai and twenty-two in Shenzhen) after the opening of Bshares to domestic investors. Two test statistics are λtrace and λmax and the critical values are from OsterwaldLenum (1992). The statistic

λtrace

tests the null hypothesis that the number of cointegrating vectors is less than

or equal r = 1 against the alternative that it is greater than r . The statistic

λmax

tests the null hypothesis that

the number of cointegrating vectors equals r against the alternative that it is equal to r = 1 .
Shanghai (26 firms)
Code no.
λtrace
of stock
600054
38.143
600094
35.802
600190
57.229
600221
63.093
600604
43.016
600610
26.311
600611
32.623
600612
51.528
600613
35.180
600614
47.547
600619
38.755
600639
22.864
600648
35.650
600650
39.536
600663
12.856
600680
41.954
600689
49.246
600726
35.807
600754
38.218
600776
41.231
600801
35.437
600822
23.671
600827
26.619
600835
19.732
600843
26.881
600845
30.780

λmax
35.917
32.029
54.247
59.837
41.089
24.911
30.881
49.702
33.525
44.591
36.755
21.033
33.441
36.562
10.952
39.891
46.739
32.481
35.339
34.642
33.231
22.339
25.059
17.828
25.041
28.937

critical
values
2.226
3.772
2.982
3.256
1.927
1.400
1.742
1.827
1.655
2.955
2.000
1.830
2.209
2.975
1.904
2.062
2.507
3.326
2.879
6.589
2.206
1.331
1.560
1.904
1.840
1.842

Shenzhen (22 firms)
Code no.
λtrace
of stock
000002
22.716
000011
54.066
000012
15.373
000016
12.942
000018
24.929
000019
27.492
000022
28.826
000024
15.464
000028
38.512
000055
25.057
000058
21.505
000413
17.665
000429
39.671
000513
30.750
000521
56.549
000530
14.699
000550
28.806
000553
19.782
000570
65.307
000581
17.019
000625
15.145
000761
36.650

λmax
19.667
51.516
13.416
10.089
22.889
25.800
24.665
15.423
33.902
23.910
19.620
15.706
34.675
29.341
53.627
12.915
28.347
18.068
61.546
16.479
14.426
33.033

critical
values
3.049
0.002
1.957
2.854
2.040
1.692
4.160
0.041
4.610
1.146
1.885
1.958
4.995
1.409
2.922
1.785
0.460
1.714
3.762
0.540
0.719
3.618
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Table 3(a) Hasbrouck’s Information Shares in Shanghai Exchange
This table reports estimates (by percentage) of the Hasbrouck’s (1995) information shares (as described in
Section 3) for A- and B-shares in Shanghai before and after the opening of B-shares to domestic investors. It
includes upper bounds, lower bounds, and mean values of information shares. The averages of the above upper
bounds, lower bounds, and mean values of all A-share and B-share stocks (eight firms before and twenty-six
firms after the opening of B-shares) are listed on the bottom line.
Unit: %
Before the opening (8 firms)
Code no. A-shares
B-shares
of stocks
upper
lower
mean
upper
lower
600054
600094
600190
600221
600602
600604
600610
600611
600612
600613
600614
600618
600619
600623
600639
600648
600650
600663
600679
600680
600689
600726
600754
600776
600801
600818
600822
600827
600835
600841
600843
600845
Average

64.75

26.24

45.50

73.36

35.25

mean

54.50

47.76

5.51

26.64

94.49

52.24

73.36

35.68

3.26

19.47

64.32

96.74

80.53

80.02

29.50

54.76

70.5-

19.98

45.24

29.61
66.99

1.04
20.18

15.32
43.58

98.96
79.82

70.39
33.01

84.68
56.42

80.51

39.01

59.76

60.99

19.49

40.24

63.95

15.93

39.94

84.07

36.05

60.06

38.12

61.88

After the opening (26 firms)
A-shares
B-shares
upper
lower
mean
upper
lower

mean

93.86
97.29
96.92
99.85

14.28
17.68
26.81
26.09

54.07
57.48
61.86
62.97

85.72
82.32
73.19
73.91

6.14
2.71
3.08
0.15

45.93
42.52
38.14
37.03

98.80
98.21
96.75
97.53
95.50
93.64

15.09
16.71
24.87
19.32
8.67
26.74

56.94
57.46
60.81
58.42
52.09
60.19

84.91
83.29
75.13
80.68
91.33
73.26

1.20
1.79
3.25
2.47
4.50
6.36

43.06
42.54
39.19
41.58
47.91
39.81

93.26

11.37

52.32

88.63

6.74

47.68

97.94
96.95
99.53
98.64

14.95
15.33
23.28
19.13

56.45
56.14
61.41
58.88

85.05
84.67
76.72
80.87

2.06
3.05
0.47
1.36

43.55
43.86
38.59
41.12

97.27
95.09
99.10
96.84
99.43
98.38

14.71
10.20
24.77
17.34
16.05
29.90

55.99
52.65
61.93
57.09
57.74
64.14

85.29
89.80
75.23
82.66
83.95
70.10

2.73
4.91
0.90
3.16
0.57
1.62

44.01
47.35
38.07
42.91
42.26
35.86

95.58
99.93
99.67

15.18
46.05
28.93

55.38
72.99
64.30

84.82
53.95
71.07

4.42
0.07
0.33

44.62
27.01
35.70

94.24
87.27

9.48
6.23

51.86
46.75
58.01

90.52
93.77

5.76
12.73

48.14
53.25
41.99
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Table 3(b) Hasbrouck’s Information Shares in Shenzhen Exchange
This table reports estimates (by percentage) of the Hasbrouck’s (1995) information shares (as described in
Section 3) for A- and B-shares in Shenzhen before and after the opening of B-shares to domestic investors. It
includes upper bounds, lower bounds, and mean values of information shares. The averages of the above upper
bounds, lower bounds, and mean values of all A-share and B-share stocks (twelve firms before and twenty-two
firms after the opening of B-shares) are listed on the bottom line.
Unit: %
Before the opening (12 firms)
Code
no.
of A-shares
B-shares
stocks
upper
lower
mean
upper
000002
61.57
7.14
34.36
92.86
000011
89.68
23.32
56.50
76.68
000012
000016
70.42
29.23
49.83
70.77
000018
99.49
81.81
90.65
18.19
000019
000022
000024
000026
59.76
11.92
35.84
80.08
000028
000029
000037
000039
000045
000055
000056
73.35
23.62
48.49
76.38
000058
85.80
33.64
59.72
66.36
000413
000418
30.52
4.99
17.76
95.01
000429
000513
000521
000530
35.15
0.16
17.66
99.84
000539
74.54
14.79
44.66
85.21
000541
24.23
0.31
12.27
99.69
000550
000553
91.57
35.77
63.67
64.23
000570
000581
000625
000761
Average
44.28

lower
38.43
10.32

mean
65.64
43.50

29.58
0.51

50.17
9.35

40.24

64.16

26.65
14.20

51.51
40.28

69.48

82.24

64.85
25.46
75.77

82.34
55.34
87.73

8.43

36.33

55.72

After the opening (22 firms)
A-shares
B-shares
upper
lower
mean
upper
82.08
2.59
42.33
97.41
98.56
7.25
52.91
1.44
99.19
27.57
63.38
72.43
89.13
31.56
60.35
68.44
97.02
10.52
53.77
89.48
98.13
10.48
54.30
89.52
88.64
7.33
47.99
92.67
96.83
16.35
56.59
83.65

lower
17.92
92.75
0.81
10.87
2.98
1.87
11.36
3.17

mean
57.67
47.09
36.62
39.65
46.23
45.70
52.01
43.41

99.77

18.19

58.98

81.81

0.23

41.02

87.76

0.17

43.97

99.83

12.24

56.03

97.21
90.97

10.25
3.24

53.73
47.11

89.75
96.76

2.79
9.03

46.27
52.89

96.13
99.33
99.99
99.83

13.38
18.18
17.41
20.60

54.76
58.76
58.70
60.21

86.62
81.82
82.59
79.40

3.87
0.67
0.01
0.17

45.24
41.24
41.30
39.79

98.14
88.77
99.71
99.68
64.54
97.02

25.74
3.67
14.34
29.28
27.95
14.40

61.94
46.22
57.03
64.46
46.24
55.71
54.52

74.26
96.33
85.66
70.77
72.05
2.98

1.86
11.23
0.29
0.32
35.46
85.60

38.06
53.78
42.97
35.54
53.76
44.29
45.48
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Table 4(a) Modified Information Shares between A-shares and B-shares on the Shanghai Exchange
This table reports estimates (by percentage) of the modified information shares (as described by equation (8))
for A- and B-shares in Shanghai before (panel A) and after (panel B) the opening of B-shares to domestic
investors. It includes upper bounds, lower bounds, and mean values of modified information shares for public
A

information in A-shares ( ε ), B-sharea ( ε ) and private information in A-shares ( e ), B-shares ( e ).
B

A

Panel A: the first subperiod (before the opening)
Code no. of stocks
upper
lower
mean

600614

600639

600663

600680

εA
εB
eA
eB

εA
εB
eA
eB
εA
εB
eA
eB
εA
εB
eA
eB

27.03
11.53
95.78
86.63

0.12
0.01
9.07
2.38

9.74
3.22
56.75
30.29

20.68
4.55
75.85
85.42

0.01
0.01
8.98
22.01

8.43
1.65
36.95
52.98

25.33
22.00
87.48
86.76

0.04
0.00
0.53
7.30

7.00
6.86
31.46
54.68

16.11
11.17
85.91
92.47

0.19
0.00
2.99
12.55

6.35
3.40
39.25
51.01

Panel B: the second subperiod (after the opening)
Code no. of stocks
upper
lower
mean

Unit: %
Code no. of stocks

600776

600801

600822

600841

600654

600694

600190

eA
eB

εA
εB
eA
eB
εA
εB
eA
eB

600221

εA
εB
eA
eB

600604

εA
εB

eA
eB

εA
εB
eA
eB
εA
εB
eA
eB
εA
εB
eA
eB

Code no. of stocks

A

ε
εB

εA
εB

B

upper

lower

mean

20.38
7.82
79.90
63.63

0.00
0.00
20.71
9.70

20.71
4.27
44.28
43.46

37.98
25.13
96.01
80.48

0.30
0.00
7.04
2.21

13.97
5.79
50.07
30.17

3.07
6.12
92.70
97.37

0.07
0.00
1.60
5.96

1.36
1.71
46.37
50.56

16.69
8.33
76.53
86.75

0.10
0.01
7.41
21.43

7.08
2.75
39.09
51.08

upper

lower

mean

5.51
15.23
97.08
97.83

0.05
0.00
0.21
1.04

1.57
3.17
63.21
32.05

98.16
78.98
15.55
3.78

19.44
0.92
0.00
0.12

60.82
33.79
4.55
0.84

3.73
21.93
92.48
95.60

0.00
0.00
0.40
4.52

1.43
2.39
62.62
33.56

25.01
13.86
89.71
97.36

0.00
0.00
0.97
8.68

7.25
3.70
41.40
47.65

21.77
13.71
92.88

0.15
0.00
0.45

7.34
3.18
39.74

A

9.97
42.32
90.70
94.40

0.11
0.00
3.43
1.78

3.36
6.32
54.41
35.92

8.71
10.27
80.62
95.68

0.02
0.01
1.02
17.55

2.32
2.78
34.39
60.50

42.94
40.96
98.19
98.57

0.21
0.00
0.03
0.24

12.53
7.84
45.47
34.16

95.60
67.61
98.62
98.01

0.34
0.00
0.02
0.01

29.30
13.14
34.72
22.83

600689

8.46
18.24
96.44

0.01
0.01
0.62

2.28
3.28
42.05

600726

600650

600663

600680

ε
εB

eA
eB

εA
εB
eA
eB
εA
εB
eA
eB

εA
εB
eA
eB

εA
εB
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eA
eB
600610

600611

600612

600613

600614

εA
εB
eA
eB

εA
εB
eA
eB

εA
εB
eA
eB
εA
εB
eA
eB
εA
εB
eA
eB

600619

600639

εA
εB
eA
eB
εA
εB
eA
eB

600648

εA
εB
eA
eB

97.51

1.97

52.39

96.14
70.33
18.98
6.80

27.21
0.01
0.00
0.72

69.49
21.15
7.04
2.32

16.43
14.13
95.10
98.59

0.25
0.00
0.12
3.88

5.21
3.19
37.24
54.36

10.06
4.87
93.17
77.15

0.00
0.00
20.68
2.76

3.10
1.92
58.05
36.93

86.30
85.00
81.24
90.97

0.32
0.00
0.95
0.04

10.71
8.94
34.27
46.08

9.30
11.38
95.10
91.83

0.32
0.00
5.66
0.90

2.95
2.69
60.09
34.27

36.35
27.48
85.51
91.19

0.04
0.00
0.00
9.70

9.24
8.60
32.38
49.77

5.20
16.50
90.68
98.05

0.09
0.00
0.41
7.38

1.36
1.73
57.08
39.83

3.85
15.89
87.30
98.23

0.01
0.00
0.20
10.25

1.36
1.78
56.53
40.33

eA
eB
600754

600776

600801

600822

600827

εA
εB
eA
eB

εA
εB
eA
eB

εA
εB
eA
eB
εA
εB
eA
eB
εA
εB
eA
eB

600835

600843

εA
εB
eA
eB
εA
εB
eA
eB

600845

εA
εB
eA
eB
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98.52

6.21

49.74

28.83
24.85
98.00
98.26

0.24
0.00
0.23
1.05

8.69
5.93
49.39
35.99

54.15
46.84
95.42
96.30

0.29
0.00
0.15
1.89

15.70
9.15
36.64
38.50

12.54
17.89
83.29
98.78

0.33
0.00
0.02
14.30

3.63
4.61
36.94
54.82

13.65
23.89
98.58
98.32

0.41
0.00
0.24
0.07

2.95
4.52
63.20
29.33

60.19
24.02
98.86
90.54

0.61
0.00
0.20
0.18

21.64
4.65
40.38
33.33

9.93
20.80
99.07
82.61

0.10
0.00
7.40
0.15

2.09
2.49
76.72
18.70

5.79
16.58
98.75
86.32

0.03
0.01
9.19
1.14

1.63
2.08
71.49
24.80

2.26
15.70
97.91
98.25

0.01
0.00
0.06
0.94

0.79
2.02
65.37
31.82
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Table 4(b)
Modified Information Shares between A-shares and B-shares in the Shenzhen Exchange
This table reports estimates (by percentage) of the modified information shares (as described by equation (8))
for A- and B-shares in Shenzhen before (panel A) and after (panel B) the opening of B-shares to domestic
investors. It includes upper bounds, lower bounds, and mean values of modified information shares for public
A
B
A
B
information in A-shares ( ε ), B-shares ( ε ) and private information in A-shares ( e ), B-shares ( e ).
Panel A: the first subperiod (before the opening)
Code no. of stocks
upper
lower
mean

Unit: %
Code no. of stocks

A

000002

000011

ε
εB

eA
eB

εA
εB
eA
eB

000016

000018

εA
εB
eA
eB
εA
εB
eA
eB

000026

εA
εB
eA
eB

000056

εA
εB
eA
eB

27.17
6.00
86.86
88.68

0.02
0.03
7.09
11.96

9.54
1.65
40.51
48.30

11.25
5.69
56.23
99.46

0.17
0.00
0.27
42.02

4.20
1.57
21.56
72.67

23.47
8.32
97.61
66.53

0.23
0.04
24.68
1.09

9.73
2.16
68.76
19.35

32.77
16.81
88.17
93.26

1.56
0.00
0.12
8.87

10.90
3.71
34.56
50.84

20.23
17.36
79.45
97.97

0.13
0.00
0.04
16.95

6.62
5.22
28.21
59.96

40.43
9.95
97.56
98.45

0.15
0.00
0.05
1.89

15.36
2.13
52.55
29.97

Panel B: the second subperiod (after the opening)
Code no. of stocks
upper
lower
mean

000058

000418

000002

000011

eB
000012

εA
εB

ε
εB

eA
eB

εA
εB
eA
eB

000530

000539

εA
εB
eA
eB
εA
εB
eA
eB

000541

εA
εB
eA
eB

000553

εA
εB
eA
eB

Code no. of stocks

A

ε
εB
eA
eB
εA
εB
eA

upper

lower

mean

13.78
5.30
87.54
97.80

0.29
0.00
0.67
11.16

5.59
1.49
52.31
40.60

56.21
17.52
98.30
95.21

0.61
0.00
0.13
35.37

22.16
3.12
39.35
0.83

13.74
11.17
63.63
91.48

0.00
0.01
5.79
32.50

4.32
4.13
31.39
60.16

14.45
6.86
76.31
86.14

0.08
0.02
9.64
22.44

5.86
2.14
41.18
50.81

82.33
12.41
80.11
47.01

0.59
0.00
0.00
0.21

32.1
7.21
43.70
16.90

20.90
10.27
91.64
97.22

0.47
0.00
0.13
7.43

8.22
2.28
34.77
54.74

upper

lower

mean

11.11
26.24
88.58
90.08

0.00
0.01
4.63
8.32

2.62
3.92
45.06
48.40

25.45
20.02
89.28
99.34

0.00
0.00
0.00
8.85

6.85
5.74
34.98
52.43

6.77
30.68
96.92

0.16
0.01
48.61

1.62
8.74
77.15

A

A

2.73
21.28
98.78
90.86

0.17
0.03
7.46
0.03

0.92
7.92
62.36
28.81

36.60
45.82
93.79
98.26

0.32
0.00
0.15
1.46

10.05
11.74
33.09
45.12

000429

72.92
63.30
95.85

0.61
0.00
0.37

21.48
12.92
31.79

000513

000413

ε
εB
eA
eB
εA
εB
eA
eB

εA
εB
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eA
eB
000016

000018

000019

000022

000024

εA
εB
eA
eB

εA
εB
eA
eB

εA
εB
eA
eB
εA
εB
eA
eB
εA
εB
eA
eB

000028

000055

εA
εB
eA
eB
εA
εB
eA
eB

000058

εA
εB
eA
eB

95.84

1.31

33.81

31.93
13.56
98.39
96.41

0.96
0.00
0.22
0.00

12.12
4.02
52.52
31.34

5.80
8.99
72.90
94.25

0.65
0.00
0.00
23.35

2.80
2.15
39.39
55.66

3.93
50.93
80.12
97.60

0.04
0.00
0.03
18.67

1.69
16.69
22.28
59.34

19.87
27.22
48.34
92.37

0.28
0.00
0.05
28.53

9.01
8.93
27.22
54.84

12.24
29.23
97.17
81.30

0.12
0.01
13.49
0.39

3.47
8.22
70.53
17.78

3.19
14.60
88.21
97.74

0.03
0.00
0.71
9.01

1.48
3.34
53.28
41.90

54.60
48.83
97.25
92.84

0.32
0.00
1.91
0.44

15.21
10.71
45.49
28.58

67.96
56.73
98.49
97.09

0.27
0.00
0.14
0.00

19.67
10.90
41.85
27.55

eA
eB
000521

000530

000550

000553

000570

εA
εB
eA
eB

εA
εB
eA
eB

εA
εB
eA
eB
εA
εB
eA
eB
εA
εB
eA
eB

000581

00625

εA
εB
eA
eB
εA
εB
eA
eB

000761

εA
εB
eA
eB
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46.75

2.10

12.49

23.30
35.08
75.36
97.17

0.12
0.00
0.52
16.51

6.51
7.82
31.07
54.61

20.45
27.09
95.71
94.06

0.26
0.00
0.96
3.58

5.24
5.89
34.37
54.50

18.39
27.98
4.12
96.25

0.16
0.00
0.25
21.17

5.85
6.91
30.91
56.34

25.25
36.08
97.38
97.71

0.28
0.00
0.10
0.34

7.07
8.99
42.08
41.86

11.90
48.71
99.85
86.99

0.07
0.03
10.97
0.05

3.79
12.89
61.11
22.21

8.37
9.15
79.28
98.61

0.33
0.00
0.00
18.01

3.40
2.40
41.21
52.99

35.05
32.31
98.35
93.97

0.34
0.00
2.03
0.00

11.05
6.52
53.80
28.62

4.57
52.04
96.75
97.01

0.10
0.00
0.05
0.92

1.86
4.94
59.52
33.68

49

International Research Journal of Applied Finance
Vol. V Issue – 1 January, 2014

ISSN 2229 – 6891

Table 4(c)
Summary of the Average Mean Values of Modified Information Shares between A-shares
and B-shares
This table summarizes the average mean values of the modified information shares in Table 4(a) and (b). It
A

includes the average mean values of the modified information shares for public information in A-shares ( ε ),
B

A

B

B-shares ( ε ) and private information in A-shares ( e ), B-shares ( e ). All estimates are percentages.
Unit: %
before the opening
Shanghai
Shenzhen
public
information
private
information

A

after the opening
Shanghai

Shenzhen

ε
εB

7.74

11.23

11.11

6.99

3.71

3.07

6.35

7.83

eA
eB

43.03

40.74

46.36

45.05

45.53
44.97
36.19
Figure 1(a): Stock index in Shanghai
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Figure 1(b): Stock index in Shenzhen
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Figure 2(a): Trading volumes in Shanghai
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Figure 2(b): Trading volumes in Shenzhen
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Appendix: List of company names in sample
A. Shanghai Exchange
Code No.
Full name of company
600054
Huangshan Tourism Development Co., Ltd.
600094
Shanghai Worldbest Co., Ltd.
600190
Jinzhou Port Co., Ltd.
600221
Hainan Airlines Co., Ltd.
600602
Sva Electron Co., Ltd.
600604
Shanghai Erfangji Co., Ltd.
600610
China Textile Machinery Co., Ltd.
600611
Dazhong Transportion (Group) Co., Ltd.
600612
China First Pencil Co., Ltd.
600613
Shanghai Wingsung Data Technology Co., Ltd.
600614
Shanghai Sanjiu Technology Development(Group) Co., Ltd.
600618
Shanghai Chlor-Alkali Chemical Co., Ltd.
600619
Shanghai Highly (Group) Co., Ltd.
600623
Shanghai Tyre & Rubber (Group) Co., Ltd.
600639
Shanghai Jinqiao Export Processing Zone Dev. Co., Ltd.
600648
Shanghai Wai Gaoqiao Free Trade Zone Development Co.
600650
Shanghai Jin Jiang International Ind. Inv. Co., Ltd.
600663
Shanghai Lujiazui Finance & Trade Zone Dev. Co., Ltd.
600679
Phoenix Co., Ltd.
600680
Shanghai Posts & Telecommunications Equipment Co., Ltd.
600689
Shanghai Sanmao Enterprise (Group) Co., Ltd.
600726
Huadian Energy Co., Ltd.
600754
Shanghai Jinjiang International Hotels Dev. Co., Ltd.
600776
Eastern Communications Co., Ltd.
600801
Huaxin Cement Co., Ltd.
600822
Shanghai Material Trading Co., Ltd.
600827
Shanghai Friendship Group Incorporated Company
600835
Shanghai Mechanical & Electrical Industry Co., Ltd.
600841
Shanghai Diesel Engine Co., Ltd.
600843
SGSB Group Co., Ltd.
600845
Shanghai Baosight Software Co.,Ltd.
B. Shenzhen Exchange
Code No.
000002
000011
000012
000016
000018
000019
000022
000024
000026
000028
000029
000037
000039
000045
000055
000056
000058
000413
000418
000429

Full name of company
China Vanke Co., Ltd.
Shenzhen Properties & Resources Dev. (Group) Ltd.
CSG Holding Co., Ltd.
Konka Group Co., Ltd.
Shenzhen Victor Onward Textile Ind. Co., Ltd.
Shenzhen Shenbao Industrial Co., Ltd.
Shenzhen Chiwan Wharf Holdings Ltd.
China Merchants Property Development Co., Ltd.
Shenzhen Fiyta Holdings Limited
Shenzhen Accord Pharmaceutical CO., Ltd.
SZ S.E.Z. Real Estate & Properties (Group) Co., Ltd.
Shenzhen Nanshan Power Station Company Limited
China International Marine Containers (Group) Co., Ltd
Shenzhen Textile (Holdings) Co., Ltd.
China Fangda Group Company Limited
Shenzhen International Enterprise Co., Ltd.
Shenzhen SEG Co., Ltd.
Shijiazhuang Baoshi Electronic Glass Company Limited
Wuxi Little Swan Company Limited
Guangdong Provincial Expressway Development Co., Ltd.
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Code No.
000513
000521
000530
000539
000541
000550
000553
000570
000581
000625
000761
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Full name of company
Livzon Pharmaceutical Group Inc.
Hefei Meiling Co., Ltd.
Dalian Refrigeration Co., Ltd.
Guangdong Electric Power Development Co., Ltd.
Foshan Electrical & Lighting Co., Ltd.
Jiangling Motors Corporation Ltd.
Hubei Sanonda Co., Ltd.
Changchai Co., Ltd.
Weifu High-Technology Co., Ltd.
Chongqing Changan Automobile Co., Ltd.
Bengang Steel Plates Co., Ltd
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The Asymmetric Information of Alpha on Portfolio Management within the
S&P 500
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Abstract
Alpha, Beta and the Sharpe Ratio have become the obsessive Holy Trinity of portfolio
management. Portfolio managers are held hostage to these statistics and their benchmark error.
This paper recognizes this reality. It is an attempt to help S&P 500 large-capitalization portfolio
managers perform better. The hypothesis is that by concentrating only on high alpha stocks,
performance characteristics could be enhanced for such managers. The paper makes a
compelling case for such conduct.
Introduction
There are many paradigms in finance. One is
the contention that the stock market is
efficient. Eugene F. Fama espoused this
paradigm, The Efficient Market Hypothesis
(EMH), while a doctoral student at Chicago.
The core concept is simple. Stock prices
change from one period to the next due to the
appearance of new and unanticipated
information.
Since this information was
revealed randomly, stock prices at all times
were correctly set, which is the finance
definition of “efficient.” This concept of an
efficient market is still paramount in
investment
theory
although
strict
interpretation of it has been challenged as time
has passed. Fama (1970) noted that in an
efficient market any new information would
be immediately and fully reflected in equity
prices.
A financial market therefore quickly, if not
instantaneously, discounts all available
information. In an efficient market, investors
should expect an asset price to reflect its true
fundamental value at all times. Bruno Solnik
(1996) noted that since fundamental value is
unknown, the only way to test for market
efficiency is to detect whether some specific
news is not yet incorporated in the asset price
and could therefore be used to make some
abnormal profit.
Those who challenge EMH suggest that there
exists public information already available that

can be more effectively incorporated in the
asset price and could therefore be used to
make some abnormal profit. This group
includes most of the world’s investment
managers.
Market Efficiency
It is essential to understand the environment in
which securities are priced. The signal
question is how effectively investor’s
expectations are incorporated into security
pricing. Are investor’s expectations for a
particular security quickly and accurately
reflected in the price of the security? This is
the concept of market efficiency.
In an efficient market, the current prices of
securities represent unbiased estimates of the
“fair,” “intrinsic,” “real,” “fair market,”
“sound,” and “true” value of the securities. If
all securities are correctly valued (by whatever
term), investors will earn a return on their
investment appropriate for the level of risk
assumed by the investor according to Capital
Market Theory. This is called the “normal
return”. This “normal return” will occur
regardless of which securities are purchased.
Thus, in a perfectly efficient market in
equilibrium all securities are correctly priced,
and there are no under or over valued
securities. The existing price for each security
is its correct price.
The degree to which a market is efficient has a
profound implication for investors. If a market
is efficient, the time, money, effort, required
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knowledge, and anxiety required to engage in
security analysis becomes meaningless.
The central theorem of the EMH is that the
security market participants are competent and
well-informed. It is the competition therefore
between these very astute market participants
which results in security prices being fairly
and correctly priced. These market
participants immediately “compete away” any
chance to earn an abnormal profit.
The Efficient Market Hypothesis
The framework for a discussion of the
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH)
is
generally centered around Eugene Fama’s
May 1970 Journal of Finance paper “Efficient
Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and
Empirical Work.” .
Fama defined efficient markets in terms of a
“fair game” where security prices “fully
reflect” all the information available.
Consequently, if the markets are efficient,
individuals can-not consistently receive
abnormal risk-adjusted returns. Utilizing the
framework of the Capital Asset Pricing Model,
this implies that the expected value of ex-ante
alpha must be zero. This implies that the
complete measurement of risk can be noted in
the beta of the security.
Fama suggested that the Efficient Market
Hypothesis (EMH) can be divided into three
categories. These categories are as follows:
1. Weak-Form EMH. In the weak-form
EMH, the type of information being
considered is restricted exclusively to
historical price data. If the weak-form
EMH is correct, investors should not be
able to consistently earn abnormal
profits by simply observing the
historical prices of securities. WeakForm efficiency is, in fact, a special case
of Semi-Strong form efficiency.
2. Semi-Strong Form EMH. The semistrong form EMH asserts that security
prices rapidly and correctly adjust to the
release
of
publicly
available
information. Thus, under the semi-strong
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form, current prices fully reflect not only
all past price data but all other data as
well. Hence, any and all information that
is available to the public should be
quickly if not instantaneously reflected
in security prices so that investors can
not consistently earn abnormal returns
by action on such public information.
3. Strong-Form EMH. The strong-form
EMH represents the most extreme case
of market efficiency. Under the strongform it is argued that security prices
fully reflect all information whether
public or private. Fama himself thought
that this form was an extreme one that, if
ever adequately tested, would prove
false.
There are a huge number of empirical studies
of the EMH. It is beyond the scope of this
paper to conduct even a causal review of those
studies. Suffice it to say, researchers have
tested the EMH due to its signal importance in
financial literature and their combined results
indicate that the EMH as postulated by Fama
is overwhelmingly supported especially in
dealing with the weak and semi-strong
versions of the hypothesis. The difficulty of
obtaining data on undisclosed sources of
information makes it difficult to research the
strong-form hypothesis.
However, even in face of this consensus, there
are a growing number of researchers that
question the EMH. Robert Haugen is one. He
argues in multiple books that the EMH is a
paradigm that is at the extreme end of the
spectrum. He has made a serious case for
recognizing that the market overreacts to past
records of success and failure with resulting
incorrect or imprecise security prices. (Haugen
(1999) New Finance p. ix)
Other researchers are even more radical,
holding the opinion that the market is in chaos
(which also implies you can not beat the index
as well).
Finally, there is a small but growing group that
believes the American stock market is now
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(perhaps again) manipulated. Further, the
EMH can also be seriously questioned in view
of the international financial turmoil following
the sub-prime crisis in the USA.
Alpha
This paper is focused on one aspect of the
CAPM spectrum: the Alpha. The alpha herein
discussed is the intercept of the regressed
returns of a stock and its index–its
characteristic line. It represents the
unexplained return (positive or negative) given
the slope (beta) of the regression against an
index such as a capitalization-weighted S&P
500 which is used in this study.
The purpose of this paper is to determine the
advantage, if any, of utilizing alpha as a
predictive factor in portfolio management.
CAPM states that beta has predictive powers
due to its “memory.” Does alpha have
memory power as well?
In portfolio management alpha has assumed a
paramount position in measuring portfolio
performance. To a great degree, the success of
portfolio managers is measured by their riskadjusted excess returns versus the market. An
alpha is then a measurement of the ability to
select winning (losing) stocks.
This is part due to the fact that for beta to be
valid measurement of risk a diversified
portfolio of stocks should have an ex-ante
alpha of zero. The only measurement of risk
therefore is beta. In a world without CAPM, a
beta adjusted return would not exist.
Portfolio managers have found it most
difficult to outperform the S&P 500 market on
a risk-adjusted basis. Stated another way, they
have not been able to capture normally
positively desired “excess alpha” in their stock
selection process.
Perhaps focusing only on stocks that have
historically demonstrated “excess returns”
might be a possible way to achieve superior
performance within the S&P 500. This is the
core of the research hypotheses proposed in
this paper.
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Research Hypotheses
The research hypotheses of this paper are that
by sectoring the S&P 500 into Alpha terciles
the Top Alpha tercile will outperform both the
S&P 500 (Equally-Weighted) as well as the
Bottom Alpha tercile on a risk-adjusted basis
after transaction costs based on the portfolio’s
Coefficient of Variation (CV).
The terciles are rebalanced on a monthly basis.
Thus, the study is a Weak-Form Efficient
Market Hypothesis test. The research period is
December 31, 2002 through December 31,
2011.
The selection of terciling the S&P 500 was
done for one predominate reason: the
necessity for efficient diversification. Each of
the three portfolios has been selected on the
basis of alpha alone. Industry and/or sector
groups should be accounted for in normal
portfolio construction. This is at best
pragmatically difficult. Consequently, three
large portfolios mitigate this problem. This
study was done on a stock selection basis of
167 stocks in the top tercile; 166 stocks in the
mid-tercile, and 167 stocks in the bottom
tercile.
The Alpha (ALP) employed in this research
comes from the same five-year monthly
regression used to calculate the beta of a stock
against the S&P 500. It is the excess return
(positive or negative) not explained by the
beta. Excess positive (negative) Alpha is
sought by investment managers indicating
their superior ability to selecting winning
(losing) securities. All investment managers
“seek alpha.”
Data and Methods
This paper will explore the total return
behavior on a risk-adjusted basis, through the
above noted hypothesis. Only one data source,
Ford Equity Research of San Diego, was used
in this study. Ford Equity Research is a data
vendor with proprietary models for investment
managers globally and is affiliated with
Mergent through stock ownership. See
www.fordequity.com for more information
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A review of the data and methods used by
Ford Equity Research is constructed such that
the three most common biases in investment
data were eliminated. There is no look-ahead
bias, no restatement bias, nor any survivorship
bias to the data.
Ford Equity Research, likewise, provided all
variables utilized in this study. Total return
includes both price changes and dividends.
Dividends are included in the appropriate
period based on their ex-dividend date. All
returns were computed on a geometric basis,
as were the standard deviations in conformity
with accepted professional investment
standards.
All returns were calculated on a monthly basis
including the index. Hence, re-balancing
occurs on a monthly basis for the entire study
period. All returns were computed equallyweighted. All stocks were selected from the
noted benchmark S&P 500 Index.
A number of output variables were selected.
One key output variable was an estimation of
turnover. This allows for the estimation of
transaction costs for testing the efficiency of
the strategy for both market efficiency and
pragmatic investment management. The final
portfolios were subjected to a .5% transaction
cost utilized by hedge funds in back-testing
models.
All three terciles previously noted were
constructed utilizing the highest positive
Alpha to the lowest negative Alpha. The
bottom tercile is therefore also constructed as
the “short” portfolio since the research
hypothesis states that it will underperform the
top tercile portfolio as well as the S&P 500
(Equally-Weighted).
The selection for the sample size is of concern
for all researchers. The selection of portfolios
of 167-166-167 stocks reduces the impact of
industry concentration especially in short time
frame studies. Ideally, the number of stocks
from one specific industry should be in line
with the benchmark index. Even more ideally,
the selected portfolio should be of the same
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industry weightings as the benchmark index.
Unfortunately, there is no computer program
in the United States that allows for this type of
back-testing without signal manual analysis.
Data Results
The results of the investigation can be found
in the following two tables. Table 1 presents
the results on a risk adjusted basis before
transaction costs. Table 2 presents the results
on a risk-adjusted basis after transaction costs.
The performance, again, was computed on a
monthly rebalancing basis.
Data Analysis
The results of the study had a number of
significant implications. First, the hypotheses
were confirmed. The Top Alpha portfolio
outperformed the S&P 500 (EquallyWeighted) on both a non-transaction cost and
after-transaction cost basis risk-adjusted
utilizing the CV. Further, the Top Alpha
portfolio outperformed the Bottom Alpha
portfolio on both a non-transaction cost and
after-transaction cost basis risk-adjusted
utilizing the CV.
There are a number of pragmatic investment
management conclusions. The first is that
portfolio managers can have a higher
probability of achieving the same results as
the S&P 500 by selecting only stocks in the
Top Alpha tercile category. Thus, the amount
of analytical work is reduced by two-thirds. It
must be acknowledged, however, that the
portfolio
manager
could
select
underperforming stocks within this tercile. The
reduction in analytical work must be
contrasted to the fact that the betas of both the
top and bottom terciles are different than the
equally-weighted beta value of the S&P 500.
Table 3 addresses this situation. It shows,
based on year end data for the last five years, a
problem does exist but it is not material in
nature.
The
second
pragmatic
investment
management consideration is the ability to run
a risk-free portfolio with returns that
outperform US T Bills. This statement must be
59

International Research Journal of Applied Finance
Vol. V Issue – 1 January, 2014
carefully noted under two key assumptions.
First, the beta of the two portfolios (Top and
Bottom) Alphas have the same beta
throughout time. This calculation was not
done in the study. However, the year-end betas
were noted for the past five years of the study.
While the averages are close (Top at 1.21 and
the Bottom at 1.23), the results were indicative
of the economic environment.
It would appear that the Top Alpha portfolio
will have a bias towards a higher beta than the
bottom over long periods of time of economic
advancement. Second, the study was done
without inter-period analysis. Consequently,
there could be periods in which this positive
differential (Long Top Alpha – Short Bottom
Alpha) did not hold with resulting drawdowns.
Additionally, short selling, even with S&P 500
stocks, can be quite difficult. This difficulty
could result in some of the excess profit being
lost. Table 3 again discusses this situation over
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the past five years of the study utilizing year
end data only.
Conclusion
This study examined the weak-form of the
EMH utilizing the technical tool of Alpha
developed from the characteristic line. The
tercile Alpha portfolios of the S&P 500
showed that on an after-transaction basis that
the Top Alpha portfolio outperformed ever-somarginally the equally-weighted S&P 500
utilizing the Coefficient of Variation. This
Top Alpha portfolio clearly outperformed the
Bottom Alpha portfolio. This could allow for a
risk-free arbitrage opportunity.
However, the key implication of this study is
that large-capitalization S&P 500 portfolio
managers should concentrate most of their
stock selection efforts on stocks within the
Top Alpha portfolio. It could well be the way
to really truly achieve “Excess Alpha” returns.

Table 1: Alpha Tercile Performance Monthly Rebalancing Without Transaction Costs
(December 31, 2002-December 31, 2011)
Equally-Weighted
Top Tercile
Bottom Tercile
S&P 500
Annual Returns
11.0%
8.0%
9.6%
Standard Deviation
19.3%
22.2%
18.9%
CV
1.75
2.78
1.97
Table 2: Alpha Tercile Performance Monthly Rebalancing After Transaction Costs
(December 31, 2002-December 31, 2011)
Equally-Weighted
Top Tercile
Bottom Tercile
S&P 500
Annual Returns
Standard Deviation
CV

9.8%
19.2%
1.96

6.8%
22.2%
3.26

9.6%
18.9%
1.97

Table 3: S&P 500 Alpha Terciles for Mean Alpha and Beta data for December year end only
Top Alpha
Bottom Alpha
Equally-Weighted
Year End
Portfolio
Portfolio
S&P 500
Alpha Beta
Alpha
Beta
Alpha
Beta
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
Five Year
Average

1.64
1.64
1.72
1.74
1.84

1.24
1.26
1.36
1.21
1.00

-0.36
-0.32
-0.37
-0.93
-0.87

1.14
1.10
1.22
1.32
1.37

0.61
0.63
0.64
0.43
0.46

1.16
1.16
1.19
1.18
1.11

1.72

1.21

-0.57

1.23

0.55

1.16
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Abstract
The financial performance of hospitals in Taiwan is evaluated following the implementation
of the National Health Insurance scheme. Results showed that, overall, public hospitals in

Taiwan had better liquidity status than private hospitals, but showed poor results for
collection delays. Aside from a few foundation hospitals, analysis of capital structure showed
almost no long-term debt, suggesting a need to explore capital financing to improve
profitability. The majority of private and foundation hospitals showed profitability, but most
public hospitals operated at a loss.
Keywords: Hospital financial performance, national health insurance in Taiwan
Introduction
In 1995, the government of Taiwan
implemented the National Health Insurance
(NHI) scheme, stimulating competition in
the health care market. Hospitals in Taiwan

hospitals, 18 psychiatric hospitals, and 92

are classified by type (medical center,
teaching hospital, regional hospital, and
district hospital) and region (north, middle,
south and east). Since the implementation of

Hospitals Report, FY 1994, DOH). Prior to
the implementation of NHI, Taiwan provided
public insurance schemes for agricultural
workers,
laborers,
and
government

the National Health Insurance (NHI) in 1995,
out-patient attendance at large hospitals has
decreased significantly and small hospitals
are finding it increasingly difficult to

employees, but five million people (25% of
the total population) were not covered by
these plans. NHI was implemented to
provide universal coverage, with special

compete with the large hospitals. Hospital
financial and operating performance has a
key impact on the role-effectiveness of the
various types of hospitals in providing

emphasis on children, the elderly and the
poor. To finance the scheme, premiums were
doubled on those who had coverage under
the three pre-existing schemes before 1995.

effective and efficient health care in Taiwan.
As of 1995, Taiwan had a total of 715
hospitals, including 12 medical centers, 42
regional hospitals, 86 district teaching

The medical environment in Taiwan differs
from that in many Western countries, along
with the primary issues in hospital financial
management. The following discussion

hospitals, 475 district hospitals, 3 speciality
teaching hospitals, 9 psychiatric teaching

reviews the key characteristics of Taiwan’s

miscellaneous type hospitals (Hospitals
Accreditation Report, FY’s 1993~1995,
Department of Health, Government of
Taiwan, ROC; Accreditation of Psychiatric
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medical system, including payment systems,
fees and insurance.
Taiwan’s NHI system features three types of
doctor's wage and salary systems. The first,

from registration fees, copayments, and
minority difference burdens – government
subsidies for people below poverty line and
poor indigenous populations to cover the

typical of large private hospitals, is a fee-forservice system established 30 years ago to
raise doctor incomes, improve service
quality, and reduce the incidence of bribery.

20% copayment. The Healthcare Bureau
strictly regulates the list of declarable items
and conducts critical audits of medical
services and expenses to prevent waste and

This system has been modified to the current
physician fee (PF) system, wherein doctors
receive 1% of the hospital’s fees for
examination, handling and surgery as their

reduce increases to the overall cost of
medicine. The declaration is also involved in
the management of hospital accounts
receivable. Increased attention should focus

bonus (Huang, Jiajing, 1996). Since doctor
incomes are determined by patient volume
and price of service items, this system
encourages doctors to treat more patients and

on increasing declared expenses, raising the
ratio of pre-paid fees, accelerating payments,
and reducing the number of rejected
declarations.

provide higher-priced services. According to
Lin (1994), prior to the implementation of
NHI, 57.5% of regional hospitals used the
physician fee system. The second physician

Financial efficiency is traditionally a key
performance factor for most businesses.
However, financial efficiency and its
attendant concepts and practices are relative

compensation system is the salary plus bonus
system used in public hospitals, where
doctors are paid a bonus are based on
hospital
profitability.
This
system

novelties in the hospital sector. A hospital’s
financial condition and focus has a critical
impact on its sustainability. (Cleverley,
1987, 1988; Williams D. et al, 1992).

encourages the doctors to help the hospital
control costs, fixes fee standards and controls
factors which impact the market for medical
services. The third system is the individual

Accordingly, interest in this topic has grown
among policy makers, hospital management
and researchers (Narine et al, 1996).
Despite the research devoted to financial

profit system in the small private clinics
where doctor incomes are determined by the
profits made by hospital profits, encouraging
doctors to help increase hospital income and

efficiency, basic evaluation standards for
hospitals are still lacking. This report
concentrates on evaluating four financial
efficiency criteria (liquidity, operating

reduce costs.
In terms of fees and insurance payments,
80% of hospital income comes from the
Bureau of National Health Insurance through

ability, capital structure and profitability)
along with other factors.
In evaluating a hospital’s financial efficiency
liquidity and operating ability are assessed in

patient claims (known as “written
declarations”). The remaining 20% comes

terms of its liquidity ratio, leverage ratio,
profitability ratio, and turnover. Research has
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shown that, of these four measures, liquidity
ratio has a much lower correction rate than
the other three (Lynn & Wertheim, 1993).
In terms of capital structure, Taiwan’s

on profitability, such as operational strategy
and contract management. Clement (1998)
found no relationship between process
factors and hospital profitability. This report

healthcare system can be usefully compared
to that of the United States, where Medicare
and other third party insurance companies
use the prospective payment system, in

categorizes these structural and process
factors into four components: liquidity,
operating ability, capital structure, and
profitability.

which risk is transferred from the payers to
healthcare providers. In this system, the
amounts that hospitals charge patients for
identical services often vary widely. In

Method
Data was obtained from the National Health
Insurance Bureau covering 13 months from
1995 to 1996, following the implementation

addition, hospital profitability is limited by
increased operating risk, unpaid medical
bills, competition from other Medicare
providers, and implementation of managed

of NHI. Our sample covered 144 hospitals in
Taiwan, including 67 public hospitals, 49
private hospitals, and 28 foundation
hospitals. The sampled hospitals are located

care programs (McCue & Ozcan, 1992), thus
increasing the difficulty of debt financing.
Under
these
conditions,
hospital
management must stay aware of critical

in all four regions and represent 23.8% of all
hospitals in Taiwan, and 48.2% of total bed
capacity. Definition and measurement of
financial variables were based on the work of

factors that impact the hospital’s capital
structure strategy (e.g., short-term or longterm debt financing). This report will focus
on factors affecting capital structure at the

Mccue and Lynch (1987), which defined
specific indicators for financial status and
performance, and developed specific
quantitative norms indicative of favourable

financial, organizational and operational
level.
Given an understanding of the critical factors
affecting profitability, hospital management

status/performance based on industry
averages. Standard definitions used in the
health management literature were adopted
for performance indicators specific to the

can act to minimize risk and maximize profit.
Policy makers can also benefit from an
appreciation of the impact of new policies on
hospital operations (Gapenski et al, 1993).

hospital industry. Hospitals provide data to
the National Health Department in various
formats, but these are then standardized in an
SAS-compatible format. Statistical methods

Fottler
(1987)
separated
hospital
characteristics into two parts: structural
factors with a direct impact on hospital
financial conditions and profitability, such as

appropriate to the study objectives and
hypotheses were selected, and applied to
balance sheets and income statements for
144 hospitals for the fiscal year running from

size, systemic association and profit; and
process factors which have positive impact

January 1 to December 31.
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Results
Descriptive statistics

As shown in Table 1, the sample for this
study included 144 hospitals including 67
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22 regional hospitals reported positive
earnings, as opposed to 50% of the 10
medical centers, and 51% of the 112 district
hospitals.

public hospitals, 49 private hospitals, and 28
foundation
hospitals,
respectively
representing 79%, 10.6% and 47.5% of all
hospitals in each category. In terms of

When the level of hospitals was collapsed
within each ownership type, the loss ratio
among public hospitals is highest in medical
centers, followed by district hospitals and

hospital type, the study included 10 medical
centers, 22 regional hospitals and 112 district
hospitals, respectively representing 71.4%,
48.9% and 20.5% of all hospitals of each

regional hospitals. Among foundation
hospitals, earnings were higher for medical
centers, followed by district hospitals and
regional hospitals.

type. In
sample
Taiwan,
Taiwan,

terms of regional distribution, the
included 66 hospitals in south
50 in north Taiwan, 21 in central
and 7 in east Taiwan, respectively

representing 24.4%, 23.2%, 20% and 50% of
all hospitals in each region.
In terms of bed capacity, the sample included
50 hospitals with fewer than 100 beds, 35
with 100-299 beds, 22 with 300-499 beds, 20
with 500-99 beds, and 7 with more than 1000
beds, respectively representing 14.4%, 35%,
53.7%, 55.6%, and 63.6% of the total
number of hospitals
classification.

in

each

size

Refer Table I
Descriptive statistics of hospital income

Refer Table II
Reinvestment capacity

About half of public medical centers had
good reinvestment ability, as opposed to
26.9% of public hospitals. Sorted by level,
medical centers had better performance, with
about half exhibiting good reinvestment
ability.
Refer Table III
Descriptive statistics of hospital liquidity
and capital structure
In terms of liquidity measures, the current
ratio status is satisfactory among the sample
hospitals, indicating satisfactory liquidity
status. Private hospitals show relatively

In our sample, approximately equal numbers
of hospitals reported profits or losses from
medical services. When sorted by hospital

poorer liquidity and short-term liability
status with low current ratios. However,
public hospitals need to reduce the current
delay in clearing accounts receivable. When

ownership type, 22.4% of 67 public hospitals
showed positive earnings from medical
services (i.e., a positive operating margin), as
opposed to 70% of the 29 foundation

reviewed by in terms of hospital level,
increased level correlates positively with
improved liquidity status.
In terms of capital structure, the sample

hospitals, and 73% of the 49 private
hospitals. When sorted by level, 48% of the

hospitals seldom used financial leverage or
used short-term debt to fund capital
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requirements. Private and the regional
hospitals tended to resort to debt financing
while foundation hospitals and medical
centers funded operations and expansions

(c) Very low or negative profitability of
public hospitals as compared with
private hospitals.
(d) Higher level hospitals are in

through capital. Higher hospital level
correlates positively with capital structure.

relatively better financial shape.

Refer Table IV
Descriptive statistics of hospital liquidity

Discussion and Conclusions

Findings are discussed in comparison with
comparable indicators of hospital financial

and capital structure
Effective operations require managers to
carefully evaluate the turnover of each type
of asset. This could be due either to use or

performance in the United States.

reduction of assets. Overall, in private and
regional hospitals, increased turnover was
found to be associated with a decrease in
assets, but this is beyond the scope of this

counterparts, but a higher acid-test ratio. This
indicates that the total value of accounts
receivable at Taiwan hospitals is lower than
in the US, and that collection period is 10

research.
When sorted by hospital type, public
hospitals fared the worst in terms of
profitability indicators. Sorting by level

days lower. The day’s cash on hand is
considerably greater than in the US, (39.8
days for Taiwan as opposed to 13.1 days for
the US). The average payment period in

failed to produce a uniform pattern, and
when sorted by level, the ranking proceeded
from medical center to district hospital to
regional hospital. Caution must be exercised

Taiwan is 20 days longer than in the US
(74.1 days vs. 53.3 days), suggesting
relatively lower payment ability and credit
availability in Taiwan. This also explains the

when evaluating return on equity as a
measure of profitability.

lower long-term debt-to-equity ratio of
Taiwan hospitals and their reliance on shortterm debt for their capital needs. Most
liquidity indicators were more favourable for

Refer Table V

Overall, our evaluation of hospital financial
effectiveness indicates the following salient
features of the sample hospitals:
(a) High current ratio and short-term
debt.
(b) Relatively low use of financial
leverage, and reliance on short-debt for
capital requirements, with the exception
of some foundation hospitals.

Liquidity analysis
Hospitals in Taiwan had lower current and
quick
ratios
than
their
American

Taiwan hospitals than for their US
counterparts.
Overall, Taiwan hospitals have few shortterm debt problems. Sorted by hospital type,
private hospitals tended to have the poorest
short-term debt conditions, with low current
ratios and fewer days cash on hand, though
they had a shorter payment collection period
than other hospital types. This is possibly
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due to the small scale of most private
hospitals with little current capital and
relatively fewer accounts receivable. Public
and foundation hospitals were better off, but

liability. Private hospitals have a greater
tendency to take on debt, probably because
small and medium sized hospitals have
limited capital and need to raise loans to

long collection periods need to be reduced.
Higher level hospitals had relatively better
liquidity positions, possibly because such
hospitals have higher profits from medical

fund operations and expansion. Foundationrun hospitals and medical centers tend to
have plenty of capital which contributes to
increased income, and tend to have more

services, resulting in increased accounts
receivable and cash levels adequate to meet
short-term debt needs. Another explanation
is that most Taiwan hospitals are non-profit,

cash on hand and other liquid assets, thus
mooting the need for loans.

and thus require less investment and
therefore have more cash on hand.
Capital structure analysis
The most outstanding difference in capital

structure between Taiwanese and American
hospitals is the relatively low use of financial
leverage in Taiwan where, due to traditional
conservatism in the industry, most capital
resources are raised using short-term debt.
With the exception of a few hospitals
carrying long-term debt, most support
operations and expansion with ownership
capital. For public hospitals that have only
recently installed professional accounting
systems, government subsides make up most
uncovered expenditures, thus precluding the
need for debt financing, and reducing longterm debt to nearly zero. Foundation
hospitals adopt a conservative approach to
financing partly because of tax structures:
Operating margin exceeding 20% are subject
to tax, thus these hospitals prefer to refinance
using profits to the extent that operating
margins are kept below 20%. In addition,
subsidies for medical foundations are not
taxed, which also contributes to long-term

Operating ability analysis

Turnover indicators show that hospitals in
Taiwan have a total asset turnover rate of
85.5%, and a current assets turnover rate
253.6%, both lower than their US
counterparts (96% and 388%, respectively),
but had a higher fixed assets rate (320%) vs.
175%). This indicates that Taiwan hospitals
are relatively more efficient in terms of asset
use.
Sorted by hospital type, private hospitals had
the highest rates of total asset turnover and
current asset turnover. Sorted by hospital
level, higher level hospitals were associated
with lower total assets turnover, which could
be due to two possible explanations. First,
private hospitals (including most district
hospitals) showed high rates of asset usage
effectiveness, resulting in an apparent
correlation between hospital level and asset
usage effectiveness. Second, smaller total
asset holdings are typically associated with
high turnover, particularly in the private
sector, which could be a factor given that
most district hospitals are privately-run.
Public hospitals show the highest turnover of
fixed assets, followed by private and
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foundation hospitals, possibly because public
hospital capital accounts do not reflect actual
land costs, resulting in their fixed assets
being significantly undervalued as compared

On the whole, Taiwan hospitals had less
short term liability than US hospitals. The
most outstanding difference seen in liability
structure lies in the fact that Taiwan hospitals

to other types of hospitals, thus leading to
inflated turnover statistics. Based on this
study, there appears to be a case for
recommending the government review

have almost no long-term debt and relatively
higher amounts of short-term debt, while US
hospitals are more prone to using financial
leverage.
Among
Taiwan
hospitals,

investment measurements before buying
fixed assets.

foundation hospitals exhibited the highest
degree of financial effectiveness while public
hospitals were the least effective. It is
possible this results from differences in

Profitability analysis

Every profitability index shows that Taiwan
hospitals are less profitable than those in the
US. This could be due American hospitals
placing a greater emphasis on profitability.
Also, non-operating revenue is relatively
lower in Taiwan, indicating that the major
revenue source for Taiwan hospitals was
derived from performing medical services.
Public hospitals had the lowest overall
profitability levels, and higher losses, a
pattern which also prevailed in terms of
turnover. The explanation for this is probably
the same as that for asset turnover.

management, where foundation hospital
executives are more entrepreneurial and
better attuned to issues including operational
effectiveness, cost control and revenue
maximization. Public hospitals are also
limited by their systems for human resource
management, accounting and purchasing
high personnel and purchasing costs eroding
their competitiveness. Differences in
accounting
methods
also
apparently
contributed to the relative financial
effectiveness
of
public
hospitals.
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Table I: Characteristics of sample hospitals
Total Hosp.

Sample #

Percent

Public

84

67

79.80%

Private

462

49

10.60%

Foundation

59

28

47.50%

Medical Center

14

10

71.40%

Regional Hosp.

45

22

48.90%

District Hosp.

546

112

20.50%

North

216

50

23.20%

Central

105

21

20%

South

270

66

24.40%

East

14

7

50%

<100 Beds

417

60

14.40%

00-299 Beds

100

35

35%

300-499 Beds

41

22

53.70%

500-999 Beds

36

20

55.60%

>1000 Beds

11

7

63.60%

Mean Bed capacity

154.5

312.6

Total Hospital

605

144

23.80%

Total Beds

93742

45014

48.20%

Statistic value

Type of Hosp.
X2=101.44*

Level of Hosp.
X2=17.83*

Region

X2=3.29

Bed capacity

X2=41.75*

t = 0.55

Note: 1.*denotes Z-value significance at 5%. 2. Significance level = 0.05. 3. Sample
# denotes number of hospitals.
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Table II: Income by level and type
Medical Income

Total Income

Hosp no.

Loss

Gain

Loss

Gain

Medical Center Public

6

5 (83.3%)

1 (16.7%)

3 (50%)

3 (50%)

Foundation

4

0 (0%)

4 (100%)

0 (0%)

4 (100%)

Total

10

5 (50%)

5 (50%)

3 (30%)

7 (70%)

Regional Hosp. Public

14

10 (71.4%)

4 (28.6%)

10 (28.6%)

4 (28.6%)

Foundation

8

3 (37.5%)

5 (62.5%)

2 (75.0%)

6 (75%)

Total

22

13 (59.1%)

9 (40.9%)

12 (45.5%)

10 (45.5%)

District Hosp. Public

47

37 (78.7%)

10 (21.3%)

35 (74.5%)

12 (25.5%)

Private

48

13 (27.1%)

35 (72.9%)

15 (31.3%)

33 (68.7%)

Foundation

17

5 (29.4%)

12 (70.6%)

9 (52.9%)

8 (47.1%)

Total

112

55 (49.1%)

57 (50.9%)

59 (52.7%)

53 (47.3%)

Total Public

67

52 (77.6%)

15 (22.4%)

48 (71.6%)

19 (28.4%)

Private

48

13 (26.5%)

35 (73.5%)

15 (30.6%)

33 (69.4%)

Foundation

29

8 (28.6%)

21 (71.4%)

11 (39.3%)

18 (60.7%)

Total

144

73 (50.7%)

71 (49.3%)

74 (51.4%)

70 (48.6%)
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III: Reinvestment ability by level and type
Reinvestment Ability
Poor (%)

Good (%)

Medical Center Public

3 (50%)

3 (50%)

Foundation

0 (0%)

4 (100%)

Total

3(30%)

7 (70%)

Regional Hosp. Public

10 (71.4%)

4 (28.6%)

Private

2 (25%)

6 (75%)

Total

12 (54.5%)

10 ( 45.5%)

District Hosp. Public

36 (76.6%)

11 (23.4%)

Private

15 (31.3%)

33 (68.7%)

Foundation

9 (52.9%)

8 (47.1%)

Total

60 (53.6%)

52 (46.4%)

Total Public

49 (73.1%)

18 (26.9%)

Private

15 (30.6%)

34 (69.4%)

Foundation

11 (39.3%)

17 (60.7%)

Total

75 (52.1%)

69 (47.9%)
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IV: Liquidity and capital structure

Panel A

Type of hospital
Total

Public

Private

Foundation
2.1

Liability
Current Ratio

1.68

1.95

0.71

Quick Ratio

1.43

1.62

0.51

1.7

Acid-Test Ratio

0.46

0.57

0.16

0.89

Day in Accounts

53.6

83.04

0

41.7

Average Payment Period

74.08

74.86

70.96

77.11

Days cash on hand

39.8

52.71

14.84

71.72

Equity Financing Ratio

0.48

0.54

0.18

0.6

Cash Flow to Total Debt

0.06

–0.396

0.21

0.16

Debt Service Coverage

0.08

–0.396

0.29

0.18

0

0

0

0.03

0.9

0.94

1.02

0.6

0

0

0

0.03

Receivable

Capital Structure

Long-term Debt to Equity
Total Debt to Equity
Long-tem Debt to
Net Fixed Assets
Panel B

Level of hospital
Total

Medical Center

Regional Hosp.

District Hosp.

Current Ratio

5.04

1.52

1.61

1.84

Quick Ratio

4.75

1.44

1.34

1.56

Acid-Test Ratio

3.19

0.48

0.45

0.24

Day in Accounts

62.27

54.37

52.19

63.58

55.27

69.82

77.22

53.25

176.13

47.82

31.12

13.12

Equity Financing Ratio

0.88

0.49

0.45

0.49

Debt Service Coverage

0.68

0.09

0.07

–

0

0

0

0.67

0.14

1.03

0.91

–

0

0

0

0.59

Liability

Receivable
Average Payment
Period
Days cash on hand
Capital Structure

Long-term Debt to Equity
Total Debt to Equity
Long-term Debt to Net Fixed Assets

(Indicator selection based on: McCue, M.J., and Lynch, J.R., 1987)
Table V: Operating ability and profitability
Type of hospital
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Publics

Private

Person

Operating Ability
Total Assets Turnover

85.46

84.71

167.78

71.77

Fixed Assets Turnover

320.13

570.38

394.09

126.2

Current Asset Turnover

253.6

185

692.04

231.47

Markup

1.01

0.81

1.06

1.04

Operating Margin

-0.01

–0.247

0.04

0.02

0

–0.197

0.04

0.01

Non-operating Rev.

0.01

0.01

0

0.03

Return on Total Assets (%)

-0.28

–12.40

7.31

0.97

Return on Fixed Assets (%)

-0.34

–33.70

13.88

1.69

Profit/(FA-Land) (%)

-0.79

–67.54

11.78

2.05

Return on Equity (%)

-1.92

-21.5

11.68

1.8

Profitability

Total Margin

Level of hospital
Total

Medical Center Regional Hosp. District Hosp.

Operating ability
Total Assets Turnover

55.91

82.75

98.57

96

Fixed Assets Turnover

119.22

499.99

323.14

175

Current Assets Turnover

137.47

310.42

255.49

388

1.04

0.98

1.01

1.24

0

–0.060

0.01

0.03

Total Margin

0.02

–0.036

–0.009

–

Non-operating Rev.

0.07

0.02

0

0.31

Profitability
Markup
Operating Margin

Return on total Assets (%)

2.56

–5.30

–0.49

5

Return on Fixed Assets (%)

7.75

–7.70

–0.62

–

Profit/(FA-Land) (%)

9.48

–22.17

–0.79

–

Return on Equity (%)

3.73

–8.84

–2.20

9

(Selection of indicators was based on: McCue, M.J., and Lynch, J.R., 1987)

Reference
Clement,
J.
P.
(1988).Corporate
diversification:
expectations
and
outcomes. Health Care Management

Review, 13 (2), 7-13.
Cleverley, W. O. (1987). Financial
viability of the hospital industry 1981-

1985. Healthcare Executive, 2 (1), 5455.
Claverley, W. O. (1988). Ten financial
management principles for survival.
Health
Progress, 69 (2), 36-41, 104.
Fottler, M. D. (1987). Health care
organizational performance: Present
73

International Research Journal of Applied Finance
Vol. V Issue – 1 January, 2014

ISSN 2229 – 6891

and future. Journal of Management, 3
(2), 367-391.
Gapenski, L. C., and Vogel, W. B.
(1993). The determinants of hospital

Narine, L., Pink, G., and Leatt, P. (1996).
Prediction
of
the
financial
performance of Ontario hospitals: a
test of environmental determinist and

profitability. Hospital & Health
Services Administration, 38 (1), 6380.
Lin, S. (1994). A Survey Study Of

adaptationist perspectives. Health
Services Management Research, 9,
137-155.
Williams, D., Hadley, J., and Pettengill,

Physician Fee System On 3-Level
Teaching. Hospitals In Taiwan,
Taizhong Shi : Zhongguo yi yao xue
yuan, Minguo 83.

J. (1992). Profits, community role, and
hospital closure: an urban rural
analysis. Medical Care, 30 (2), 174187.

Lynn, M. L., and Wertheim, P. (1993).
Key financial ratios can foretell
hospital closures. Healthcare Financial
Management, 7 (11), 66-70.
McCue, M. J., and Lynch, J. R. (1987).
Financial assessment of small multihospital systems. Hospital & Health
Services Administration, 2 (2), 171189.
McCue, M. J., and Ozcan, Y. A. (1992).
Determinants of capital structure.
Hospital
&
Health
Services

Authors
Jiunn Chiou Chiang, Associated
Professor, National Taichung University
of Science and Technology, Taiwan,
Tsai Yi Wang, Assistance Professor,
National Taichung University of Science
and Technology, Taiwan,
*Feng Jui Hsu, Assistance Professor,
Department of Finance, National Chung
Hsing
University,
Taiwan,
rickhsutw@yahoo.com.tw

Administration, 37 (3), 333-346.

74

International Research Journal of Applied Finance
Vol. V Issue – 1 January, 2014

ISSN 2229 – 6891

The Effects of M&A on the Change of Productivities – Evidence From The
Japanese Shinkin Banks
Dai jianzhong
Abstracts
In this paper we examine the effects of merger and acquisition（ M&A） incidents occurred in
the period of financial year (FY) 2001-FY 2004 on the productivity changes of the Japanese
shinkin banks during the period of FY 2005-FY 2008. We use a two-stage approach to
analyze the effects of M&A on the productivity change. To deal with measure error and
endogenous problems inherent in the second stage regressions, this paper uses a semiparametric bootstrapping approach to get more robust estimates of the coefficients in the
model. The paper finds that M&A incidents and some other related variables have significant
effects on the productivity change and its components.
Keyword: DEA; Malmquist index; semi-parametric bootstrapping; banking
JEL code: C14 D24 G21 O47
Introduction
This paper examines the effects of merger
and acquisition（ M&A） incidents occurred
during the fiscal year (FY) 2001 to FY 2004
on the productivity changes of the Japanese
shinkin banks in FY 2005 to FY 2008.
Shinkin bank is a kind of regional financial
institutions in Japan. They are non-profit
mutual financial institutions aimed at
servicing small and middle enterprises
(SMEs) and local inhabitants.
From the beginning of 21st century, the
supervision environment for financial
institutions in Japan experienced great
changes. With the progress of deregulation
and financial liberalization, the permitted
business scope of financial institutions was
widened and the boundary between different
kinds of financial institutions became
obscured. These changes triggered a wave of
M&A among shinkin banks at the beginning
of 2000s (see graph 1). As the result, the
number of shinkin banks deceased from 371
at the end of FY 2000 to 279 by the end of
FY 2008. It is interesting to analyze the
effects of this peak of M&A activities on the

productivity changes in the shinkin banks.
Refer Figure I
The influence of M&A is a major concern of
many papers about the determination of
efficiency and productivity changes in
financial institutions. Interests in this area are
not purely due to academic curiosity. They
also come from policy considerations.
Encouraging M&A among financial
institutions is an important component of
bank restructuring policy packages in many
countries. Therefore understanding the
impacts of M&A on the efficiency and
productivity changes in financial institutions
has significant policy implications.
Unfortunately there is no consensus among
researchers about the effects of M&A on the
efficiency and productivity changes in firms.
Many researchers argued that M&A will
improve the efficiency of the involved firms
through: (1) technology transfers between
the participant firms, (2) economy of scale
and economy of scope improvement due to
M&A, (3) reduction of overcapacity and
redundant labors often carried out after
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M&A. On the other hand, M&A may
increase the market power of the involved
firms. This may increase the efficiency
measured in value terms. But it may also
reduce their motive for innovation. Thus it
may decrease their efficiency measured in
technical terms and also be disadvantageous
to the interests of consumers.
There are by now many empirical researches
in this field. For example, Berger and
Humphrey (1992)studied 57 M&A case
among large US banks during the period
1981 to 1989. Hahn (2007) analyzed the
effects of M&A on the efficiency of Austrian
banks during the period of 1995-2002. AlSharkas et al. (2008) analyzed the impact of
M&A on the efficiency of the US banks for
the period from 1985 to 2002. Rezitis (2008)
analyzed the effects of bank mergers on the
efficiency and of productivity changes for
ten Greek banks from 1993 to 2004.
Several researchers focus on the M&A
among credit unions and other small
financial institutions. For example, GrifellTatjé and Lovell (1996) analyzed the effects
of M&A on the productivity changes of the
Spanish saving banks from 1986-1991.
Vennet (1996) analyzed the effects of M&A
on the cost efficiency and other financial
profit indicators of the credit union in Europe
over the period of 1988-1993. Fried et al.
(1999) analyzed the effects of mergers on the
efficiency of credit union of the United
States from 1989-1995. Garden et al. (1999)
analyzed the effects of mergers on the
efficiency changes of the credit union in
Australia during the period of 1992-1997.
Haynes and Thomson (1999) analyzed the
effects of M&A on the productivities of the
building society in U.K. Devaney and Weber
(2000) analyzed the effects of market
structure on the productivity changes in the
rural banking sector of the United States
during the years from 1990-1993.
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Corresponding to the inconsistence in the
theoretical explanation, the conclusions of
the empirical literature about the effects of
M&A on the efficiency are mixed. Some
have found no evidence (Grifell-Tatjé and
Lovell 1996, Garden et al. 1999, Devaney
and Weber 2000, etc.) that M&A had
significant effects on the efficiency of the
banks. Some (Fried et al 1999, etc.) found
mixed evidences about the effects of M&A.
some (Rezitis 2008, etc.) even reported
negative effects of M&A on efficiencies. On
the other hand, others (Vennet 1996, Haynes
and Thomson 1999, Al-Sharkas et al 2008,
etc.) have found positive relationship
between M&A and efficiency.
There are also several papers which concerns
the small and middle financial institutions in
Japan. These papers either directly analyzed
the effects of M&A activities or used M&A
as an important control variable. For
example， Hoshino (1992) analyzed the
effects of M&A on some simple financial
ratios of the small and medium financial
institutions in Japan. Fukuyama (1996)
analyzed the return of scale of credit unions
in FY 1992. Harimaya (2004) analyzed the
correlation between the efficiency and
dividend policy of the shinkin banks by
using the data of FY 2002. Horie (2010)
analyzed the relationship between the
operation areas and the productivity changes
in the Japanese shinkin banks during the
period of FY 2005-FY2008. In this paper I
use the same selection of inputs and outputs
as Horie when calculating the productivity
changes of the shinkin banks. I also follow
his idea of weighted average when
measuring some variables for the regional
economic environments.
Measuring the effects of M&A on the
efficiency or change of productivities is not
an easy task. Some analysts (Fried et al.
1999， Rezitis, 2006, etc.) directly calculated
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the efficiency changes of the banks involved
in M&A activities before and after the
occurrence of M&A. However, this approach
is problematic. M&A activities will cause
discontinuity of data for the acquired or
closed banks. As for the acquiring or the
merging banks (some with a new name), the
operating environment also has greatly
changed; hence simple comparison of these
banks before and after the merging is
misleading. In our case of Japanese shinkin
banks, some banks even experienced more
than two M&A during the sample period,
which makes the problem even more
complex. Noticing this problem, some
researchers (Ralston et al. 2001, etc.)
compared the efficiency scores of the bank
formed after M&A with the weighted
average of the efficiency scores of the
merged and merging banks before M&A.
Alternatively some researchers (Cooper,
Seiford et al. 2006) advocate comparing a
virtual bank which have aggregated inputs
and outputs of the merged and merging
banks to the bank formed after M&A. This is
also questionable. For due to the nature of
the measurement, the average radial
efficiency score of two or more banks is not
always equal to the efficiency score of the
bank with aggregated inputs and outputs of
these banks (Fried, Lovell et al. 2008).
This paper does not simply compare the
efficiencies of the banks which involved in
M&A activities before and after the M&A
incidences. Instead it compares the
productivity changes between the banks
involved in M&A activities before the
sample period with those not involved. All
those which involved in M&A activities
during the sample period are deleted from
the sample. The effects of M&A are inferred
from the differences between these two
groups.
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The paper also makes several other
contributions to the literature. First of all， in
order to get a more objective measuring of
efficiency, it uses the hyperbolical-oriented
distance instead of input or output-oriented
Shephard distance as the measure of
efficiency. This approach avoids the possible
discrepancy between the input and outputoriented measurements and is also more
closely related to the traditional profit
concept. Second， to deal with measurement
error and endogenous problems inherent in
the second stage regressions, this paper uses
the algorithm suggested by Simar and
Wilson (2007), but with a few alternations.
To avoid the problem of bounding of the
dependent variable, instead of using
efficiency scores this paper uses a
productivity change index called Malmquist
index as the dependent variable. This avoids
using the censored or truncation models and
makes it possible only using OLS models,
because Malmquist index is only lowbounded by 0. Finally, following Horie
(2010), this paper uses weighted regional
economic data as the control variables.
Compared to macroeconomic data, which are
used in most of the other related papers,
regional data are more suitable for the
analysis of the regional financial institutions.
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows:
Section 2 makes a brief review of the
literature about the methodology used by the
paper. Section 3 describes the data and the
variables used in the paper. Section 4 gives
the results of the estimation and makes some
analysis about them. Section 5 draws
conclusions from the analysis.
The methodology
We use a two-stage approach to analyze the
effects of M&A on the productivity changes.
It consists of two stages: in the first stage, a
productivity
change
measure
called
Malmquist index and its decomposition are
77

International Research Journal of Applied Finance
Vol. V Issue – 1 January, 2014

ISSN 2229 – 6891

calculated. In the second stage, the estimated outputs) based on the performance of all
Malmquist index and its decomposition are DMUs in that year. In the output-input space,
regressed on several environmental variables Shephard distance is the relative distance
and a technique called semi-parametric from the point of that DMU to the “frontier”
bootstrapping is used to test the significance along a certain direction.
of the parameters of the model.
Shephard distance can be estimated either
along the direction of inputs or outputs or
A. Estimation of productivity changes
In Malmquist index, the productivity change any other arbitrary directions. In this paper
of a decision making unit (DMU) is we use the hyperbolic-oriented distance to
measured as the ratio of efficiency of the measure the efficiency. For an arbitrary
DMU between two periods. Efficiency
production point ( x0 , y0 ) , the hyperbolicmeans the relative performance of a DMU
compared to the potential performance. oriented distance is defined as the proportion
Generally Shephard distance is used as the needed to simultaneously reduce the inputs
measure of efficiency. In each year, we can and increase the outputs to push a point to
derive a production frontier (consisted by the frontier.
those efficient combinations of inputMathematically, we can define the production set Ψ t at time t as:
Ψ t = {( x, y )ℜ N + M | x can produce y at time t}

(1)

where x ∈ ℜ N are N dimension vector of inputs and y ∈ℜ M are M dimension vector of
outputs. The Shephard hyperbolic distance D0t ,t is defined as:
D0t ,t = sup{γ >0| (x / γ , γ y ) ∈ Ψ t }

(2)

Where γ is the scale that needed to decrease x0 and increase y0 simultaneously to push the
point ( x0 , y0 ) to the efficient frontier ∂ t Q ( x, y ) (the set that constituted by efficient DMUs,
which are those points with γ = 1 ).
Since
hyperbolical-oriented
distance
considers both the output and input
efficiency, it avoids the problem of possible
discrepancy between input and outputoriented distance (Fukuyama, 1996). Thus it
is a more objective measure of efficiency. It
is also more related to the concept of profit,
which is the conventional measurement of
efficiency.
Beside calculating the distance of DMU i in
year t according to the frontier of year t as

Dit ,t , we can also estimate the distance of

DMU i in year t+1 according to the frontier
of year t as Dit ,t +1 . Similarly we can calculate
the distance of DMU i in year t and t+1 both
according to the frontier of year t+1 as Dit +1,t
and Dit +1,t +1 respectively; then we can get two
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expressions of productivity changes as M it

and M it +1 :

It is very likely that these two ratios are

economy. Scale economy is measured as the
ratio of distance to the current frontier under
the assumption of constant return of scale
(CRS) to the distance to the current frontier
under the assumption of VRS. T is the
technological
changes. Since it measures the
(3)
effect of the moving of the CRS production
frontier from period t to t+1 on the
productivity changes of a DMU, it is also
called “frontier shift effects”. As in the case
of total score, for the input-oriented or
hyperbolic-oriented distance, a larger
(smaller) value of component means
deterioration
(improvement)
of
the
component over time.
I use Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
approach to estimate the hyperbolic oriented
distance. DEA identifies those efficient
DMUs by solving a programming. The
production
frontier
is
the
convex
combination of these optimal points. For
input or output-oriented distance, the
programming is linear. For hyperbolicoriented distance the programming is nonlinear, but with the help of computer it can
also be easily solved by recursive trying. For
technical details of the programming, see
Wheelock and Wilson (2009).
B. Problems with the second stage models

different; Malmqust index ( M i ) is the
geometric average of the two18:
1/2

Dit,t+1 Dit+1,t+1 
Mi =(M ×M ) =  t,t × t+1,t 
Di 
 Di
t
i

t+1 1/2
i

The explanation of Malmquist index depends
on the method used for the calculation of the
distance D. For the input-oriented or
hyperbolic-oriented distance, a larger
(smaller) value of M means deterioration
(improvement) of productivity over time. On
the other hand, for the output-oriented
distance, a larger (smaller) value of M means
an
improvement
(deterioration)
of
productivity over time.
In order to detect the sources of productivity
changes, we need to decompose the above
Malmquist index into several components.
One of the most widely used decomposition
methods was first proposed by Färe,
Grosskopf, Lindgren and Ross (1992):
M = E × S ×T

(4)

M is the Malmquist index. E is the change
of pure technical efficiencies. It measures the
change of position of a DMU according to
the current frontiers between year t and t+1
under the assumption of variable returns to
scale (VRS). S is the change of scale

18

Since Malmquist index is a commonly

Suppose, for a DMU i, i = 1, 2,L n, it can use
xi to produce y i , it has a efficiency measure

of γ i , γ i is determined by a vector of

used indicator for productivity changes we

environmental variables z i , then the basic

will not explain its technical details here.

two stage model is:

γ i = z i βi' + ui ,

Those who are not familiar with it can see
Fried et al (2008).

i = 1, 2,L n

（5）
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ui is the error term.

Among those papers which used the twostage models, in the first stage most
researchers used the efficiency score as the
dependent variables. In the second stage,
some analysts just used OLS (Garden et al.
1999, Devaney and Weber 2000, Ralson et
al. 2001) to estimate the model.
However, for the second stage regression
models using efficiency score itself as the
dependent variable, several problems have to
be solved. First of all, the dependent variable
(the efficiency measurement γ i ) is bounded.
For the input or hyperbolic- oriented
distance, it is low bounded by 1. For the
output-oriented distance, it is low bounded
by 0 and upper bounded by 1.
To solve the bounding problem of the
efficiency scores, in the second stage most
researchers used censored or Tobit (e.g.
Hahn 2007) models to estimate the
coefficients of the model. Simar and Wilson
(2007) argued that truncated model may be
more suitable in this case. Some analysts
(Fried et al. 1999) used logit models to
analyze the problem.
Another way to solve the problem is to use
some ratio of the efficiency measure as the
dependent variable. For ratios such as the
Malmquist index are only low bounded by 0;
therefore models using these ratios as
dependent variable can be estimated by OLS.
Second, the dependent variable γ is not an
observed variable. It itself is estimated from
the sample in the first stage. By construction
the

dependent

variable

γ

is

serially

correlated. This is because γ i is measured as
the distance to the frontier and the entire
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sample x and y are involved in the
construction of the frontier. Any DMU’s
change of x and y may cause change of the
frontier, thus the efficiency scores of all the
DMUs. The fact that γ i is correlated with
any x and y also means ui is correlated with
z i , because the choice of x an y of the DMU
i is conditional on z i , thus here we also face

a endogenous problem.
The third problem is that although γˆ is a
consistent estimator, it is a biased estimator
of real γ , Thus we also face a measure error
problem in this model. This bias is also
correlated with x and y, thus the z, and
disappears at a slower rate than that of the
traditional econometric models.
The two and third problems are more
difficult
to
deal
with.
Traditional
econometric techniques cannot be used to
handle these problems.
Simar and Wilson (2007) designed a more
advanced semi-parametric approach for
solving the problem. This paper uses a semiparametric approach similar to that suggested
by Simar and Wilson to estimate the second
stage model. But unlike the original model, I
choose Malmquist index as the dependent
variable. To further simplify the problem, I
take log of the ratio. As mentioned above,
ratios like the Malmquist index are only low
bounded by 0. Their logarithms can even
take negative values. Thus it avoids the
bounding
problem
that
efficiency
measurement will face.
The Simar and Wilson approach has two
algorithms. In the first approach, we first run
a regression model, then form new efficiency
scores by randomly combining the fitted
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value and residuals. The Simar and Wilson
approach has two algorithms. This paper
only uses the first one because the second
algorithm involves using the estimated
efficiency score (such as the Shephard
distance) and its residuals to generate new
input and output samples. Hence it is
unsuitable in the case of Malmquist index.
For details about the problems in the second
stage model and bootstrapping approach
used in the model, see Simar and Wilson
(2007).
C. model specification
Except the Malmquist index, the paper also
regress the components of the Malmquist
index on the same environmental variables.
Then we will get a system of regression
equations:

method is a more accurate estimate. Through
bootstrapping, we can obtain B estimate of

ln M = zβ 'm + u m ,

date04): Dateit = 1, t = 01,L 04,

ln E = zβ 'e + u e ,

bank i experienced M&A during the fiscal
year of t.
To control for other factors that may
influence the productivity changes, the paper
includes several control variables in the
second stage model. These variables can be
divided into two categories: Internal factors
and external factors. Corresponding to the
differentiation and logarithm of the
dependent variables, all of these control
variables are differentiated and taken log.
Internal factors are bank specific variables
that may influence the productivity of the
banks. In our model, these factors include:
(1) Total income (asset), as the indicator
of bank scale. According to the firm
theory， for each industry, there is an optimal
scale of production. For firms smaller than
this optimal level of scale, increasing the
scale of production will increase their
productivities. On the other hand, for firms
larger than this optimal level of scale, the
increasing the scale of production will have
negative effects on their productivities. For
81

'
t

ln T = zβ + u t ,
ln S = zβ 's + u s ,
St . ln M = ln E + ln T + ln S

Utilizing the constraint, only three out of the
four equations can be estimated. I omitted
the equation for pure efficiency changes and
estimate the remained three equation using
OLS method. The coefficients of the omitted
equation for pure efficiency and their
significance levels can be deduced from the
estimated models. The vector of coefficient
of the equation for LnE is: β e = β m − βt − β s
and

their

corresponding

variance

is:

VAR (β e ) = VAR(β m ) + VAR (βt ) + VAR(β s ) .

With the estimate and its variances, it is easy
to obtain its significance level. However,
because the variances of the estimates are
larger than those obtained by traditional
method, its significant level will be
underestimated. In this case bootstrapping

each

coefficient:

β*e = β*m − β*t − β*s

.

The

bootstrapping significant level can be
estimated by using the quantile approach
described above.
The paper is especially interested in the
effects of M&A incidences on the
productivity changes. I set dummies to
capture the effects of M&A. It may take
times for the participant banks to integrate
their operations and cultures. Therefore, the
effects of M&A on productivities of the
involved banks may at first decrease, then
gradually increase and finally will disappear.
To capture this dynamics the paper set 4 time
dummies (date01, date02, date03 and
if shinkin
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regional institutions like shinkin banks, their
business is limited in a relative small area;
thus we should expect their optimum scale to
be much smaller than national financial
institutions. Due to these considerations the
sign of the variable is hard to be determined
in advance.
(2) Risk level indices. Since risk taking
behaviors and the profits of banks are
correlated, these indices certainly will have
effects on the productivities of shinkin
banks. The paper chooses three indices as the
indicators of risk taking.
(2.1) Risk adjusted capital adequacy
ratio (CAR), the capital/risk weighted asset
ratio defined by the Basle Accord. The sign
of this coefficient is not easy to predict.
Higher CAR ratio means a larger proportion
of bank fund is not used in more profitable
projects. This is detrimental to the
productivity. On the other hand, a strong
capital position makes it possible for banks
to take riskier projects. This will improve
their productivities. The results of empirical
studies in this field are mixed.
(2.2) Non-performing loans/ total
loans ratio (npl); higher NPL ratio will
reduce the productivities of the banks, thus
this variable should have negative effects on
the change of productivities
(2.3) Loan loss provisions / total loan
ratio (lp). The effects of this variable are
similar to that of CAR.
(4)
Indices
of
administration
efficiency, an efficient administration will
reduce the cost of production and strengthen
the control of risk. Thus it will certainly have
effects on the productivities of shinkin
banks. Following Horie (2010), this paper
includes three indicators of administration
efficiency in the model:
(4.1) Labor efficiency of the
headquarter (LH): the numbers of staffs in
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the headquarter divided by the numbers of
offices in headquarter.
(4.2) Organizational efficiency (NH):
Number of department in the Headquarter /
number of branches.
The two variables reflect the
efficiency of headquarters. The higher the
ratios, the higher the operating expense of
headquarter is. However， higher ratio also
reflects higher ability of supervision and risk
control. Therefore the sign of these two
variables are not predetermined.
(4.3) efficiency of the Branch (LB):
average number of employees per branch:
This variable reflects labor efficiency of
branches. Thus it should have negative
effects on productivities.
External factors are those variables out of the
control of the banks that affects the
productivity of the shinkin banks. All of
these factors are indicators of operating
areas. Operating areas is the economic and
social environment in which a bank operates.
As a kind of regional financial institution,
shinkin bank’s activities are limited in a
specific geographic area. Unlike large
financial institutions which operate in a
national scope, the economy of the region
over which a shinkin bank operates plays a
key role in the determination of its
productivities (Horie 2010). In the model of
this paper I use several economic and social
variables as the indicators of operating area.
These variables include:
(1) Sharei : the ratio of the number of
branches of shinkin bank i to the total
number of branches of all financial
institutions operating in the same region -an
indicator of market power of shinkin banks.
The role of market power in the
determination of productivity changes is not
certain. On one hand, high market power
may discourage a bank to improve its
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efficiency and technology, thus its
productivity growth rate may be low; on the
other hand, high market power also gives
bank high price fixing ability; therefore its
productivity growth rate measured in value
terms may be high. Due to these conflicting
effects, the sign of market power indicators
in the model is not easy to be pre-assumed.
The model also includes three indicators for
the level of regional economic activities:
(2.1) yi : The taxable personal income of
the region in which shinkin bank i operates.
(2.2) instii : The number of enterprises of
the region in which shinkin bank i operates.
(2.3) manui : The value of manufactures
of the region in which shinkin bank i
operates.
It is reasonably predicted that banks operate
in areas which have high economic activities
should have high rate of productivity growth;
Thus these three variables all should have
positive effects on the productivity growth.
Population problem now is a key factor that
influencing the Japanese economy. Thus the
model specially includes two indicators of
the characters of population in the region:
(3.1) popi : The population density of the
region in which shinkin bank i operates.
High density of population normally
indicates more members and customers for
the shinkin banks. Therefore it should have
positive effects on productivity changes.
(3.2) oldi : The proportion of aged
families to the total number of families in the
region in which shinkin bank i operates.
High proportion of aged families is
disadvantageous for the regional economy.
Thus this variable should have negative
effects on productivity changes of the banks.
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I use “city, town or village” (shi, mura or
machi) as the unit of region. Since many
shinkin banks operate over more than one
city, I use weighted average of city statistics
of the above variables as the indicator of
operating area. The weight is the ratio of the
number of branches in city i of shinkin bank
j to the total number of branches of bank j in
year t.
Since the scale of city is different, it is
questionable to treat each city equally. To
avoid this problem, the three quantity
variables for economic activities are
expressed in term of value per acreage.
Because external variables are weighted
average, thus the change of these variables
for a shinkin bank can be originated either
from the change of the variables themselves
in each city or the change of weights of each
city in which the shinkin bank operate.
Data and variables
A. The estimation of Malmquist index and
choice of inputs and outputs
Data of the inputs and outputs for the
estimation for Malmquist index comes from
the annual income statement of the shinkin
banks from FY 2005 to FY 2008. The data is
obtained from the database of Nikkei
NEED19.
In the estimation of productivity changes,
one difficult problem is the choice of time
length. To let the effects of M&A fully
exposed, the paper chooses a 3 year time
length.
Another difficult problem encountered is the
merging, acquisition (M&A) and closing
down of the DMUs. As mentioned in the
19

This database is offered by the Company “Japanese

Economic News” (Nihon keizai Shimbon, Nikkei.)
The database includes various kinds of financial and
economic data. FY 2001 and FY 2008 are the
beginning and end year of the database when the
paper is written.
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introduction, to avoid this problem, I delete
all of those banks which have been involved
in the M&A activities or have been closed
down during the period of comparison. After
doing so, the number of samples for the
period of FY 2005 to FY 2008 is reduced
from 303 to 261.
One of the serious problems of the DEA
analysis is that it is very sensitive to outliers.
Here I use an approach suggested by Wilson
(1993) to detect and delete the outliers from
our samples.. This method is specially
designed for non-parametric frontier
models20. By using this technique, 5 outliers
have been detected in the period of FY 2005
to FY 2008 and the number of sample is
further reduced from 261 to 256.
For the choice of output and input, the
method used in this research is similar to the
production approach. As in Horie (2010), the
paper uses value rather than the volume of
output and input as the measure of scales.
Since the scope of business of shinkin banks
is not as wide as that of large financial
institutions in Japan, I focus on the credit
services provided by shinkin banks, which
accounts for more than 70% of the current
incomes of most shinkin banks. In the
income statement of shinkin banks, the credit
activities are reflected under the entry of
“Income on funds managed”. I group items
under this entry of income into two products:
A single item in the entry called “Interests
from loans”, which is the interest incomes
from loans, forms the first product. It is the
largest source of the interest income of
shinkin banks. Meanwhile, other items in the
entry, such as interest incomes from call
loans, bonds and deposits in other financial
institutions, are aggregated to form the
20

The technique details of the method are not given in
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second product called “other interest
income.”
The paper uses net income rather than total
(raw) income as output. That is, we deduct
expenses on raising funds for a given credit
from income gained from such credit. In this
way, we not only reduce one input in the
model but also avoid the difficult problem of
treating deposits in the model, which is a
major
difference
between
different
approaches. Interest earned from deposits is
treated as income, whereas interest paid to
depositors is treated as expenses incurred in
the production of credit products
Unfortunately, there are no separate entries
of expenses for each of the two products. All
expenses are aggregated under a single entry
“Fund Raising Expenses”. To get the
corresponding expense for each of the two
products, following Horie (2010), I divide
this single entry into two entries by the
weight of each product on the total interest
incomes; thus the equations for the two
products
are
as
follows
NYL = YL -

YL
CI
YI

NYNL = YNL -

YNL
CI
YI

(7)
(8)

where:
NYL =net interest from loans;
NYNL = net other interest income;
YL = total interest income from loans;
YNL = total other interest income;
YI = YL + YNL = total interest income; and
CI = total fund raising expenses.

the paper due to the limitation of space, interested
authors can refer to the paper by Wilson (1993).
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In the input side, also two inputs are
selected: One is the labor expenses. In the
income statement of shinkin banks, these
expenses are recorded under the entry “Labor
expenses”; however, this entry only includes
the expenses on the formal employees. In
recent years, like in other Japanese
corporations, informal workers have
accounted for an increasingly large
proportion of the employees in the shinkin
banks. Expenses on these employees are
included in the entry called “General
expenses”. Due to the lack of information, it
is impossible to segregate expenses on
informal employees from general expenses
and add them to labor expenses. Thus we
should keep in mind that labor expenses do
not include all of the cost of labor inputs for
shinkin banks.
Another input used in this research is fixed
expenses, which roughly correspond to
capital input for shinkin banks. This input is
the combination of two expense entries in the
income statement of the shinkin banks:
“General expenses” and “expenses on
service transactions”. General expenses
include rents for stores, depreciation,
expenses on advertisements, deposit
insurance fees, outsourcing expenses, and
expense on informal employees, among
others. Expenses on service transactions
include expenses on financial services by the
shinkin banks for their financial activities.
This entry is neither large enough to be
considered as a separate input nor too small
to be ignored. Since these expenses are
similar to some of the general expenses (e.g.,
outsourcing expenses and expenses on
informal employees), I added them to
general expenses.
The calculations involve data across time,
making the inflation effect a necessary
concern. To eliminate this effect, the paper
uses the GDP deflator to deflate the data
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with the beginning year of the sample period
as 100.
Table 1 summarized the descriptive statistics
of the inputs and outputs used in this paper:
Table I, Descriptive statistics of inputs and
outputs
From table 1, it is easy to see that the scale
of business of the sample banks significantly
increased during the sample period, however,
the variance of scale among the banks also
enlarged.
B. Explanatory variables in the second
stage model
All of the data about the internal variables
come from the Nikki database and the
yearbooks “The Japan financial directory”
published also by Nikki. The descriptive
statistics
of
internal
variables
are
summarized in table 2:
Table II Descriptive statistics of the growth
rate of internal variables
The data about the market share are obtained
from the yearbooks “The Japan financial
directory”. Other external data come from
the “Regional Statistics Database” offered in
the official website of the statistics of the
Japan (www.e-stat.go.jp). Unfortunately not
every year of the data for some external
variables is available. Thus the end year for
the variable insti is 2009. The end year for
pdensity and old are 2010 respectively. Table
3 shows the descriptive statistics of the
external variables.
Table III Descriptive statistics of the growth
rate of the external variables
Because the external variables are weighted
averages of the “shi”s which shinkin banks
operate, their growth rates reveal both the
changes of the variables and the geographical
structure of the shinkin banks.
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The results and their explanation
A. The results for the Malmquist index
estimation
We use a package of the software R called
FEAR to estimate the Malmquist index. It
was designed by P. W. Wilson (2008)
particularly for the purposes of DEA. The
descriptive statistics of the estimation of
Malmquist index and its three components
for the period of FY 2005 - FY 2008 are
outlined in table 4.
Table III
Descriptive Statistics of the
Malmquist results
For the case of hyperbolic-oriented distance
measurement, higher score of Malmquist
index and its components means lower
growth. It is easy to find that in the sample
period productivity has significantly
decreased. The means and medians of the
Malmquist index and two of its three
components are all above 1. However, the
scale economy has significantly improved
during the period. The results confirm the
impression we got from the descriptive
statistics of the internal environmental
variables in table 2.
B. The results of the second stage model
and their explanation
The results of the second stage model are
summarized in table 5.
Table V Estimation results of the second
stage model
All of the models have low adjusted R 2 . The
models of Fried et al.(1999) , Ralson et al.
(2001) and Horie (2010) also have this
problem. Nevertheless some interesting
conclusions can still be drawn.
We first check the four time dummies for
M&A. From table 5 we see that they are all
insignificant for the Malmquist index.
However, when we look at the components,
we see a different picture. For the technical
efficiency， date04 is significant (at 5%
level). date03 is weakly significant (at 10%
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level) only in the bootstrapping results. In
the equation for scale efficiency, date04 is
highly significant (at 1% level). In the cases
that the coefficients are significant, for LnT,
the signs are negative, indicating M&A
incidences in the year of FY 2001-FY 2004
have positive effects on the technical
efficiency. This is in line with the market
power hypothesis. However, for LnS, the
signs are positive. This may indicate that
many banks formed after M&A are
oversized. The coefficient of date04 is also
much more significant in all equations. In the
deduced results for LnE, the four time
dummies are all insignificant. This tells that
the M&A incidences have no significant
effect on the changes of pure efficiency. The
controversial effects of M&A incidences on
LnT and LnS plus its insignificant effects on
LnE may be the major reason why time
dummies are all insignificant in the equation
for LnM. As for the dynamics of the effects,
the latest M&A cases have the most
significant effects on these components.
The paper then checks other variables which
may be related with the M&A activities.
First of all, M&A activities will increase
bank scale. For the Malmquist index, the
variable “dlnasset” (change of bank income)
is only weakly significant both in the original
and bootstrapping results (all at 10% level).
However, it is highly significant in the
equations for technical and scale efficiency
(all at 1% level). It is insignificant in the
deduced results for pure efficiency. In case
of the total score and scale economy, the
signs of the coefficients are negative. This
indicates that most shinkin banks are in the
position of increasing returns of scale and the
increasing of scale has positive effects on
their productivity changes and scale
economy. On the other hand, in the equation
for the technical efficiency, the sign of the
coefficient is positive, which means bank
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scale has negative effects on technical
efficiency changes, which support the
hypothesis that large banks lack the motive
for technical progress. Combined with
insignificance of the LnE, it is not surprising
the variable is less significant in the equation
for Malmquist index than in the equations for
the two components. The results are
consistent with the findings of Al-Sharkas et
al. (2008) and Hahn (2007).
As mentioned in the introduction, M&A may
also cause the reduction of overcapacity and
redundant labors. Thus they may bring out
administration structure changes. For the
three indices of administration efficiency,
only dlnNH (number of department in
headquarter/ number of branches) is weakly
significant (at 10% level) in the equation for
lnM, both in the original estimation and the
bootstrapping results. Some variables are so
insignificant in some equations that they are
omitted from the corresponding equations.
M&A also may strengthen the market power
of the acquiring or merging banks. The sign
of the variable dLnshare (market power of
the shinkin banks) is positive in the equation
for the total score, scale economy and the
reduced results for the pure efficiency. This
supports the hypothesis that market
concentration has negative effects on the
change of total productivity, pure efficiency
and scale economy. On the other hand, in the
equation for technical efficiency changes, its
sign is negative, which is against the
hypothesis the banks with market power are
reluctant in adopting new technologies.
However, they are all insignificant, whether
according to the original estimation or the
bootstrapping results. This means the change
of market share has no significant effects on
the productivity changes and its components.
Though it is not our purpose, it is also
interesting to check the results for other
variables. For internal factors, the variable
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“dlnlp” (Loan loss provisions ratio) is only
weakly significant (at 10% level) in the
equation for dlnM. Its sign is positive. This
means loan loss provisions have negative
effects on the productivity changes. The
variable “dlnCAR” (change of capital
adequacy ratio) are significant for the
Malmquist index and pure efficiency. In the
equations which it is significant, its sign is
negative, indicating that change of CAR ratio
has positive effects on the productivity
changes and pure efficiency. This support the
hypothesis that high capital position makes
shinkin banks take riskier but also more
profitable strategies. The variable “dlnnpl”
(change of NPL ratio) is significant only for
the scale economy. Its sign is positive,
indicating that increase of NPL ratio has
negative effects for the change of scale
economy. This is easy to understand, since
banks with high npl ratio are constraint in
their ability to increase their assets and
exploit the economy of scale.
The paper next checks the effects of external
variables on productivity changes. The
variable dlny (the change of taxable income)
is only significant for the Malmquist index.
In all equations, its signs are negative. This
supports the hypothesis that shinkin banks
which located in an area with higher
economic growth rate will have higher
growth rate of productivity and technical
efficiency.
For the indicators of economic activities, the
variable d ln instii (the change of the number
of enterprises) is only significant for LnS
(only

for

original

results).

d ln manui

(change of value of manufactures) are
significant in varied degrees for the
equations of LnM, LnS and LnE. But in
some equations the signs of the variables are
not what we expected.
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For the two indicators about the population,
the variable dlnpop (change of the population
density) is significant only for LnS.
However, in that equation its sign is positive.
This means the growth rate of population
density has negative effects on the growth of
the scale economy. This is not what we
assumed. The variable dlnold (the change of
proportion of aged families) is insignificant
for all the equations. In all equations its sign
is negative. This means shinkin banks in the
area with high growth rate of aging
population have high rate of productivity
growth. Again this is not what we assumed.
However, some other researchers (Dietsch
and Lozano-Vivas, 2008) also got the same
contradictory results for efficiency analysis.
Conclusions
This paper at first estimates the productivity
changes of shinkin banks in Japan during the
period of FY 2005-FY 2008 and then
investigates the effects of M&A activities on
these changes. The paper finds that on
average the productivities of shinkin banks

ISSN 2229 – 6891

have significantly decreased. Their pure and
technical efficiencies also decreased.
However, their economies of scale have
significantly increased. It finds that merger
incidents have significant effects only on the
growth of the two components (technical and
scale efficiency). It also discovers that the
merger incidents occurred in FY 2004 have
stronger effects on these two components.
This may be because it is closest to the
examined period.
Some other factors which are closely related
to the M&A also have significant effects on
the productivity change and its components.
The indicator of change of bank scale is
significant for all the three equations. The
indicator of change of market share is
significant for two of the three equations.
All these results prove that the M&A
activities occurred during the early years of
2000s have significant effects on the
productivity changes and its components in
shinkin banks. Thus they may offer some
support for the policies of encouraging M&A
activities.

Figure 1: number of M&A cases among shinkin banks in 2000s
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Sources of data： Annual reports of shinkin banks by Central shinkin banks
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Table I Descriptive statistics of inputs and outputs
Unit： million yen
y11
397
1531
2902
4808
5660
31510
5478

Min.
1st Qu.
Median
Mean
3rd Qu.
Max.
sd

y12
63
422.5
998.5
1475
1898
11880
1589

x11
354
966.5
1807
2873
3434
18280
3001

x12
202
698.2
1314
2161
2676
14030
2401

y21
287
1372
2528
4318
5088
26390
4936

y22
136
519.5
1079
1666
2217
11050
1723

x21
303
1014
1827
2835
3359
17980
2948

x22
212
710.2
1297
2178
2618
14220
2457

Note:
y11=Net interest from loans in FY 2005

y21=Net interest from loans in FY 2008

y12= Net other interest income in FY 2005 y22= Net other interest income in FY 2008
x11= Labor expenses in FY 2005

x21= General expenses in FY 2008

x12= Labor expenses in FY 2005

x22= General expenses in FY 2008

Min, Median, Mean, Max and SD are the minimum, median, mean, max, and standard deviation of the
sample, respectively.
Table II Descriptive statistics of the growth rate of internal variables
Unit: %
Min.
1st Qu.
Median
Mean
3rd Qu.
Max.
sd

LH
-35.110
-7.360
1.391
5.899
13.110
253.300
25.783

LB
-40.260
-7.536
-1.925
-1.015
4.235
127.800
12.719

NH
-100.000
-1.161
4.555
8.622
17.040
160.000
29.218

Asset
-9.457
1.202
3.832
4.441
7.801
23.180
5.408

lp
-78.800
-30.800
-8.363
4.951
21.050
617.500
67.440

CAR
-59.750
-3.762
6.567
5.355
16.730
58.070
18.043

npl
-70.670
-36.970
-24.310
-19.360
-11.060
116.500
27.219

Note: variables are defined as in section II C. Min, Median, Mean, Max and sd are defined as in table I.
Table III Descriptive statistics of the growth rate of the external variables
Unit: %
share

income

institute

manu

pop

old

Min.

-70.00

-56.09

-57.24

-28.70

-87.21

-38.16

1st Qu.

-4.58

1.83

-1.39

0.59

-3.68

9.53

Median
Mean
3rd Qu.

0.00
0.15
3.20

5.04
7.27
8.91

1.08
12.70
4.10

10.18
13.36
19.52

-0.83
0.49
2.04

12.89
14.19
15.52

Max.

125.30

388.30

2177.00

387.30

309.60

199.00

var

14.69

27.58

138.36

30.30

23.55

17.23
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Table IV Descriptive Statistics of the Malmquist results
malm

pure

tech

scale

Min.
1st Qu.
Median
Mean
3rd Qu.
Max.

0.9509
1.001
1.034
1.035
1.06
1.217

0.9066
0.9783
1.001
1.01
1.04
1.206

0.9867
1.021
1.038
1.037
1.051
1.09

0.8937
0.9758
0.9939
0.9896
1.001
1.068

sd

0.046

0.048

0.02

0.046

Note:
malm = malmquist index;

pure= pure efficiency score;

tech= technical efficiency score

scale = scale economy score

Table V Estimation results of the second stage model
LnM
Original
(Intercept)
dlnasset
dlnlp
dlnCAR
dlnnpl
dlnLH

LnT
Boot

Original

0.03116

0.00377

0.03359

(0.00615) ***

(0.00569)***

(0.00204)***

-0.09079

-0.19115

0.06126

(0.05320 )*

(0.05139)*

(0.02315)***

-0.0074

-0.01514

0.00564

(0.00786)

(0.00763)

(0.00336)*

-0.03787

-0.0379

(0.01550)**

(0.01520)***

-0.00821

-0.00724

-0.00556

(0.01208)

(0.01162)

(0.00533)

0.00975

0.00983

-0.00759

(0.01431)

-0.01374

(0.00632)

dlnLB

-0.00947
(0.01063)

dlnNH

-0.01411

-0.01735

-0.00388

(0.00848)*

(0.00791)*

(0.00376)

-0.01543

-0.01438

-0.00912

(0.01332)

(0.01310)

(0.00589)

date02

0.01067

0.01917

0.00192

(0.00897)

(0.00849)

(0.00394)

date03

-0.00014

0.01379

-0.00811

(0.01140)

(0.01097)

(0.00502)

-0.01109

-0.0149

-0.01639

(0.01684)

(0.01645)

(0.00739)**

date01

date04

LnS
boot

0.03361
(0.00197)***
0.06126
(0.02217)***

Original

boot

0.00141

0.0013

(0.00373)

(0.00366)

-0.14101

-0.1383

(0.03077)***

(0.03030)***

-0.00458

-0.00463

(0.00454)

(0.00415)

0.01432

0.01378

(0.00895)

(0.00848)

0.02416

0.02418

(0.00699)***

(0.00661)***

-0.00778
(0.00609)

0.01161

0.01144

(0.00822)

(0.00806)

-0.00948
(0.01007)

-0.01342

-0.01312

(0.01384)

(0.01353)

0.01039

0.01043

(0.00770)

(0.00725)

-0.00086

-0.00078

(0.00518)

(0.00489)

-0.00089

-0.00077

(0.00659)

(0.00640)

0.03002

0.02988

(0.00974)***

(0.00949)***

0.00561
(0.00331)*

-0.00567
(0.00515)

-0.00397
(0.00367)
-0.00912
(0.00572)
0.00192
(0.00387)
-0.00784
(0.00472)*
-0.01609
(0.00730)**
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dlnshare
dlny

0.03428

0.03697

-0.00939

(0.02327)

(0.02293)

(0.01019)

-0.00966

-0.01931

-0.00415

(0.01122)**

(0.01090)

(0.00486)

dlninsti

0.00684
(0.00493)

dlnmanu
Dlnpop

Dlnold
Adjusted Rsquared

dlnasset
dlnlp
dlnCAR

(0.00754)*

0.0229

-0.00979

-0.00982

0.01826

0.01846

(0.01744)

(0.01663)

(0.00693)

(0.00677)

(0.01008 )*

(0.00950)**

0.01484

-0.00826

-0.0078

-0.00793

(0.02964)

(0.02703)

(0.02023)

(0.01933)

0.04283

0.05011
Original
-0.00384

-0.00379

(0.00748)

(0.00740)

-0.01103

-0.01389

(0.06567)

(0.06661)

-0.00846

-0.00857

(0.00968)

(0.00933)

-0.05219

-0.05209

(0.01494) *

（ 0.01462） *

0.00708

(0.01767)

(0.01796)

0.02289

0.0226

(0.01745)

(0.01749)

-0.01023

-0.0108

(0.00927)

(0.00896)

dlny

(0.00911)

-0.00354

0.00572

dlnshare

-0.00631

(0.00769)*

-0.0125

dlnLH

date04

(0.00602)

-0.01264
-0.0061

-0.02647

date03

(0.00657)

(0.00922)

-0.02682

date02

-0.0077

0.03825

(0.01783) ***

date01

(0.01303)

-0.00776

(0.01560)**

(0.01789) ***

dlnNH

0.00697
(0.00466)

0.01936

(0.01353)

0.03326

dlnnpl

dlnLB

-0.00415
(0.00462)

0.01941

(0.01586)

LnE
(Intercept)

-0.009
(0.00987)
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-0.01669

-0.01652

(0.01648)

(0.01614)

0.00961

0.00943

(0.01108)

(0.01067)

0.00886

0.00894

(0.01409)

(0.01381)

-0.02472

-0.02389

(0.02081)

(0.02034)

0.02426

0.02309

(0.02878)

(0.02823)

0.00225

0.00211

(0.01388)

(0.01336)

0.1326
boot
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dlninsti
dlnmanu
dlnpdensity

dlnold

0.0058

ISSN 2229 – 6891

-0.00066

(0.00913)

(0.00989)

0.03936

0.04581

(0.01835) ***

（ 0.01692） ***

-0.01201

-0.01209

(0.02130)

(0.02079)

0.02264

0.02354

(0.03589)

(0.03481)

Adjusted R-squared
Note: a． ***: significant at 1% level., **: significant at 5% level. *: significant at 10 % level
b. figure in bracket is the standard error of the estimated coefficient.
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